By John Wear
Published: 2020-05-07
The Treaty of Versailles is
sometimes said to have been the beginning of World War II. The Versailles
Treaty crushed Germany beneath a burden of shame and reparations, stole vital
German territories, and rendered Germany defenseless against enemies from within
and without. Britain’s David Lloyd George warned the treaty makers at
Versailles: “If peace is made under these conditions, it will be the source of
a new war.”[1]
Unfairness of the Versailles
Treaty
In an address to Congress on
January 8, 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson set forth his Fourteen Points as
a blueprint to peacefully end World War I. The main principles of Wilson’s
Fourteen Points were a non-vindictive peace, national self-determination,
government by the consent of the governed, an end to secret treaties, and an
association of nations strong enough to check aggression and keep the peace in
the future. Germany decided to end World War I by signing an armistice
agreement on November 11, 1918, which bound the Allies to make the final peace
treaty conform to Wilson’s Fourteen Points.[2]
The Treaty of Versailles
presented to German officials, however, was a deliberate violation of the
armistice agreement. The Allied representatives at Versailles decided that
Germany should lose all of her colonies. All private property of German
citizens in German colonies was also forfeited.[3]
Even worse, the Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to cede 73,485 square
kilometers of her territory in Europe, inhabited by 7,325,000 people, to
neighboring states. Germany lost 75% of her production of zinc ore, 74.8% of
iron ore, 7.7% of lead ore, 28.7% of coal, and 4% of potash. Of her annual
agricultural production, Germany lost 19.7% in potatoes, 18.2% in rye, 17.2% in
barley, 12.6% in wheat, and 9.6% in oats. The Saar and other regions to the
west of the Rhine were occupied by foreign troops and were to remain occupied
for 15 years until a plebiscite was held. Germany had to pay the total costs of
3.64 billion gold marks to fund the Allied occupation of the Saar.[4]
Article 231 of the Treaty of
Versailles placed upon Germany the sole responsibility “for causing all the
loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their
nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by
the aggression of Germany and her allies.” This so-called “war-guilt clause”
was fundamentally unfair and aroused deep resentment among virtually all
Germans. It linked Germany’s obligations to pay reparations with a blanket
self-condemnation to which almost no German could subscribe.[5]
The Allies under the
Versailles Treaty could set reparations at any amount they wanted. In 1920, the
Allies set the final bill for reparations at the impossible sum of 269 billion
gold marks. The Allied Reparations Committee in 1921 lowered the amount of
reparations to 132 billion gold marks, or approximately $33 billion – still an
unrealistic demand.[6]
The Versailles Treaty also
forced Germany to disarm almost completely. The treaty abolished the general
draft, prohibited all artillery and tanks, allowed a volunteer army of only
100,000 troops and officers, and abolished the air force. The navy was reduced
to six capital ships, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats,
15,000 men and 500 officers. After the delivery of its remaining navy to the
Allies, Germany also had to hand over its merchant ships to the victors with
only a few exceptions. All German rivers had to be internationalized and
overseas cables ceded to the victors. An international committee oversaw the
process of Germany’s disarmament until 1927.[7]
Germany eventually signed the
Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, because she faced death by starvation
and invasion if she refused to sign the treaty. Germany could not feed her
people because U.S. warships supported an Allied naval blockade against
Germany, and Germany’s merchant ships and even Baltic fishing boats were
sequestered. Germany’s request to buy 2.5 million tons of food was also denied
by the Allies. With German families starving, Bolshevik uprisings occurring in
several German cities, Trotsky’s Red Army driving into Europe, Czechs and Poles
ready to strike from the east, and Allied forces prepared to march on Berlin,
Germany was forced to sign the treaty.[8]
Despite the unfairness of the
Treaty of Versailles, its provisions remained in effect and were formally
confirmed by the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928. Germans regarded the
provisions of the Versailles Treaty as chains of slavery that had to be broken.
One German commented in regard to the Versailles Treaty, “The will to break the
chains of slavery will be implanted from childhood on.”[9]
Adolf Hitler referred to the Versailles Treaty in Mein Kampf as “…a
scandal and a disgrace…the dictate signified an act of highway robbery against
our people.”[10] Hitler was committed to
breaking the chains of Versailles when he came to power in Germany in 1933.
