DAVID L. HOGGAN
Editor's Note
This article is excerpted from David L. Hoggan's book
The Forced War: The Origins and Originators of World War II. The complete book
was published in hardcover by the Institute for Historical Review in December
1983. Professor Hoggan's treatment of the Roosevelt/American role in his book
is not limited to one section, but runs rather through the course of the
narrative as that role develops. Here we have culled the pertinent sections,
providing a running commentary (italicized) which fills in the chronological
gaps and gives the essential background, as presented by the author, of
European events against which Roosevelt moved. The treatment of President
Roosevelt in The Forced War begins in earnest in the year 1938, and that is
where this article takes up the story. Crucial both to Professor Hoggan's portrayal
of Roosevelt and his general thesis as to war responsibility is his assertion
that in October 1938, after the Munich conference, personal control of British
foreign policy passed from Prime Minister Chamberlain to his Foreign Minister,
Lord Halifax, who thereupon waged an unremitting campaign to force a war with
Germany.
The Secret War
Aspirations of President Roosevelt
The attitude of President Roosevelt and his entourage
was perhaps more extreme than that of the British leaders, but at least the American
President was restrained by constitutional checks, public opinion, and
Congressional legislation from inflicting his policy on Europe during the
period before World War II. A petulant outburst from Assistant Secretary F. B.
Sayre, of the American State Department, to British Ambassador Sir Ronald
Lindsay on September 9, 1938, during difficult negotiations for an
Anglo-American trade treaty, illustrated the psychosis which afflicted American
leaders and diplomats. Sayre later recalled: "I went on to say that at
such a time, when war was threatening and Germany was pounding at our gates, it
seemed to me tragic that we had not been able to reach and sign an
agreement." To imagine Germany pounding on the gates of the United States
in 1938 is like confusing Alice in Wonderland with the Bible.
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
telephoned Paris on March 14, 1938, to inform the French that the United States
would support and cooperate with a Socialist measure of the Blum Popular Front Government
to control, and, if necessary, to freeze foreign exchange in France. This would
have been a drastic measure contrary to the international system of arbitrage
and to the prevailing international financial policy of the United States.
Morgenthau was eager to see Leon Blum retain the premiership in the hope that
he would plunge France into conflict with Hitler. He had no compunctions about
taking this step without informing either the United States Congress or
American business leaders. Leon Blum, the Socialist, did not dare to go that
far, and his Government fell because of an inadequate fiscal policy.
The German leaders correctly believed that the
unrestrained anti-German press in the United States was profoundly influencing
both public and private American attitudes toward Germany. Goebbels told United
States Ambassador Hugh Wilson on March 22, 1938, that he expected criticism,
and "indeed, it was inconceivable to him that writers in America should be
sympathetic with present-day Germany because of the complete contrast of method
by which the (German) Government was acting." On the other hand, he
objected to libel and slander and to the deliberate stirring up of hatred.
Wilson confided that it was not the German form of government which was at issue,
but that "the most crucial thing that stood between any betterment of our
Press relationship was the Jewish question." Ribbentrop was able to
challenge Wilson on April 30, 1938, to find one single item in the German press
which contained a personal criticism of President Roosevelt. He also intimated
that the situation could be otherwise.
In early 1938, Jewish doctors and dentists were still
participating in the German state compulsory insurance program
(Ortskranken-kassen), which guaranteed them a sufficient number of patients.
Wilson relayed information to Secretary of State Hull that, in 1938, 10% of the
practicing lawyers in Germany were Jews, although the Jews constituted less
than 1 % of the population. Nevertheless, the American State Department continued
to bombard Germany with exaggerated protests on the Jewish question throughout
1938, although Wilson suggested to Hull on May 10, 1938, that these protests,
which were not duplicated by other nations, did more harm than good. The United
States took exception to a German law of March 30, 1938, which removed the
Jewish church from its position as one of the established churches of Germany.
This meant that German public tax receipts would go no longer to the Jewish
church, although German citizens would continue to pay taxes for the Protestant
and Catholic churches. The situation established by this new law in Germany was
in conformity with current English practice, where public tax revenue went to
the Anglican Church, but the Jewish churches received nothing.
On March 14, 1938, Under-Secretary of State Sumner
Welles complained to Polish Ambassador Jerzy Potocki about the German treatment
of the Jews and praised Poland for her "policy of tolerance."
Potocki, who knew that current Polish measures against the Jews were more
severe than those in Germany, replied with dignity that "the Jewish
problem in Poland was a very real problem." It is evident that the Jewish
question was primarily a pretext of American policy to disguise the fact that
American leaders were spoiling for a dispute with Germany on any terms. In
September 1938 President Roosevelt had a bad cold, and he complained that he
"wanted to kill Hitler and amputate the nose."
Perhaps frustration and knowledge of the domestic
obstacles confronting his own policy increased President Roosevelt's fury.
Jules Henry, the French Charge d'Affaires, reported to Paris on November 7,
1937, that President Roosevelt was interested in overthrowing Hitler, but that
the majority of the American people did not share his views. French Ambassador
Saint-Quentin reported on June 11, 1938, that President Roosevelt suddenly
blurted out during an interview that "the Germans understand only
force," and then clenched his fist like a boxer spoiling for a fight. He
noted that the President was fond of saying that if "France went down, the
United States would go down." Apparently this proposition was supposed to
contain some self-evident legalistic-moralistic truth which required no
demonstration.
Ambassador Saint-Quentin noted that the relations
between President Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt, were especially close. This
was understandable, because Bullitt was a warmonger. Bullitt was currently
serving as United States Ambassador to France, but he was Ambassador-at-large
to all the countries of Europe, and he was accustomed to transmit orders from
Roosevelt to American Ambassador Kennedy in London or American Ambassador
Biddle in Warsaw. Bullitt had a profound knowledge of Europe. He was well aware
that the British did not intend to fight in 1938, and that the French would not
fight without British support. He improved his contacts and bided his time
during the period of the Austrian and Czech crises. He prepared for his role in
1939 as the Roosevelt Ambassador par excellence. He could accomplish little in
either year, because the whole world knew that the President he was serving did
not have the backing of the American people for his foreign policy.
In the wake of the peaceful settlement of the Sudeten-German
problem in Czechoslovakia at the Munich conference, and after a German-backed
Czech-Polish agreement on the transfer of ethnic Polish territory (Teschen) to
Poland, Polish Ambassador to Germany Lipski meets with German Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop at Berlin in November 1938, to discuss the Danzig and Corridor
questions. Little is accomplished, as Lipski carries out Polish Foreign
Minister Beck's instructions not to engage in realistic discussion. But,
bearing in mind Hitler's recent generous proposal of a German guarantee of
Poland's Western border (provided that the Danzig question, with the question
of free and sovereign German access to Danzig across the Corridor, is settled),
Lipski ostensibly leaves room for a possible agreement on German road and
railway access across the Corridor.
Potocki Reports
from America
Lipski returned to Poland on November 22, 1938, to
discuss the Danzig situation. His assurance to Ribbentrop about the
superhighways and the railways had been a mere ruse designed to appease the
Germans. The Polish leaders agreed that no concessions would be made to Germany
either at Danzig or in the Corridor transit question. The affable manner of
Ribbentrop, despite the adamant Polish stand on Danzig, impressed the Polish
leaders. Beck speculated that Danzig might not be the issue after all which
would produce a conflict between Germany and Poland. He suggested that Hitler
might be allowing Ribbentrop unusual liberty in the Danzig question to see what
he could accomplish. Lipski's attitude was similar to Beck's. His latest
conversation with Ribbentrop had caused him to modify his earlier opinion that
Germany would never retreat at Danzig. He suggested that the injury done to
German relations with the United States by the anti-Jewish policy might affect
German policy toward Poland.
Lipski tended to exaggerate the effects on German
foreign relations of the demonstrations against the Jews in Germany on November
10, 1938. He predicted that a Franco-German declaration of friendship, which
had been discussed by Hitler and the French leaders since the preceding month,
would never be signed because of the negative French reaction to the
anti-Jewish demonstrations. This prediction proved to be false, and Ribbentrop
signed the declaration at Paris on December 6, 1938.
Lipski and the other Polish diplomats were influenced
in their judgment of this question at the moment by a report which had been
telegraphed by Count Jerzy Potocki from Washington, D.C., on November 21, 1938.
The Polish Ambassador was informed by William C. Bullitt, the American
Ambassador to France who was visiting in the United States, that President
Roosevelt was determined to bring America into the next European war. Bullitt
explained to Potocki at great length that he enjoyed the special confidence of
President Roosevelt. Bullitt predicted that a long war would soon break out in
Europe, and "of Germany and her Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, he spoke with
extreme vehemence and with bitter hatred." He suggested that the war might
last six years, and he advocated that it should be fought to a point where
Germany could never recover.