Initial Steps to Break the
Chains of Versailles
Hitler’s first success in
breaking the chains of Versailles was a legal victory in the Saar plebiscite on
January 13, 1935. This highly industrialized region had been detached from
Germany and placed under the administration of the League of Nations by the
Treaty of Versailles. The terms of the Versailles Treaty called for a
plebiscite after 15 years with three choices: return to Germany, annexation by
France, or continuation of League of Nations rule.[11]
In an unquestionably free election, the vote was 477,119 in favor of
union with Germany and only 46,613 in favor of the continuance of the existing
regime.[12] Despite offering the Saar
citizens a number of tax and customs advantages if they decided to become part
of France, only 0.40% of voters voted to join France; 8.85% voted for
independence of the Saar, and 90.75% voted for union with Germany.[13]
The Saar inhabitants, who
voted overwhelmingly to return to Germany were mostly industrial workers – Social
Democrats or Roman Catholics. They knew what awaited them in Germany: a
dictatorship, the destruction of trade unions, and restrictions on freedom of
expression.[14] They knew of the
establishment of the Dachau Prison Camp and the execution of scores of SA
members in the Röhm purge on June 30, 1934. The German economy in January 1935
was also not substantially better than that of France or other countries in
Europe. The Saar election was evidence that the appeal of German nationalism
was powerful.
Hitler began an assault on the
Versailles provisions with the creation of a German air force on March 9, 1935.
On March 16, 1935, Hitler announced the restoration of compulsory military
service. Germany regarded the army of the Soviet Union at 960,000 men as
excessively large, and France had recently increased the terms of service in
her armies. Hitler wanted to increase German military strength to 550,000
troops because of this Franco-Russian threat.[15]
Germany continued to modify
the Versailles provisions by signing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement on June
18, 1935. This treaty fixed the size of the German fleet at 35% of the total
tonnage of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Germany could also build a
submarine force equal to that of Great Britain. Hitler was elated with this
agreement. Hitler had dreamed of an Anglo-German alliance ever since he had
fought Britain in World War I. Britain’s naval treaty with Germany also
effectively undermined the Stresa Front that Britain had established with
France and Italy earlier in 1935.[16]
Germany was forbidden under
the Treaty of Versailles to build fortifications or maintain troops in a wide
demilitarized zone along its western frontier. This arrangement made the vital
Ruhr and Rhineland industrial areas vulnerable to a swift attack from France.
The Treaty of Locarno, of which Britain and Italy were co-guarantors, also
endorsed the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Hitler challenged this
limitation when he sent troops into the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. Although
this was a major gamble by Hitler, France was unwilling to challenge Hitler
without British support. Britain was unwilling to authorize anything resembling
war because there was a general feeling in Britain that Germany was only
asserting a right of sovereignty within her own borders.[17]
Germany was now able to
protect her western borders by constructing the Siegfried Line. Lloyd George,
the former prime minister of Great Britain, commended Hitler in the House of
Commons for having reoccupied the Rhineland to protect his country:
France
had built the most gigantic fortifications ever seen in any land, where, almost
a hundred feet underground you can keep an army of over 100,000 and where you
have guns that can fire straight into Germany. Yet the Germans are supposed to
remain without even a garrison, without a trench…If Herr Hitler had allowed
that to go on without protecting his country, he would have been a traitor to
the Fatherland.[18]
On later meeting Hitler, Lloyd
George was “spellbound by Hitler’s astonishing personality and manner” and
referred to Hitler as “indeed a great man. Führer is the proper name for him,
for he is a born leader – yes, a statesman.”[19]
Other British statesmen were
also impressed with Hitler. In a book published in 1937, Winston Churchill
expressed his “admiration for the courage, the perseverance, and the vital
force which enabled [Hitler] to challenge, defy, conciliate, or overcome, all
the authorities or resistances which barred his path.”[20]
Hitler and his Nazis had shown “their patriotic ardor and love of country.”[21]
Churchill also wrote: “Those
who have met Herr Hitler face to face have found a highly competent, cool,
well-informed functionary with an agreeable manner, a disarming smile, and few
have been unaffected by a subtle personal magnetism. Nor is this impression
merely the dazzle of power. He exerted it on his companions at every stage in
his struggle, even when his fortunes were in the lowest depths.”[22]
By March 1936 Germany had
taken important steps in overcoming the provisions of the Versailles Treaty.