Potocki did not share the enthusiasm of Bullitt and
Roosevelt for war and destruction. He asked how such a war might arise, since
it seemed exceedingly unlikely that Germany would attack Great Britain or
France. Bullitt suggested that a war might break out between Germany and some
other Power, and that the Western Powers would intervene in such a war. Bullitt
considered an eventual Soviet-German war inevitable, and he predicted that
Germany, after an enervating war in Russia, would capitulate to the Western
Powers. He assured Potocki that the United States would participate in this
war, if Great Britain and France made the first move. Bullitt inquired about
Polish policy, and Potocki replied that Poland would fight rather than permit
Germany to tamper with her western frontier. Bullitt, who was strongly
proPolish, declared it was his conviction that it would be possible to rely on
Poland to stand firmly against Germany.
Potocki incorrectly attributed the belligerent
American attitude solely to Jewish influence. He failed to realize that
President Roosevelt and his entourage considered World War I to have been a
great adventure, and that they were bitter about those Americans who continued
to adopt a cynical attitude toward American militarism after President
Roosevelt's quarantine speech in 1937. President Roosevelt had been one of the
few advocating permanent peacetime military conscription in the United States
during the complacent 1920's. Such factors were more than sufficient to prompt
Roosevelt to adopt an aggressive attitude toward Germany. He had no strong
pro-Jewish feelings; he jokingly said at the 1945 Yalta Conference that he
would like to give the Arabian leader, Ibn Saud, five million American Jews.
The Jewish issue was mainly a convenient pretext to justify official American
hostility toward Germany, and to exploit the typical American sympathy for the
under-dog in any situation.
Potocki overestimated the Jewish question because of
his own intense prejudices against the Jews, which were shared by the entire
Polish leadership. He was highly critical of the American Jews. He believed
that Jewish influence on American culture and public opinion, which he regarded
as unquestionably preponderant, was producing a rapid decline of intellectual
standards in the United States. He reported to Warsaw again and again that
American public opinion was merely the product of Jewish machinations.
Though the unresolved issues between Germany and
Poland over Danzig and the Corridor begin to come to the fore, in early 1939
the problem of Czechoslovakia -- the rump, polyglot state created at
Versailles, comprising many central European ethnic populations -- continues to
dominate European affairs. Hitler backs the aspirations for independence from
the Czechs of the Slovaks, the largest minority within the artificial Czech
state.
Roosevelt
Propagandized by Halifax
Halifax continued to maintain a detached attitude
toward the Czech problem, and he secretly circulated rumors both at home and
abroad which presented the foreign policy of Hitler in the worst possible
light. Hitler would have been condemned by Halifax for anything he did in
Czechoslovakia. Had he decided to throw German weight behind the Czechs in an
effort to maintain Czech rule over the Slovaks, he would have been denounced
for converting the Czech state into a German puppet regime. His decision to
support the Slovaks could be denounced as a sinister plot to disrupt the
Czecho-Slovak state which the Munich Powers had failed to protect with their
guarantee.
The situation is illustrated by the message which
Halifax dispatched to President Roosevelt on January 24, 1939. Halifax claimed
to have received "a large number of reports from various reliable sources
which throw a most disquieting fight on Hitler's mood and intentions." He
repeated the tactic he had used with Kennedy about Hitler's allegedly fierce
hatred of Great Britain. Halifax believed that Hitler had guessed that Great
Britain was "the chief obstacle now to the fulfillment of his further
ambitions." It was not really necessary for Hitler to do more than read
the record of what Halifax and Chamberlain had said at Rome to recognize that
Great Britain was the chief threat to Germany, but it was untrue to suggest
that Hitler had modified his goal of Anglo-German cooperation in peace and
friendship.
Halifax developed his theme with increasing warmth. He
claimed that Hitler had recently planned to establish an independent Ukraine,
and that he intended to destroy the Western Powers in a surprise attack before
he moved into the East. Not only British intelligence but "highly placed
Germans who are anxious to prevent this crime" had furnished evidence of
this evil conspiracy. This was a lamentable distortion of what German
opposition figures, such as Theo Kordt and Carl Goerdeler, had actually
confided to the British during recent months. None of them had suggested that
Hitler had the remotest intention of attacking either Great Britain or France.
Roosevelt was informed by Halifax that Hitler might
seek to push Italy into war in the Mediterranean to find an excuse to fight.
This was the strategy which Halifax himself hoped to adopt by pushing Poland
into war with Germany. Halifax added that Hitler planned to invade Holland, and
to offer the Dutch East Indies to Japan. He suggested to Roosevelt that Hitler
would present an ultimatum to Great Britain, if he could not use Italy as a
pawn to provoke a war. Halifax added casually that the British leaders expected
a surprise German attack from the air before the ultimatum arrived. He assured
Roosevelt that this surprise attack might occur at any time. He claimed that
the Germans were mobilizing for this effort at the very moment he was preparing
his report.
The British Foreign Secretary reckoned that Roosevelt
might have some doubt about these provocative and mendacious claims. He
hastened to top one falsehood with another by claiming that an "economic
and financial crisis was facing Germany" which would compel the allegedly
bankrupt Germans to adopt these desperate measures. He added with false modesty
that some of this "may sound fanciful and even fantastic and His Majesty's
Government have no wish to be alarmist."
Halifax feared that he had not yet made his point. He
returned to the charge and emphasized "Hitler's mental condition, his
insensate rage against Great Britain and his megalomania." He warned
Roosevelt that the German underground movement was impotent, and that there
would be no revolt in Germany during the initial phase of World War II. He
confided that Great Britain was greatly increasing her armament program, and he
believed that it was his duty to enlighten Roosevelt about Hitler's alleged
intentions and attitudes "in view of the relations of confidence which
exist between our two Governments and the degree to which we have exchanged
information hitherto." Halifax claimed that Chamberlain was contemplating
a public warning to Germany prior to Hitler's annual Reichstag speech on
January 30, 1939. This was untrue, but Halifax hoped to goad Roosevelt into
making another alarmist and bellicose speech. He suggested that Roosevelt
should address a public warning to Germany without delay.
Anthony Eden had been sent to the United States by
Halifax, in December 1938, to spread rumors about sinister German plans, and
Roosevelt had responded with a provocative and insulting warning to Germany in
his message to Congress on January 4, 1939. Halifax hoped that a second
performance of this kind would be useful in preparing the basis for the war
propaganda with which he hoped to deluge the British public. He did not achieve
the desired response to this specific proposal. Secretary of State Hull
explained, in what a British diplomat at Washington, D.C., jokingly described
as "his most oracular style," that the Administration was blocked in
such efforts at the moment by hostile American public opinion. Halifax was
comforted on January 27, 1939, when he was informed officially that "the
United States Government had for some time been basing their policy upon the
possibility of just such a situation arising as was foreshadowed in your
telegram." This was another way of saying that the New Deal, which had
shot the bolt of its reforms in a futile effort to end the American depression,
was counting on the outbreak of a European war.
Halifax learned on January 30, 1939, that leading
American "experts" disagreed with a few of the details of his
analysis of the Dutch situation. They expected Hitler to mobilize his forces
along the Dutch frontier and to demand the surrender of large portions of the
Dutch East Indies without firing a shot. The ostensible purpose of this
Rooseveltian fantasy would be to "humiliate Great Britain" and to "bribe
Japan." This dispatch was not sent on April Fool's Day, and it was
intended seriously. It enabled Halifax to see that he had pitched his message
accurately to the political perspective of Roosevelt, Hull, and their advisers.
Anyone in their entourage who did not declare that Hitler was hopelessly insane
was virtually ostracized. Roosevelt hoped to have a long discussion with Joseph
Stalin at Teheran in 1943 about the alleged insanity of Adolf Hitler. He was
disappointed when Stalin abruptly ended this phase of the conversation with the
blunt comment that Hitler was not insane. It was like telling the naked Emperor
that he was wearing no clothes. It was evident to Stalin that Roosevelt was a
clever and unscrupulous politician who lacked the qualities of the statesman.
On January 4, 1939, President Roosevelt tells Congress
that U.S. neutrality policy must be re-examined. The next day, Beck and Hitler
converse at Berchtesgaden. Hitler stresses German-Polish cooperation, pointing
to that of the previous year over the Czechoslovakian crisis (and noting that
he would have preferred a settlement in which only Poland, Germany, and
Hungary-the countries with ethnic interests within Czechoslovakia -would have
participated, rather than the Great Power convocation at Munich). Though quite
cordial, the conversations are unproductive in terms of concrete progress
toward resolution of the Danzig and Corridor problems. But Hitler at least
makes clear his attitude that Danzig would return to Germany sooner or later. Beck
hides his strong private aversion to this idea behind a friendly, if reserved,
mask. He does reassure Hitler of a dependable (that is: suspicious) Polish
attitude toward Russia. Privately, Beck is less interested in preventing a
short-range setback or even defeat for Poland than in promoting the ruin of
both Germany and Russia. His attitude reflects a Polish mystique arising from
World War I: a defeat of Russia by Germany, and of Germany by the Western
Powers, would permit a Great Poland to emerge from the ashes of a momentary new
Polish defeat.
The Poles Regard
America
The Poles also attached great importance to the role
of the United States. They knew that American intervention had been decisive in
World War 1. They knew that the American President, Franklin Roosevelt, was an
ardent interventionist. Roosevelt differed markedly from his predecessor,
Herbert Hoover, after whom many streets were named in Poland in gratitude for
his post-World War I relief program. Hoover had been favorably impressed by a conversation
with Adolf Hitler on March 8, 1938, and he was a leader in the struggle against
current American interventionism. The Poles knew that Hoover, who was wrongly
accused of being the father of the American economic depression, that began in
1929, had little influence on American policy in 1938. They knew that President
Roosevelt was eager to involve the United States in the struggles of distant
states in Europe and Asia. American opponents of Roosevelt who opposed his
foreign policy were disdainfully labeled isolationists.
The Poles did not trouble themselves about the reasons
for President Roosevelt's interventionism. They were too realistic to assume
that he necessarily had any legitimate reasons. They were content to accept the
convenient explanation of Count Jerzy Potocki, the Polish Ambassador to the
United States. Potocki claimed that President Roosevelt's foreign policy was
the product of Jewish influence. This was untrue, but there was little interest
in Poland for an elaborate analysis of American policy. The surveys sent by the
Polish Foreign Office to missions abroad rarely mentioned the American scene.
The Poles recognized the importance of the American position, but they were
content to leave the problem of promoting American intervention in Europe to
their British friends.
Beck discussed the European situation after his return
to Warsaw with American Ambassador Anthony Biddle. Biddle reported to the
American State Department on January 10, 1939, that Beck was not enthusiastic
about his recent trip to Germany. The most he was willing to say about his
conversation with Hitler was that it had been "fairly satisfactory,"
and that Hitler had promised him that there would be no "surprises."
Beck confided to Biddle that Hitler was disappointed about President
Roosevelt's address to Congress on January 4, 1939, which had been bitterly
hostile toward Germany. Biddle noted that Beck was complacent about
Anglo-French relations and concerned about current Polish relations with
France. Biddle reported that "Beck emphasized that Poland and France must
meet at an early date to clarify their joint and respective positions vis-a-vis
Germany. They were now both in the same boat and must face realities." It
was evident from the general nature of Beck's remarks that the official Polish
attitude was incompatible with the successful negotiation of an agreement with
Germany.
American Ambassador Bullitt in Paris reported on
January 30, 1939, that he discussed recent German-Polish negotiations with
Juliusz Lukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador. Lukasiewicz admitted that Danzig
and the Corridor transit problems had been discussed. He informed Bullitt that
Beck had warned Hitler that Poland might act in Ruthenia. Bullitt also
discussed general German policy with Lukasiewicz, French Foreign Minister
Bonnet, and British Ambassador Sir Eric Phipps. The three men agreed that
Hitler would not deliberately make war on any country in 1939. These views were
an interesting contrast to the alarmist reports which Halifax had sent to
President Roosevelt a few days earlier.
American Charge d'Affaires Gilbert reported from
Berlin on February 3rd that Hitler's basic policy in the East was friendship
with Poland. It seemed certain to Gilbert that Beck would be willing to allow
the return of Danzig to Germany in exchange for a 25-year Pact, afid for a
German guarantee of the Polish Corridor. Gilbert noted that official German
circles were quite open in announcing that the reunion of Memel with East
Prussia was planned for the Spring of 1939. The Germans believed that the
Lithuanians, British, and French would agree to this development without any
ill-feeling.
On March 14, 1939, the artificial Czech state
disintegrates. The Slovakian parliament proclaims its independence. Hungarian
troops enter the Ruthenian region to protect and embrace the ethnic Hungarian
population there. The Czechoslovakian president, Emil Hacha, requests an
immediate meeting with Hitler. On March 15th, Hacha signs an agreement with
Hitler establishing the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia on the former Czech
territory. German troops move in that day, and Germany accepts the protection
of Slovakian independence. Britain initially accepts the new situation,
reasoning that her guarantee of Czechoslovakia given after Munich is rendered
invalid by the internal collapse of the Czech state. But on March 17th,
Chamberlain -- egged on by Halifax and Roosevelt -- announces a stunning
reversal of British policy: the end of the peace policy
("appeasement") with Germany. From now on Britain will strenuously
oppose, even to the point of war, any further territorial moves by Hitler, no
matter how justified.
America and the
British Policy Reversal
William C. Bullitt, the leading American diplomat in
Europe, was pleased by the reversal of British policy in March 1939. He knew
that President Roosevelt would welcome any British pretext for a war in Europe.
Ambassador Bullitt sent a jubilant report from Paris on March 17, 1939, in
which he triumphantly concluded that there was no longer any possibility for a
peaceful diplomatic settlement of European differences.
Halifax welcomed the enthusiastic support for a change
in British policy which he received from the American Government after March
15, 1939. The collapse of Czecho-Slovakia produced a greater immediate outburst
of hostility toward Germany in Washington, D.C., than in any other capital of
the world. German Charge d'Affaires Thomsen reported to Berlin that a violent
press campaign against Germany had been launched throughout the United States.
There was much resentment in American New Deal circles when Sir John Simon
delivered a speech in the British House of Commons on March 16, 1939, in
support of Chamberlain's conciliatory message on the previous day. The Simon
speech produced a vigorous American protest in London on March 17,1939. Halifax
replied by promising President Roosevelt that the British leaders were
"going to start educating public opinion as best they can to the need of
action." This is a different picture from the one presented by Gilbert and
Gott [in their book The Appeasers] to the effect that "for most men the
answer was simple" after the events at Prague on March 15, 1939. Roosevelt
warned Halifax that there would be "an increase of anti-British sentiment
in the United States" unless Great Britain hastened to adopt an
outspokenly anti-German policy.
Roosevelt requested Halifax to withdraw the British
Ambassador from Germany permanently. Halifax replied that he was not prepared
to go quite that far. British opinion was less ignorant than American opinion
about the requirements of diplomacy, and Halifax feared that a rude shock would
be produced if the British copied the American practice of permanently
withdrawing ambassadors for no adequate reasons. He promised that he would
instruct Henderson to return to England for consultation, and he promised that
he would prevent the return of the British Ambassador to Germany for a
considerable time. He also promised that Chamberlain would deliver a
challenging speech in Birmingham on the evening of March 17, 1939, which would
herald a complete change in British policy. He assured Roosevelt that Great
Britain was prepared at last to intervene actively in the affairs of Central
Europe.
Halifax requested President Roosevelt to join Great
Britain in showing "the extent to which the moral sense of civilization
was outraged by the present rulers of Germany." He knew that this lofty
formulation of the issue would appeal to the American President. Roosevelt was
satisfied with the response from Halifax. He promised the British Foreign
Secretary that he would undermine the American neutrality legislation, which
had been adopted by the American Congress, with New Deal approval, in response
to pressure from American public opinion. Halifax also received the promise
that American Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau would take vigorous new
steps in his policy of financial and economic discrimination against Germany.
Halifax was greatly encouraged by the support he received from President Roosevelt
for his war policy.
Polish Foreign Minister Beck received an assurance
from Juliusz Lukasiewicz and William Bullitt on March 19, 1939, that President
Roosevelt was prepared to do everything possible to promote a war between the
Anglo-French front and Germany. Bullitt admitted that he was still suspicious
about British intentions, and he feared that the British might be tempted to
compose their differences with Germany at some later date. He promised that any
such deviation from a British war policy would encounter energetic resistance
from President Roosevelt. Bullitt had received word from Premier Daladier that
the British were proposing an Anglo-French territorial guarantee to Rumania,
and the American diplomat welcomed this plan.
Bullitt informed the Poles that he knew Germany hoped
to acquire Danzig, and that he was counting on Polish willingness to go to war
over the Danzig question. He urged Lukasiewicz to present demands to the West
for supplies and other military assistance. Lukasiewicz told Bullitt that
Poland would need all the help the West could possibly offer in the event of
war. Bullitt said that he hoped Poland could obtain military supplies from the
Soviet Union, but Lukasiewicz displayed no enthusiasm for this possibility. He
warned Bullitt that it was too early to predict what Position Russia would take
in a German-Polish dispute. Bullitt recognized from this remark that
Lukasiewicz was assuming that Soviet policy toward Poland would be hostile. It
was equally clear that Bullitt recognized the military hopelessness of the
Polish position, if the Soviet Union did not aid Poland in a conflict with
Germany.
Halifax attempts to create a broad anti-German front
by proposing an alliance to include Britain, France, Poland, and the Soviet Union.
But the Poles are as distrustful of the Soviets as they are of the Germans,
preferring to maintain a maximum independence of Soviet influence and
protection from possible future Soviet moves. Nevertheless they continue in a
bellicose anti-German attitude-though Germany is the only nation that could
possibly offer them realistic protection from the Soviets.