Hitler made no more moves in Europe for the next two years. Until 1938,
Hitler’s foreign policy moves had been bold but not reckless. From the point of
view of the Western Powers, his methods constituted unconventional diplomacy
whose aims were recognizably in accord with traditional German nationalist clamor.[23]
The Anschluss
The victors at the Paris Peace
Conference had wanted to divide rather than unify Austria and Germany. Austria
had asked Allied permission at the Paris Peace Conference to enter into a
free-trade zone with Germany. Austria’s request was denied. As far back as
April and May of 1921, plebiscites on a union with Germany were held in Austria
at the Tyrol and at Salzburg. The votes in the Tyrol were over 140,000 for the Anschluss
and only 1,794 against. In Salzburg, more than 100,000 voted for union with
Germany and only 800 against.[24] Despite
the overwhelming desire of Austrians to join with Germany, the Treaty of St.
Germain signed by Austria after World War I prevented the union.
Under the treaties of
Versailles and St. Germain, Germany and Austria could not even enter into a
customs union without permission from the League of Nations. In 1931, hard-hit
by the Great Depression, Germany asked again for permission to form an Austro-German
customs union. The League of Nations denied Germany’s request. Germany later
requested an end to its obligation to pay war reparations under Versailles
because of Germany’s economic crisis caused by the Great Depression. Germany’s
request was again refused. Many historians believe the resulting economic
distress contributed to the rapid rise of National Socialists to power in
Germany.[25] The Allied refusals also
frustrated the desire of German and Austrian nationalists to exercise their
right of self-determination.
Edward Frederick Lindley Wood
(Lord Halifax) gave Hitler encouragement to peacefully incorporate Austria into
Germany at Berchtesgaden on November 19, 1937. Lord Halifax brought up the
important questions of Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia on his own initiative
without any prompting from Hitler. Halifax told Hitler that Great Britain
realized that the Paris Treaties of 1919 contained mistakes that had to be
rectified.[26] Halifax stated that Britain
would not go to war to prevent an Anschluss with Austria, a transfer of the
Sudetenland to Germany, or a return of Danzig to the Reich. Britain might even
be willing to serve as an honest broker in effecting the return of what
rightfully belonged to Germany, if this was all done in a gentlemanly fashion.[27]
British historian A. J. P.
Taylor wrote:
This was
exactly what Hitler wanted... Halifax’s remarks, if they had any practical
sense, were an invitation to Hitler to promote German nationalist agitation in
Danzig, Czechoslovakia, and Austria; an assurance also that his agitation would
not be opposed from without. Nor did these promptings come from Halifax alone.
In London, Eden told Ribbentrop: “People in Europe recognized that a closer
connection between Germany and Austria would have to come about sometime.” The
same news came from France. Papen, on a visit to Paris, “was amazed to note”
that Chautemps, the premier, and Bonnet, then finance minister, “considered a
reorientation of French policy in Central Europe as entirely open to discussion…”
They had “no objection to a marked extension of German influence in Austria
obtained through evolutionary means”; nor in Czechoslovakia “on the basis of a
reorganization into a nation of nationalities.”[28]
Lord Halifax’s message to
Hitler underscores a crucial point in the history of this era: Hitler’s agenda
was no surprise to European diplomats. Any German nationalist would demand
adjustments to the frontiers laid down at Versailles. With Great Britain’s
approval of the peaceful annexation of Austria into Germany, the problem was
how to get the Austrians to peacefully agree to unification with Germany.
Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg would soon force the issue.[29]
Since the summer of 1934,
Austria had been governed by a conservative dictatorship headed by Dr. Kurt von
Schuschnigg. Schuschnigg persecuted Austrians who favored unification with
Germany. Political dissidents landed in concentration camps, and the regime
denied persons of “deficient civic reliability” the right to practice their
occupation.[30]
In January 1938, Austrian
police discovered plans of some Austrian National Socialists to overthrow
Schuschnigg in violation of a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” entered into with Germany
on July 11, 1936. Schuschnigg met with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on February 12,
1938, complaining of the attempted overthrow of his government by Austrian
National Socialists. Hitler and Schuschnigg reached an agreement that day, but
Schuschnigg claimed that Hitler had been violent in manner during the first two
hours of conversation.[31] Some accounts of
their meeting say that Schuschnigg was bullied by Hitler and subjected to a
long list of indignities.[32]
Schuschnigg began to consider
means of repudiating the agreement made with Hitler in their meeting of
February 12, 1938. Schuschnigg’s solution was to hold a rigged plebiscite. On
March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that a plebiscite would be held four days
later on March 13, 1938, to decide, finally and forever, whether Austria was to
remain an independent nation.
The planned plebiscite was
completely unfair. There was only one question, which asked the voter, “Are you
for a free and German, independent and social, Christian and united Austria,
for peace and work, for the equality of all those who affirm themselves for the
people and the Fatherland?” There were no voting lists; only yes ballots
were to be provided by the government; anyone wishing to vote no had to
provide their own ballot, the same size as the yes ballots, with nothing
on it but the word no.[33] During
preparations for the election, the government press in Austria announced that
anyone voting “no” would be guilty of treason.[34]
The Austrian government took
additional steps to ensure that the vote would swing in their direction. The
qualification age to vote was raised to 24, making it impossible for young
National Socialists to register their views. Schuschnigg and his men also
distributed a huge number of flyers, scattering some by aircraft in Austria’s
most-remote and -snowbound corners. Trucks drove around the country
transmitting the message of Austrian independence by loudspeaker. Everywhere
the “German” theme was driven home: Being Austrian was being a good German;
being “German” was to be free [of National-Socialist Germany]. Austrians were
better “Germans” than the National Socialists.[35]
Hitler was alarmed by
Schuschnigg’s proposed plebiscite. Hitler had hoped for an evolutionary
strategy in Austria that would gradually merge Austria into the Reich. However,
Hitler felt humiliated and betrayed by Schuschnigg, and he could not let the
phony plebiscite proceed. After receiving word on March 11, 1938 that Mussolini
accepted the Anschluss, Hitler decided to march into Austria with his
troops on March 12, 1938. Hitler was greeted with a joyously enthusiastic
reception from the masses of the Austrian people.[36]
Not a shot was fired by Hitler’s army.
Hitler was aware of the bad
publicity abroad such an apparent act of force would generate. He had hoped to
assimilate Austria in an obviously legal manner. However, Schuschnigg and his
entire cabinet had resigned from office after Britain, France and Italy all
denounced the phony plebiscite. Hitler feared that Austrian Marxists might take
advantage of Austria’s momentary political vacuum and stage an uprising. Göring
also warned of the possibility that Austria’s neighbors might exploit its
temporary weakness by occupying Austrian territory. Hitler decided to
militarily occupy Austria to prevent either of these possibilities from
occurring.[37]
On April 10, 1938, joint
plebiscites were held in Germany and Austria to approve the Anschluss.
All Germans and Austrians over the age of 20 were eligible to vote, with the
exception of Jews and criminals. The result of the plebiscites was 99.08% of
the people in Germany were in favor of the Anschluss, while 99.73% of
Austrians were for the Anschluss.[38]
The plebiscites might have been manipulated to some extent as shown by the
near-unanimous assent from the Dachau Prison Camp. Also, the ballot was not
anonymous since the voter’s name and address were printed on the back of each
ballot. However, there is no question that the vast majority of people in
Germany and Austria approved the Anschluss. Hitler’s aims had struck a
chord with national German aspirations, and the plebiscite reflected Hitler’s
popularity with the German people.[39]
The invasion of Austria had
hurt Germany’s public image. British historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote:
Hitler had
won. He had achieved the first object of his ambition. Yet not in the way that
he had intended. He had planned to absorb Austria imperceptibly, so that no one
could tell when it had ceased to be independent; he would use democratic
methods to destroy Austrian independence as he had done to destroy German
democracy. Instead he had been driven to call in the German army. For the first
time, he lost the asset of aggrieved morality and appeared as a conqueror,
relying on force. The belief soon became established that Hitler’s seizure of
Austria was a deliberate plot, devised long in advance, and the first step
towards the domination of Europe. This belief was a myth. The crisis of March
1938 was provoked by Schuschnigg, not by Hitler. There had been no German
preparations, military or diplomatic. Everything was improvised in a couple of
days – policy, promises, armed force…But the effects could not be undone…The
uneasy balance tilted, though only slightly, away from peace and towards war.