Poland Rejects
Halifax's Soviet Alliance Plan
Halifax discussed his alliance project with American
Ambassador Kennedy on March 22, 1939, and he complained at great length about
the negative attitude of Beck toward an alliance front to include both Poland
and the Soviet Union. He intimated that he was resolved to continue his
anti-Germany policy, and that hostilities in Europe might be expected fairly
soon. He was convinced that the British Navy was more than adequate to cope
with German naval forces. He urged Kennedy to request President Roosevelt to
concentrate the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, as an appropriate gesture to
protect Australia and Singapore from a possible Japanese attack, after the
outbreak of war in Europe. Halifax admitted at last that the story of a German
threat to Rumania could not be substantiated, but he assured Kennedy that
[Rumanian Ambassador] Tilea's statements at London had served a useful purpose.
The moderate attitude of Hitler produced no effect on
Beck on the eve of Lipski's return to Berlin. Beck told American Ambassador
Biddle an outrageous falsehood about Hitler's policy toward Poland on March 25,
1939, which was a fitting prelude to his later public distortions about German
policy. Beck claimed that Hitler had demanded the settlement of the Danzig
question by Easter, which was only a few days away. In fact, Hitler had never
set a time limit on the duration of his negotiation with Poland. Biddle
reported with satisfaction on March 26, 1939, in a terse telegram: "Poland
today on war footing having achieved same swiftly but quietly."
It was difficult under these circumstances for
Ribbentrop to maintain the impression that peaceful negotiations between
Germany and Poland were in progress. The German Foreign Office was receiving a
large number of reports from friendly foreign diplomats that the British were
making all possible preparations for war against Germany, and it seemed certain
at Berlin that Halifax would seek to exploit the bellicose Polish attitude.
American Minister Joseph E. Davies reported to Washington, D.C., from Brussels
on March 30, 1939, that in Belgium the Chamberlain speech at Birmingham was
regarded as a disaster which had reversed the favorable prospects for peace in
Europe.
French Ambassador Leon Noel reported to Paris that he
had attended a diplomatic dinner on the evening of March 27, 1939, at which
Beck, Count Michel Lubienski, and the Polish Chief of Staff, General
Stachiewicz, were present. Noel complained that the Polish leaders deliberately
avoided any reference to the obviously unsatisfactory recent negotiations with
Germany, and that they appeared to be distracted and preoccupied with private
problems. Beck was also vague in his conversations with American Ambassador
Anthony Biddle, but he told Biddle on the evening of March 28th that the Polish
partial mobilization was "a firm answer to certain suggestions made by
Berlin."
Lukasiewicz informed Beck from Paris that he was
continuing to collaborate closely with American Ambassador Bullitt. Lukasiewicz
was repeatedly informed by Bullitt of the conversations between the British
leaders and American Ambassador Kennedy at London. It was obvious to
Lukasiewicz that Bullitt continued to distrust the British. The American
Ambassador assured him that the United States would be able to exert sufficient
pressure to produce a British mobilization at the peak of the next crisis.
Lukasiewicz also suspected that part of this distrust reflected a childish
desire on the part of Bullitt to exaggerate the importance of his own role on
the European scene.
Polish Ambassador Edward Raczynski reported on March
29, 1939, that the principal fear in Great Britain seemed to be that a
German-Polish agreement would be reached despite the Polish partial
mobilization. The British were arguing that such an agreement would be
especially dangerous because it might lead to the rapid disintegratiorr of
Soviet Russia. The Polish Ambassador had learned that American Ambassador
Kennedy was personally distressed by the war policy of the British leaders, and
by the support for this policy which came from President Roosevelt. Raczynski
warned Beck that Kennedy appeared to be privately somewhat out of step with
Bullitt in Paris and Anthony Biddle in Warsaw, but that otherwise he was
reluctantly carrying out his instructions from President Roosevelt to warn the
British that their failure to act would produce dire consequences. Raczynski
added that he received repeated requests from the British to reassure them that
Poland would not accept the German annexation of Danzig. The Polish diplomat
noted that it was difficult to convince the British that Poland was really
willing to go to war over the Danzig issue.
American Ambassador Bullitt did what he could to
support the Polish position at Paris. Lukasiewicz informed Bullitt on March 24,
1939, that Poland would reject the pro-Soviet alliance plan and press for a
bilateral alliance with Great Britain. Bullitt assured Lukasiewicz that the
British would agree to such an alliance. The Polish Ambassador admitted that he
did not trust the British, and he asserted that the cynical English leaders
were quite capable of leading Poland into an untenable position and deserting
her. He knew that Bullitt shared this attitude to some extent. Lukasiewicz
reminded Bullitt of British participation in the partition of Czechoslovakia in
1938. He feared that Great Britain would offer to support Poland, and then insist
on Polish concessions to Germany. He knew that until recently the British
leaders had favored Polish concessions to Germany, and he was not certain that
there had been a complete change in their attitude.
Bullitt used many arguments to reassure the Polish
Ambassador. He declared that he was in complete agreement with every aspect of
Beck's stand in the alliance question, and he regarded the creation of a solid
Anglo-French-Polish front without the Soviet Union as the best thing which
could possibly happen. He claimed that Halifax was not very serious about his
Four Power Pact offer, and that it was mainly a gesture to increase British
prestige and to appease the French. He said that the British leaders hoped that
there would be a war between Germany and Russia, but that they were not eager
to make commitments to the Soviet Union.
Bullitt told Lukasiewicz on March 25, 1939, that he
had instructed American Ambassador Kennedy at London to tell Chamberlain that
the United States was in full sympathy with the Polish position in the alliance
question. Bullitt contacted Kennedy again on March 26th. Kennedy was instructed
to tell Chamberlain that the United States hoped that Great Britain would go to
war with Germany if the Danzig dispute produced an explosion between Germany
and Poland. Bullitt told the Polish Ambassador that he was confident that the
British response to these suggestions would be favorable. Halifax, of course,
was not displeased to know that he had unconditional official American support
for his war policy. Lukasiewicz told Bullitt on March 26, 1939, that Lipski
would reject the German proposals at Berlin the same day. He praised Bullitt as
"an industrious friend who at many complicated points resolved our
situation intensively and profitably."
On March 22nd, Germany and Lithuania reach an
agreement for the return to Germany of the ethnic German Memel district. The
next day, Poland orders a partial mobilization. It follows in the last week of
March with a boycott campaign against ethnic German businesses, and a
declaration that any German-caused change in the international ("Free
City") status of Danzig will be regarded as an act of war. Acts of
violence against ethnic Germans in Poland increase. Britain announces a
doubling in size of the home army. On March 30th, several days before the
planned visit of Beck to London, Halifax decides to give a "blank
check" guarantee to Poland, supporting it in the event of any action which
the Polish government considers a threat to its independence. Chamberlain is to
announce the guarantee in the House of Commons on March 31st.
The British
Guarantee and America
Halifax had made an epochal decision, and he was
impatient to bring his new policy into the open. He decided not to wait until
the arrival of Beck in London on April 3, 1939, before assuming a public
British commitment to Poland. He wired [British Ambassador to Poland] Kennard
on March 30, 1939, that a guarantee to Poland would be announced in the British
Parliament on the following day. He added that this guarantee would be binding
without commitments from the Polish side. He attempted to place the
responsibility for his extraordinary impatience on President Roosevelt. He
informed Kennard with a touch of ironical humor that the American Embassy had bombarded
him with assertions that Ribbentrop was urging Hitler to invade Poland before
the British assumed any commitment. This was a transparent pretext to
rationalize a rash policy. It was true that Bullitt at Paris was for immediate
British action, but the American diplomats at Berlin hoped that Great Britain
would adopt a policy of caution and restraint. American Charge d'Affaires Geist
suggested from Berlin that it would be wise for Great Britain to avoid placing
obstructions before German eastward expansion. No one could have been more
emphatic in deploring a hasty British guarantee to Poland.
Halifax carefully avoided giving the impression that
he beheved the alleged story about Ribbentrop's aggressive intentions. He did
repeat the old argument that President Roosevelt and the United States of
America would become hostile to Great Britain if she did not go to war against
Germany. The constant reiteration of this theme by Bullitt at Paris was
undoubtedly useful to Halifax. It also enabled him to shift part of the
responsibility for his various moves to the United States, although in reality
President Roosevelt was unable to play an active role in Europe at this stage.
The official position of the United States was governed by neutrality
legislation from the 1935-1937 period, and it is impossible, regardless of the
attitude of Roosevelt, to saddle the United States with the responsibility for
the moves which Halifax made. The decision of Halifax to confer an advance
guarantee wiped out the hopes of Hitler that personal negotiations between
Halifax and Beck would end in disagreement. The friction between the two men
was a very real thing when Beck came to London, and it is possible that their
negotiation would have ended in failure had it not been for the previous
British guarantee.
Beck arrives in London on April 3rd. He accepts the
British guarantee, and offers a reciprocal promise of Polish intervention on
the side of Britain in the event of war between Britain and Germany. But
Halifax wants more: a wide-ranging Polish commitment to go to war with Germany
if Germany attacks Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, or Denmark. Beck balks at
this request for what amounts to "permanent intervention," as at
renewed suggestions for a pro-Soviet alliance against Germany. The British
leaders suggest that Beck transform the Polish-Rumanian alliance (an
anti-Soviet pact in effect) into an anti-German pact. Beck refuses to ignore
the dangers from the Soviet Union to Poland and her neighbors' Eastern borders,
and rejects this proposal.
The British
Propagandize Beck
The British leaders did not like Beck's response. They
wished him to think exclusively in terms of destroying Germany, and to forget
other considerations. In other words, they wished his thinking to be more
similar to that of President Roosevelt in the United States. They began to
employ the same propaganda methods on Beck which they used with Roosevelt. They
began to suggest a number of hypothetical situations with their usual formula
of saying "this may sound fantastic, but" what would you do in such
and such a case. Beck put a stop to this by declaring bluntly that "it was
against the tradition of the Polish Government to express definite opinions
about third countries without directly consulting them."
Chamberlain switched from hypothetical fantasies to
rumors, and he declared that he had heard Germany was planning a sudden
invasion of Hungary. Beck did not like this English style of rumor-monge ring.
He was convinced that this assertion of alleged German designs against Hungary
was entirely false. He wished that the British leaders would desist from their
efforts to alarm him in this way. He assured the British leaders with studied
emphasis that he was entirely convinced Germany was not planning any political
action outside her present frontiers except at Danzig. This was an effective
method of reminding them that Poland was indispensable to their plan of
launching a British preventive war against Germany.
Theo Kordt of the German Embassy in London was able to
telegraph information to Berlin on April 5, 1939, about the principal topics
which had been discussed between Peck and the British leaders. Chamberlain
admitted in the House of Commons on the following day that there had been no
attempt to limit what might constitute a threat to Polish independence. The
final word on this matter was left entirely to the Poles. Beck admitted to
American Ambassador Kennedy before he left London that the British leaders had
complained about the allegedly uncoooperative Polish attitude. He also claimed
that he had been able to diminish this dissatisfaction somewhat in the last
conversations. Beck referred cleverly to his "old friend America" and
his "new friend Britain." He confided to Kennedy that he was
"more than happy" to have the British blank check. He assured the
American Ambassador that he did "not want to be the direct cause of
plunging the world into war." This was encouraging, but Beck deprived the
statement of any real meaning by admitting that he had no concrete plan to
preserve the peace. Indeed, it may be safely assumed that Beck's statement to
Kennedy was entirely for the record.
Kennedy talked with Halifax on April 6th. The British
Foreign Secretary admitted that Beck was definitely opposed to a RussoPolish
understanding. Halifax believed that he deserved a vacation after the work of
the past three weeks. He told Kennedy that Chamberlain was leaving for Scotland
on the evening of April 6th, and that he was going home to Yorkshire the
following morning. The Poles had their blank check, and a separate British
approach to Russia would be the next step. The general European situation was
discussed, and Halifax privately admitted to Kennedy that neither Hitler nor
Mussolini wanted war.
Roosevelt's Policy
and Beck
Bullitt was delighted at the opportunity to greet Beck
on his return from England to the continent. He knew that this privilege
resulted from the fact that he "was a strong admirer of the policy of
Minister Beck" and enjoyed "friendly relations" with him.
Bullitt discussed Roosevelt's policy with Beck at some length. He claimed that
he and Roosevelt were much dissatisfied with both English and American public
opinion at this point. Beck expressed mild surprise at this remark as far as
England was concerned, and he indicated that he was satisfied with the
atmosphere which he had encountered in England. He was quite unperturbed that a
formal Anglo-Polish alliance had not been negotiated, and he observed with
satisfied irony that it would require much delicacy and discretion on the part
of Chamberlain to handle the guarantee agreement other than by the standards of
a normal alliance. Beck did not believe that the British Prime Minister
possessed either delicacy or discretion. Beck observed, with a knowing smile to
his listeners, that Chamberlain had said he was glad Poland had come instantly
to an agreement with England. This amused Beck, because Poland had been waiting
over a considerable period for the English offer of an agreement.
Beck admitted that Halifax had sought to entangle him
with obligations to Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland, but he did not
attach serious importance to this fact. He was more interested in speculating
about the German response to his visit to England and to his acceptance of the
British guarantee. He declared that the alliance with England (sojusz z
Anglia) had dealt a real blow to Hitler's plans for a German-Polish
agreement. He believed that British approval of Polish aspirations at Danzig
had buttressed the Polish cause there as never before. A main topic of
speculation was whether Hitler would respond to the British guarantee by
denouncing the 1934 Pact with Poland.
Bullitt took his leave from Beck at Lille and returned
to Paris. He sent an exuberant report to Washington, D.C., at 11:00 p.m. on
April 7, 1939. He informed Roosevelt and Hull that Beck was immensely pleased
by recent developments in England, and that the degree of understanding which
had been achieved was quite adequate to fill Polish needs. Beck had said that
he knew that Hitler would be furious. Bullitt also added with obvious
satisfaction that Beck had described Ribbentrop as a "dangerous imbecile.
"
Poland's Use of
the British Guarantee
It was likely that the Poles would seek to provoke
Germany into attacking them. Unlike Germany, they could not expect to achieve
any of their objectives in a major war through their own efforts. Their hope of
ultimate victory rested with distant foreign powers. The Polish leaders were
far more enthusiastic about a German-Polish war than Hitler ever was, but
considerations of high policy suggested the wisdom of a role which was at least
passive in appearance.
Poland was counting on the support of Halifax for the
realization of her program at the expense of both Germany and Russia. It was
conceivable that Halifax could lead Great Britain into a war which began with a
surprise Polish invasion of Germany, but the Polish leaders knew that France
and the United States were also of decisive importance to British policy. The Poles
knew that Halifax would never support Poland unless he could drag France into
war. This policy was dictated by the simple fact that Halifax did not believe
Great Britain could win a war against Germany without the participation of
France. The Poles also knew that it would be difficult for President Roosevelt
to arouse the American people against Germany unless it was possible to
maintain that Poland was the innocent victim of German aggression.
Polish provocation of Germany after March 31, 1939,
was frequent and extreme, and Hitler soon had more than a sufficient
justification to go to war with Poland on the basis of traditional practices
among the nations. Nevertheless, Hitler could not justify German action, unless
he believed that he was prepared to meet the consequences. He hoped to avoid
war with Great Britain, and he knew that he would run a grave risk of an
AngloGerman war if he invaded Poland. It was for this reason that German-Polish
relations became progressively worse over a long period before they produced a
conflict. Hitler, who was usually very prompt and decisive in conducting German
policy, showed considerable indecision before he finally decided to act, and to
face the consequences. He did not abandon his hope for a negotiated settlement
with Poland until he realized that the outlook for such a settlement was
completely hopeless.
French Foreign Minister Bonnet is not as enthused as
his allies the British over the guarantee to Poland. Learning that Marshal
Smigly-Rydz, the commander-in-chief of Poland's armed forces, expressed delight
at the guarantee, he fears Polish cockiness and foolhardiness now that Britain,
dragging along France, stands unconditionally behind Poland whatever Poland
does. Bonnet continues to desire a Western/Polish accommodation with the
Soviets, fearing that a Western guarantee alone will not be enough to stop any
Hitler moves for Danzig and the Corridor. All this is communicated to the
Polish ambassador at Paris, Lukasiewicz. Marshal Smigly-Rydz proclaims with
satisfaction to assembled Polish diplomats that an immediate war with Germany
is quite possible, and that such a war would mean the end of' Germany.
Bullitt, the
French, and the Americans
Lukasiewicz was less sanguine than Smigly-Rydz about
the position of the Western Powers following the British guarantee. He
discussed the situation with American Ambassador Bullitt on April 9, 1939. He
said that he hoped France would attack Germany from Belgium in the event of
war, but he was pessimistic about the future course of French policy. Bullitt
and Lukasiewicz also discussed their recent meeting with Beck. The American
Ambassador told Lukasiewicz that he had given President Roosevelt extensive
information about Beck's analysis of the situation. Beck had claimed that basically
Hitler was a timid Austrian who might be expected to avoid a war against
determined and strong opponents. He said that "it should be obvious now to
Hitler that threats to Poland would get Germany nowhere." These exuberant
remarks seemed less convincing to Lukasiewicz after his conversation on the
previous day with Bonnet.