Hitler’s aims might still appear justifiable; his methods were condemned. By
the Anschluss – or rather by the way in which it was accomplished – Hitler took
the first step in the policy which was to brand him as the greatest of war
criminals. Yet he took this step unintentionally. Indeed, he did not know that
he had taken it.[40]
Winston Churchill made the
following statement in the House of Commons shortly after the Anschluss:
The public
mind has been concentrated upon the moral and sentimental aspects of the Nazi
conquest of Austria – a small country brutally struck down, its Government
scattered to the winds, the oppression of the Nazi party doctrine imposed upon
a Catholic population and upon the working-classes of Austria and Vienna, the
hard ill-usage of persecution which indeed will ensue – which is probably in
progress at the moment – of those who, this time last week, were exercising
their undoubted political rights, discharging their duties to their own
country.…[41]
Churchill’s statement is a
lie. The overwhelming majority of Austrians had desired a union with Germany.
The Anschluss was hugely popular in Austria. Churchill in his speech had
begun the warmongering that led to World War II.
The Czechoslovakia Crisis
At the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919, 3.25 million German inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia were
transferred to the new Czechoslovakia in a flagrant disregard of Woodrow
Wilson’s ideal of self-determination. The new Czechoslovakia was a multiethnic,
multilingual, Catholic-Protestant conglomerate that had never existed before as
a sovereign nation. From 1920 to 1938, repeated petitions had been sent to the
League of Nations by the repressed minorities of Czechoslovakia. By 1938, the
Sudeten Germans were eager to be rid of Czech rule and become part of Germany.
In a fair plebiscite, a minimum of 80% of Sudeten Germans would have voted for
the territories they lived in to become part of the new Reich.[42]
It was clear to Czech leaders
that the excitement among the Sudeten Germans after the Anschluss would
soon force the resolution of the Sudeten question. The Czech cabinet and
military leaders decided on May 20, 1938 to order a partial mobilization of the
Czech armed forces. This partial mobilization was based on the false accusation
that German troops were concentrating on the Czech frontiers. Czech leaders
hoped that the resulting confusion would commit the British and French to
support the Czech position before a policy favoring concessions to the Sudeten
Germans could be implemented. Although the plot failed, Czech leaders granted
interviews in which they claimed that Czechoslovakia had scored a great victory
over Germany. An international press campaign representing that Czechoslovakia
had forced Hitler to back down from his planned aggression reverberated around
the world.[43]
British Ambassador to Germany
Nevile Henderson believed that the Czech mobilization of its army, and the
ridicule heaped upon Hitler by the world press, led directly to the Munich
Agreement:
The defiant
gesture of the Czechs in mobilizing some 170,000 troops and then proclaiming to
the world that it was their action which had turned Hitler away from his
purpose was… regrettable. But what Hitler could not stomach was the exultation
of the press…Every newspaper in America and Europe joined in the chorus. “No”
had been said and Hitler had been forced to yield. The democratic powers had
brought the totalitarian states to heel, etc.
It was,
above all, this jubilation which gave Hitler the excuse for his…worst brain
storm of the year, and pushed him definitely over the border line from peaceful
negotiation to the use of force. From May 23rd to May 28th
his fit of sulks and fury lasted, and on the later date he gave orders for a
gradual mobilization of the Army, which should be prepared for all
eventualities in the autumn.[44]
By the 1930s, the majority of
the British people believed that Germany had been wronged at Versailles. The
British people now broadly supported the appeasement of Germany in regaining
her lost territories. If appeasement meant granting self-determination to the
Sudetenland Germans, the British people approved.[45]
Lord Halifax informed French
leaders on July 20, 1938 that a special fact-finding mission under Lord
Runciman would be sent to Czechoslovakia. President Beneš of Czechoslovakia was
disturbed by this news. It was a definite indication that the British might
adopt a compromising policy toward Germany in the crisis. The British mission
completed its study in September 1938, and it reported that the main difficulty
in the Sudeten area had been the disinclination of the Czechs to grant reforms.