Bullitt was dissatisfied with the attitude of the
French leaders, and he was inclined to blame what he considered the unwarranted
complacency of American public opinion. He complained to President Roosevelt in
a report on April 10, 1939, that the American public was not aware of the
alleged direct threat to the United States from Germany, Italy, and Japan. He
hoped that Roosevelt could do something to arouse the American people. His
complaint was the decisive factor in persuading President Roosevelt to deliver
sensational and insulting public notes to Mussolini and Hitler on April 15,
1939, after the Anglo-French guarantees to Rumania and Greece. Bullitt
complained that [French Premiere] Daladier was unresponsive to the attempt of
Lukasiewicz to secure the same blank check from France which had been presented
to Poland by England. Kennedy reported to Roosevelt from London on April 11,
1939, that Halifax was still pretending to entertain an idealistic hope for
peace. Kennedy naturally supposed that it might be worthwhile for the British
Foreign Secretary to announce to the world that peace was still possible, but
Halifax claimed that to do so would convince everyone that he was "burying
his head in the sand." These remarks illustrate the method by which
Halifax sought to convince people that he was merely the prisoner of larger
events.
The Roosevelt
Telegrams to Hitler and Mussolini
President Roosevelt was doing everything in his power
to increase alarmist sentiment in the United States. He announced at Warm
Springs, Georgia, on April 9th that he might not return for his annual autumn
health cure, because it was quite possible that the United States and the
European countries would be involved with the problems of a major European war
by that time. Fortunately, much of the reaction to this statement in the United
States was extremely hostile, and many foreign observers concluded that this
was merely an expression of wishful thinking on the part of the American
president.
The British expected some lively developments at
Danzig after their guarantee to the Poles. They did not realize that Hitler had
ordered the Danzig authorities to go to extreme lengths in seeking to
conciliate the Poles. British Ambassador Kennard heard on April 12, 1939, that
Lipski had returned to Warsaw from Berlin. He suspected that this might
indicate some new developments of major importance in the Danzig question. He
asked Beck for the latest news about Danzig, but he was told that nothing had
changed.
The quiet at Danzig began to annoy Kennard. He called
at the Polish Foreign Office ten days later to insist that Great Britain was
"entitled" to receive information about any new steps at Danzig. He
noted that the Germans were blaming Great Britain for the deadlock at Danzig,
and he claimed that the British were "somewhat anxious" about the
situation. Kennard was told once again that there was nothing to report. The
Germans had requested the return of Danzig and a transit corridor to East
Prussia. The Polish diplomats believed that the Germans expected Lipski to
appear some day with "proposals of a detailed nature." Kennard was
not told whether or not such proposals would actually be presented to the Germans
by Poland.
The evasive vagueness at the Polish Foreign Office
irritated Kennard. He complained to Halifax, and he noted with malicious
satisfaction that there were objections to Beck in Polish financial circles. It
was known in Poland that Beck had said nothing about British economic
assistance during his visit to London. He had proudly emphasized Poland's
alleged preparedness and strength. The Polish financiers regarded this as an
unpardonable and expensive blunder.
Beck was waiting impatiently for Hitler's response to
Polish acceptance of the British guarantee. He wondered if Hitler would
abrogate the 1934 Pact, which Poland had violated by accepting the guarantee.
He did not realize that Hitler had no intention of increasing Poland's sense of
self-importance by devoting a special public message to this matter. Hitler
knew that the repudiation of the Pact would be a step of major importance which
could scarcely be confined to an official communique and a few reports in the
newspapers. This problem was unexpectedly resolved for Hitler by President
Roosevelt. The American President responded to Bullitt's suggestion for an
important move to influence American public opinion by committing a colossal
diplomatic blunder, which played directly into Hitler's hands.
Roosevelt disclosed to the American public on April
14, 1939, the contents of telegrams to Mussolini and Hitler which were received
in Rome and Berlin on the following day. Roosevelt sought to create the
impression that Germany and Italy were exclusively responsible for every threat
to European peace. He presented himself as an unselfish peacemaker, who had
expended much thought and energy to devise a plan to remove the danger of war.
This peace plan required Germany and Italy to declare that they would abstain from
war under any and all circumstances for ten to twenty-five years, and to
conclude nonaggression pacts with a large number of states, of which several
had no independent existence other than in the imagination of the American
President.
The Roosevelt message met with a vigorous response in
the German press. The German journalists wondered if the United States would
agree not to attack Haiti or Santo Domingo within the next twenty-five years.
Joseph Goebbels addressed three questions to the American public on April 17,
1939. He wondered if they recognized that Roosevelt was similar to Woodrow
Wilson in his desire to promote a permanent policy of American intervention
throughout the world. He asked if the American people recognized that
Roosevelt's recent message was a new maneuver to destroy the American
neutrality laws, rather than to promote world peace. He inquired if they
realized that Roosevelt had advocated a common American front with Bolshevism
since his Chicago Quarantine speech in October 1937. The German press announced
on April 17th that Hitler would answer President Roosevelt for the German
people in a speech to the German Reichstag on April 28, 1939. This step had
been agreed upon by Hitler and Ribbentrop in a special conference on the previous
day.
Hitler was presented with an opportunity to deal with
the Poles as a secondary factor in a general situation. He planned to devote
the greater part of his message on the Pact with Poland to a careful criticism
of the American President and to a criticism of English policy. He also
Intended to abrogate the 1935 AngloGerman naval treaty. Hitler ordered the
German press to abstain from criticizing the Poles~lduring the period before he
delivered his speech.
Marshal Göring was on a visit to Italy from April 14th
until April 16, 1939. He had instructions from Hitler to discuss the total
context of Italo-German relations. Ribbentrop was somewhat uneasy about the
Göring official mission at this crucial stage when he was seeking to promote an
Italo-German alliance. He was relieved to learn later that the Göring mission
was completely successful.
Göring discussed the Roosevelt telegrams with
Mussolini and Ciano on April 16, 1939. He told Mussolini that it was difficult
to avoid the impression that the American President was mentally ill. Mussolini
criticized the factual text of the telegrams. It was ridiculous to request
Germany and Italy to conclude non-aggression pacts with Palestine and Syria,
which were British and French mandates rather than independent states.
Mussolini was interested in improving Anglo-Italian relations, and he elected
to react publicly to the American challenge in a minor key. A brief initial
expression of indignation was followed by Mussolini's speech at Rome on April
29, 1939. The Italian leader merely denounced the alarmists who sought to
disturb international relations, and he emphasized that Italy was peacefully
preparing for the International Exposition in Rome scheduled for 1942. The
privilege of delivering a detailed reply to the American President was left
entirely to Hitler.
The difficult situation between Germany and Poland was
a touchy subject in the conversations between Göring and the Italian leaders.
Göring did not attempt to minimize the seriousness of the situation, and he
complained that "England had deviated from her old line ... (and) now
obliged herself in advance to render support (to Poland, Rumania, and Greece),
and that under conditions which could be determined by the other partner."
Mussolini declared that in the existing dangerous situation it was important
for the Axis Powers to revert to passive policies for an indefinite period.
This seemed to be the only way to cope with the warlike attitude of the British
Government. Göring hoped that it would be possible to settle German differences
with Poland by peaceful negotiation, and he predicted that Roosevelt would have
little chance for re-election in 1940 if the basic European situation remained
unchanged. He admitted that an increase in provocative Polish measures against
Germany might force German action against Poland. It was evident that the
problem of Poland had become the problem of Europe at this hour.
Ribbentrop was encouraged by the Göring visit to press
for a separate Italo-German alliance. The first official discussion of such an
alliance took place in May 1938, when Hitler visited Italy. The original plan
was to extend the anti-Comintern Pact into an alliance by including the
Japanese. It became increasingly evident as time went on that the Japanese were
unwilling to proceed this far. The Japanese feared that such an alliance might
involve them in difficulties with Great Britain at a time when they were
seriously committed in China. The German and Italian attempts to mediate
between Japan and Nationalist China in 1938 were unsuccessful. Ribbentrop
telephoned a last special appeal to the Japanese for an alliance on April 26,
1939, by way of German Ambassador Ott in Tokio. The reply to this appeal was
negative as expected, and Ribbentrop proceeded to concentrate his efforts on a
separate Pact with the Italians. He knew that this was a difficult project,
because many Italians doubted the wisdom of an alliance connection with
Germany. He also knew that the Italian leaders might seek to impose
reservations which would deprive the alliance of its full effect.
The Roosevelt message of April 15,1939, was helpful to
Ribbentrop in improving German contacts with a number of countries. Ribbentrop
also had the satisfaction of knowing that the British were not pleased by the
crudeness of the Roosevelt telegrams. Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, the British
Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, declared quite candidly at the German Foreign
Office on April 17, 1939, that the British regarded Roosevelt's messages as
"a clumsy piece of diplomacy." Bullitt at Paris attempted to appease
Roosevelt by placing the unsavory situation in a positive light. He claimed
that Daladier had been "encouraged" by the latest move of the
American President.
Ribbentrop dispatched instructions on April 17, 1939,
to the German envoys in the countries named by President Roosevelt, with the
exceptions of Great Britain and France and their possessions, and Poland and
Russia. The envoys were to inquire if these countries believed themselves
threatened, and if their Governments had authorized President Roosevelt's plan.
The German Government knew that they would receive negative answers to both
questions, but in coping with Roosevelt they required explicit confirmation of
these assumptions.
The British were actively pursuing their policy
against Germany in the period of the Roosevelt messages. Polish Ambassador
Potworowski reported to Beck from Stockholm on April 15, 1939, that the British
were putting pressure on Sweden to join them in blockading Germany during a future
war. The Swedes resented the British attempt to dictate their policy, but it
was evident to Beck that England was preparing her future blockade of Germany
with single-minded energy. Halifax was employing sphinxlike silence as a weapon
against his critics in the British House of Commons. He ignored charges that
Poland and Rumania would never permit Soviet troops to operate on their
territory, and that the guarantees extended to those countries rendered
impossible a treaty with Russia. Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign
Affairs Rab Butler refused to reply to a direct question on April 18, 1939,
about the role of Danzig in the British guarantee to Poland. Only one speaker
in the House of Commons contended that Poland and Rumania alone had sufficient
troops to cope successfully with the Germans. The House as a whole found it
quite impossible to accept such a contention.
Hitler's Reply to
Roosevelt of April 28, 1939
British Ambassador Henderson appeared rather
pessimistic when he called at the German Foreign Office on April 27, 1939. He
had returned to Berlin the previous day, after having been compelled to remain
forty days in England at the insistence of Halifax, who had waited until April
20, 1939, before announcing in the House of Lords that Henderson would soon
return to Germany. Henderson admitted to [German State Secretary] Weizsaecker
that he had suffered a great loss of prestige at the British Foreign Office.
The reaction there toward the reports he had sent home before the March 1939
Czech crisis was distinctly negative. He complained that the task of defending
recent German policy had been rendered difficult by Hitler's various earlier
statements that he did not intend to seize purely Czech-populated territory.
This situation was not changed by Hitler's willingness to negotiate about the
current situation at Prague, because the British Government was unwilling to do
so. Weizsaecker complained about the British guarantee to Poland, and he
declared that it was "the means most calculated to encourage Polish
subordinate authorities in their oppression of Germans there. Consequently it
did not prevent, but on the contrary, provoked incidents in that country."
Henderson submitted a formal statement about the British announcement of April
26, 1939, that peacetime military conscription had been established in Great
Britain. The French leaders had requested the British to take this step as
early as April 1938, and the German leaders had recognized for some time that
the British were planning to introduce formal conscription to supplement the
1938 National Service Act. Weizsaecker told Henderson that the British note
would receive formal acknowledgement, but that nothing would be done before
Hitler's speech on the following day. He told Henderson that the text of
Hitler's speech had gone to press. The printed text of the speech was delivered
to the Diplomatic Corps in Berlin before Hitler addressed the Reichstag.
Hitler had received considerable American advice for
the preparation of his speech. Some of this had reached him by way of the
American press, and the rest by means of private communication to the German
Embassy in Washington, D.C. The German Government was especially grateful for
the suggestion of General Hugh Johnson, who had administered the National
Recovery Act for President Roosevelt. Hitler had received through Hans Thomsen,
the German Charge d'Affaires in Washington, D.C., the detailed suggestions of
General Johnson on April 24, 1939. Hans Dieckhoff, the last German Ambassador
to the United States, had also made a number of suggestions. Dieckhoff worked
at the German Foreign Office in Berlin after his permanent return from the
United States in November 1938. He made no secret, in his conversations with
the Diplomatic Corps in Berlin, about his fear of American intervention in the
event of a new European war, and he expressed this concern in his suggestions
to Hitler on April 25, 1939. He was convinced that President Roosevelt intended
to invade Europe with powerful American forces in the course of any future war,
and he added: "I do not believe that there are elements in the USA which
have courage enough or are strong enough to prevent this." Hitler was
impressed by this warning, but he continued to hope for American neutrality in
any possible future European conflict.
The German Foreign Office on April 27, 1939, completed
the preparation of notes to be delivered at noon on April 28th in London and
Warsaw. The notes announced German abrogation of the 1934 non-aggression Pact
with Poland and of the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Pact. The note to the Poles,
which contained a review of recent German-Polish difficulties, was more than
twice the length of the note to London.
Kennard surveyed the Polish scene for Halifax on April
26, 1939. He claimed that Poland might have fought Germany without British
support, but he assured Halifax that the Poles after they received the British
guarantee believed it was "absolutely fundamental" to fight Germany.
The German note announcing the abrogation of the 1934 Pact with Poland was
delivered at Warsaw early on the morning of April 28, 1939. Beck's immediate
reaction was one of unbridled scorn. He noted that the Germans still envisaged
the possibility of negotiation with Poland. He declared to his subordinates
that Hitler was seeking to solve his problems by diplomacy, and he vowed that
he would not permit Poland to be imposed upon in this way. Beck had anticipated
Hitler's address on April 28th by persuading the Polish military authorities to
declare a state of alert and danger of war for the Polish Navy based at Gdynia.
French Ambassador Coulondre at Berlin discussed the
situation with Lipski. The French Ambassador complained that the European scene
was very confused, and that this was due in no small measure to the fact that
the British in their diplomacy rushed abruptly from one extreme to another.
Lipski described in detail the German offer for a settlement which Poland had
rejected. Coulondre and Lipski agreed that the German offer was remarkably
generous. Coulondre hoped to discover the true motive for Polish policy, but
the Polish Ambassador merely mentioned that it was the avowed purpose of the
Polish leaders never to be dependent on either Moscow or Berlin.
The day of Hitler's greatest oratorical performance had
arrived. The German Reichstag assembled on the morning of April 28, 1939, under
the presidency of Marshal Hermann Göring. It received a good-humored speech
from Hitler, which American Charge d'Affaires Geist described as his
"lighter vein of oratory." The Reichstag reciprocated this mood, and
Geist noted that many of Hitler's remarks were received with "malicious
laughter." The laughter seemed malicious to Geist because it was at the
expense of the American President.
Hitler carefully left the door of negotiation open
toward both Great Britain and Poland. He made it clear that he intended to
remain moderate in his future negotiations with these two states. He began his
remarks by referring briefly to Roosevelt's telegram. He explained the German
disillusionment in council diplomacy, which was the inevitable heritage of the
deceitful mistreatment of Germany at Versailles. He had a formula which enabled
Germany to participate in all negotiations with renewed confidence. The formula
was a healthy determination to protect German national security. Hitler
admitted that he did not believe Germany ever should negotiate again when she
was helpless.
He analyzed and explained many of his principal
domestic and foreign policies from 1933 until the German occupation of Prague
in March 1939. He treated the prelude to the occupation of Prague at great
length. He pointed out that deviations from the Munich conference program began
at an early date. The Czechs and Hungarians in October 1938 appealed solely to
Germany and Italy to mediate in their dispute, although at Munich it had been
decided that mediation was the obligation of the Four Powers.
Hitler placed special emphasis in the latter part of
his speech on the failure of the United States to emerge from the world economic
depression under Rooseveltian leadership. He announced that Germany was
responding to Roosevelt's initiative of April 15, 1939, by proceeding to
conclude non-aggression pacts with a number of neighboring states. But he
ridiculed the idea of non-aggression pacts with states on different continents,
or with so-called states which actually did not enjoy independence. Ridicule
was Hitler's chief weapon, next to facts and statistics, in his reply to
Roosevelt. He had been genuinely amused by Roosevelt's telegram, and he
succeeded in avoiding the impression that he was personally angry with the
American President. Hitler made it appear that Roosevelt's constant efforts to
provoke him had been mere slaps at the water of the vast Atlantic ocean which
separated the two countries.
The German Chancellor paid glowing compliments to the
British Empire, and he stressed his desire for permanent Anglo-German
friendship. He revealed that he had decided with reluctance to abrogate the
Anglo-German Naval Pact. He suggested that British resentment toward recent
German foreign policy successes might have prompted the British leaders to
select Poland as an obstacle to place against Germany.
Hitler devoted less than a tenth of his speech to
Poland. He explained that he respected Polish maritime interests, and that this
had prompted him to proceed with extreme moderation in the Corridor question.
He praised Marshal Pilsudski for his desire to improve German-Polish relations.
Hitler explained that in 1934 the two states had renounced war as an instrument
of national policy in their relations. This was in accord with the terms of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. The pact had recognized one significant exception
to this declaration on behalf of Poland. The Poles were allowed to maintain
military obligations to France which were directed exclusively against Germany.