This British report was accompanied by the final rupture of negotiations
between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech leaders. The Czech crisis was coming
to a climax.[46]
British Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain flew to Hitler’s mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden to discuss the
Czech problem directly with Hitler. At their meeting Hitler consented to
refrain from military action while Chamberlain would discuss with his cabinet
the means of applying the principle of self-determination to the Sudeten
Germans. The result was a decision to transfer to Germany areas in which the
Sudeten Germans constituted more than 50% of the population. President Beneš of
Czechoslovakia reluctantly accepted this proposal.[47]
A problem developed in the
negotiations when Chamberlain met with Hitler a second time. Hitler insisted on
an immediate German military occupation of regions where the Sudeten Germans
were more than half of the population. Hitler also insisted that the claims of
the Polish and Hungarian minorities be satisfied before participating in the
proposed international guarantee of the new Czechoslovakian frontier. Several
days of extreme tension followed. Chamberlain announced on September 28, 1938
to the House of Commons that Hitler had invited him, together with Daladier and
Mussolini, to a conference in Munich the following afternoon. The House erupted
in an outburst of tremendous enthusiasm.[48]
The parties signed the Munich
Agreement in the early hours of September 30, 1938. Hitler got substantially
everything he wanted. The territories populated by the Sudeten Germans had
become a part of Germany. Chamberlain and Hitler signed a joint declaration
that the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-German naval accord symbolized “the
desire of our two peoples never to go to war with each other again.”
Chamberlain told the cheering crowd in London that welcomed him home, “I
believe it is peace in our time.”[49] War
had been averted in Europe. The chains of Versailles had been completely
broken.
British Warmongering
The British war enthusiasts
lost no time in launching their effort to spoil the celebration of the Munich
Agreement. On October 1, 1938, First Lord of the Admiralty Alfred Duff Cooper
announced that he was resigning from the British cabinet. In a speech delivered
on October 3, 1938, Duff Cooper criticized the British government for not
assuming a definite commitment during the Czech crisis. He asserted that Great
Britain would not have been fighting for the Czechs, but rather for the balance
of power, which was precious to many British hearts. Duff Cooper believed that
it was his mission and that of his country to prevent Germany from achieving a
dominant position on the continent.[50]
Clement Attlee, the new Labor
Party leader, spoke of the Munich Agreement as a huge victory for Hitler and an
“annihilating defeat for democracy.” Attlee in his speech included the Soviet
Union as a democracy. Anthony Eden gave a speech in which he criticized
Chamberlain on detailed points, and expressed doubt that Britain would fulfill
her promised guarantee to the Czech state. Eden advised the House to regard the
current situation as a mere pause before the next crisis. He claimed that the
British armament campaign was proceeding too slowly.[51]
In his speech on October 5,
1938, Winston Churchill stated that Hitler had extracted British concessions at
pistol point, and he loved to use the image of Hitler as a gangster. Churchill
used flowery rhetoric and elegant phrases to describe the allegedly mournful
Czechs slipping away into darkness. Churchill wanted to convince his countrymen
that National-Socialist Germany was seized of an insatiable desire for world
conquest. The simple and stark purpose of Churchill’s speech was to convince
the British people to eventually accept a war of annihilation against Germany.
Churchill was a useful instrument in building up British prejudice against
Germany.[52]
The debate on the Munich
Agreement surpassed all other parliamentary debates on British foreign policy
since World War I. Other Conservatives who refused to accept the Munich
Agreement included Harold Macmillan, Duncan Sandys, Leopold Amery, Harold
Nicolson, Roger Keyes, Sidney Herbert, and Gen. Edward Spears. These men were
joined by a score of lesser figures in the House of Commons, and they were
supported by such prominent people as Lord Cranborne and Lord Wolmer in the
House of Lords. Chamberlain won the vote of confidence, but he did not possess
the confidence of the British Conservative Party.[53]
The warmongering that led to
World War II was increasing in Great Britain. Hitler was dismayed at the steady
stream of hate propaganda directed at Germany. In a speech given in Saarbrücken
on October 9, 1938, Hitler said: “…All it would take would be for Mr. Duff
Cooper or Mr. Eden or Mr. Churchill to come to power in England instead of
Chamberlain, and we know very well that it would be the goal of these men to
immediately start a new world war. They do not even try to disguise their
intents; they state them openly.”[54]
Endnotes
[1] Degrelle, Leon, Hitler: Born at Versailles,
Torrance, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1992, Author’s Preface, p. x.
[2] Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second
Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 13-15, 20-22.
[3] Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road
to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for
Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review,
1993, pp. 86-87.
[4] Franz-Willing, Georg, “The Origins of the Second
World War,” The Journal of Historical Review, Torrance, Cal.: Vol. 7,
No. 1, Spring 1986, p. 103.
[5] Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road
to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for
Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review,
1993, pp. 81, 84.
[6] Franz-Willing, Georg, “The Origins of the Second World
War,” The Journal of Historical Review, Torrance, Cal.: Vol. 7, No. 1,
Spring 1986, p. 103.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the
Unnecessary War, New York: E. P. Dutton, 1980, pp. 215-216.
[9] Luckau, Alma, The German Delegation at the Paris
Peace Conference, New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. 98-100.
[10] Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, translated by James
Murphy, London: Hurst and Blackett Ltd., 1942, p. 260.
[11] Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade,
Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 45.
[12] Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road
to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual
Peace, Newport Beach, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 118.
[13] Bochaca, Joaquin, “Reversing Versailles,” The
Barnes Review, Nov. /Dec. 2012, Vol. XVIII, No. 6, p. 61.
[14] Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World
War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, p. 86.
[15] Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road
to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual
Peace, Newport Beach, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 119.
[16] Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the
Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 145-147.
[17] Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second
Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 46.
[18] Rowland, Peter, David Lloyd George: A Biography,
New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, p. 728.
[19] Ibid., p. 733.
[20] Churchill, Winston, Great Contemporaries, New
York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1937, p. 228.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., p. 232.
[23] Kershaw, Ian, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis, New
York: W. W. Norton, 2000, p. 91.
[24] Neilson, Francis, The Makers of War, New
Orleans, La.: Flanders Hall Publishers, 1950, p. 171.
[25] Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the
Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 183-184.
[26] Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful
Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989,
p. 76.
[27] Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the
Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 183-187.
[28] Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World
War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, pp. 137-138.
[29] Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the
Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 188-189.
[30] Tedor, Richard, Hitler’s Revolution, Chicago:
2013, p. 98.
[31] Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful
Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989,
p. 91.
[32] Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road
to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual
Peace, Newport Beach, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 141.
[33] Quigley, Carroll, Tragedy and Hope, New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1966, p. 624.
[34] Tedor, Richard, Hitler’s Revolution, Chicago:
2013, p. 102.
[35] MacDonogh, Giles, Hitler’s Gamble, New York:
Basic Books, 2009, p. 35.
[36] Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful
Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989,
p. 93.
[37] Tedor, Richard, Hitler’s Revolution, Chicago:
2013, p. 104.
[38] Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, 1939 – The War That Had
Many Fathers, 6th edition, Munich, Germany: Olzog Verlag GmbH,
2011, p. 150.
[39] MacDonogh, Giles, Hitler’s Gamble, New York:
Basic Books, 2009, pp. 104-106.
[40] Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World
War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, pp. 149-150.
[41] Neilson, Francis, The Makers of War, New
Orleans, La.: Flanders Hall Publishers, 1950, pp. 176-177.
[42] Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the
Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 213-215.
[43] Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful
Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989,
pp. 106-107.
[44] Henderson, Sir Nevile, Failure of a Mission,
New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940, pp. 142-143.
[45] Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the
Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 213-227.
[46] Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful
Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989,
p. 108.
[47] Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second
Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 53-54.
[48] Ibid., p. 54.
[49] Ibid., p. 55.
[50] Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful
Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989,
pp. 180-181.
[51] Ibid., p. 188.
[52] Ibid., p. 190.
[53] Ibid., p. 191.
[54] Bradberry, Benton L., The Myth of German Villainy,
Bloomington, Ind.: Author House, 2012, p. 324.
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