Hitler mentioned the many important questions which
had not been settled either by the 1934 Pact or by his own efforts for a more
comprehensive German-Polish agreement. He described in detail all the points of
his offer for a general settlement with Poland. He declared that the Polish
counter-proposals offered no basis for an agreement. They envisaged no change
in the existing unsatisfactory situation with the exception of the suggestion
to replace League authority at Danzig with a German-Polish guarantee. The
German Chancellor regretted Poland's decision to call up troops against
Germany, and to reject the German offer. He deplored Polish acceptance of the
British guarantee. He announced that Germany was no longer willing to offer her
October 1938 proposals as the basis for a settlement of differences with
Poland. He explained that he was abrogating the 1934 Pact with Poland, which he
had offered to extend for twenty-five years, because the Poles had violated it
by accepting the British guarantee. He remarked that no non-aggression pact
could survive a unilateral departure from its provisions by one of the
contracting parties.
Hitler declared that the abrogation of the Pact did
not mean that Germany would refuse to assume new contractual obligations toward
Poland. He insisted that, on the contrary, "I can but welcome such an
idea, provided, of course, that there arrangements are based, on an absolutely
clear obligation binding both parties in equal measure." Hitler avoided
treating the Polish issue as the climax of his remarks. The principal theme
throughout the speech was his reply to President Roosevelt, which he
sub-divided into twenty-one principal points. He created the impression that
such momentous decisions as the repudiation of important pacts with Great
Britain and Poland were an anticlimax compared to his debate with the American
President.
The immediate reaction to Hitler's speech in Poland
was hostile, although French Ambassador Noel observed that Hitler was pressing
for negotiations rather than closing the door. The Polish Government announced
that Beck soon would reply to Hitler in the Polish Sejm. Polski Zbrojna (The
Polish Army) described Hitler's abrogation of the 1934 Pact as a tactical
blunder. One Polish editor claimed that Hitler's speech gave the Polish press a
moral basis to attack Germany without restraint. Wild rumors accompanied
Hitler's announcement of his proposals to Poland. It was claimed in Warsaw that
the Germans had demanded a superhighway corridor through Polish West Prussia
over fifteen miles in width instead of the actual 5/8 mile. The Gazeta
Polska claimed that Poland would have to go further in Danzig than she had
done in the past. One million Polish soldiers under arms by the beginning of
summer was considered a minimum necessity. The Dziennik Narodowy (National
Daily), a National Democratic paper, asked whether or not Danzig really wished
to return to the Reich. It was suggested that possibly a handful of Nazis in
the Free City were making all the noise. A rumor circulated that Poland had
decided to establish a protectorate in Danzig based on the model of
Bohemia-Moravia. The Kurjer Warszawski (Warsaw Courier) expressed the
general sentiment that Hitler would not ask anything of Poland if he were
really a generous person.
This time the German press retaliated. Joseph Goebbels
had received permission to unshackle the press after the Reichstag speech. It
was hoped that the German press, and an aroused German public opinion, would be
effective weapons in inducing the Poles to negotiate under the less friendly
circumstances which prevailed after the British guarantee. Goebbels himself
began the campaign in Der Angriff (The Assault) with a commentary on the
Polish press, entitled: "Do they know what they are doing?" The
article was studded with citations, and its main thesis was that irresponsible
Polish journalists were violating the precepts of Pilsudski. Hans Fritzsche,
who was one of Goebbels' chief assistants in the newspaper campaign, later
recalled that "each larger German newspaper had for quite some time an
abundance of material on complaints of the Germans in Poland without the
editors having had a chance to use this material." When the restrictions
were removed, "their material now came forth with a bound."
American Ambassador Bullitt at Paris refrained from
reporting the reactions of Daladier and Bonnet to Hitler's speech, but he
claimed that Secretary-General Alexis Leger at the French Foreign Office had
denounced Hitler's oratory in sharp terms. The German Embassy in Paris reported
on April 29, 1939, that the moderate tone of Hitler's speech had produced a
reassuring effect on the French leaders. Charge d'Affaires Theo Kordt also reported
from London that Hitler's speech had produced a conciliatory effect in England.
American Ambassador Biddle at Warsaw submitted a report to Washington, D.C., on
April 28, 1939, which contained a tortuous attempt to square the circle in the
face of Hitler's logic, and to support the Polish stand against Germany. German
Charge d'Affaires Thomsen reported the American press reaction to Hitler's
speech on April 29, 1939. He expressed his personal fear that the Western
countries would make an irresistible effort to produce a new World War out of
the Danzig-Corridor problem. President Roosevelt read the English translation
of Hitler's speech on April 28, 1939. Hitler's ridicule threw Roosevelt into a
violent rage and produced undying hatred of Hitler personally. This personal
factor was added to the other motives which prompted Roosevelt to desire the
destruction of Germany. Roosevelt had been doing everything possible to promote
war in Europe before Hitler's speech. Now his personal hatred of Hitler might cause
him to make some mistake even more foolish than the telegrams of April 15,
1939, to Hitler and Mussolini. He did not have the support of the American
public for his war policy, and it was possible that a few more blunders might
lead to the total failure of his policy.
Throughout the late Spring and into the Summer of
1939, relations between Poland and Germany worsen, as Beck-with the reassurance
of the British guarantee behind him-remains adamant in not negotiating with
Germany over the Danzig and Corridor questions. Militarist and expansionist
sentiment runs high in Poland; prominent Polish newspapers print maps claiming
that large slices of German territory in fact belong to Poland ethnically and
historically. Incidents of terror against the German minority in Poland
increase. German schools in Poland are closed on a large scale. Germany appeals
to Poland to stop the wave of terror and violence within its borders, to no
avail.
Potocki Urges a
Change in Polish Policy
The Germans were forced to conclude that attempts to
arouse sympathy for the German minority in the West or to exert indirect
pressure on Poland were ineffective. The only alternatives were direct
intervention or passive acquiescence in the final elimination of the German
minority. There were many indications that hostility toward Germany was
increasing simultaneously in Great Britain and the United States. Charge
d'Affaires Thomsen sent word from Washington, D.C., on May 17, 1939, that
President Roosevelt had told the Senate Military Affairs Committee that it
would be a very good thing if both Hitler and Mussolini were assassinated. The
situation in France was less unpromising. Ambassador Welczeck reported on May
20th that French Foreign Minister Bonnet had assured him on the previous day
that he maintained his firm belief in the advantages of Franco-German
cooperation. Bonnet declared that he was not folding his hands in his lap, and
that he was working actively on a plan to preserve the peace. Official circles
in the United States and Great Britain were more or less in step with Polish
fanaticism, whereas France was obviously reluctant to go along with it.
Beck was faced at this time with several pleas from
Polish diplomats for an understanding with Germany. Polish Ambassador Jerzy Potocki,
who was on leave from the United States, discussed the situation with Beck at
the Polish Foreign Office on July 6, 1939. He told Beck that he had returned to
Poland with. the express purpose of proposing a change in Polish policy. He
complained that the United States and England were suffering from a severe war
psychosis. There had been wild rumors on the ship which brought him to Europe
that the Germans had occupied Danzig. He insisted that the Jews, the leading
capitalists, and the armament manufacturers of the West were united in a solid
front for war. They were delighted to find their pretext in the Danzig issue
and in Poland's defiant attitude. Potocki added that the most repulsive factor
was their complete and cold indifference to the destruction of Poland.
Potocki insisted that the Poles were merely negro
slaves in the opinion of the Western profiteers. They were expected to work
without receiving anything in return. He sought to appeal to Beck's vanity by
claiming that the Polish Foreign Minister was the only man they feared in
Poland. He argued that the United States, despite Roosevelt's fever for
intervention in Europe, were actually concentrating their own imperialist drive
on Latin America. He assured Beck that it would be sheer illusion to expect the
United States to intervene in Europe on behalf of Poland. Potocki was forced to
conclude that his eloquent arguments produced no .effect on the Polish Foreign
Minister.
Polish Ambassador Sokolnicki at Ankara supported
Potocki in this effort. He was a close friend of Jan Szembek, and it was
evident to Potocki and Sokolnicki that Szembek would accept their position if
he were Polish Foreign Minister. It seemed likely, too, that Pilsudski would
have rejected the Beck policy had he been alive. Sokolnicki confided to German
Ambassador Papen at Ankara on July 14, 1939, that he would like to see a
negotiated settlement between Germany and Poland before the Jews and the Free
Masons had convinced the world that a catastrophic conflict was inevitable. The
Polish diplomat added that he would be pleased to see the Anglo-Soviet alliance
negotiations end in failure as soon as possible.
The American diplomats in Europe continued to oppose
peace and urge war. Bullitt was disgusted with the failure of Bonnet to
encourage Poland with a blank check at Danzig. He continued to warn Roosevelt
that the French Foreign Minister was working for peace. Bullitt was delighted
at times to find that Bonnet was pessimistic about the chances for peace. He
reported with satisfaction on June 28, 1939, that Bonnet could see no way out
for Hitler other than war. Biddle at Warsaw gave uncritical support to Polish
policy at Danzig. He claimed in a report on July 12, 1939, that Viktor
Boettcher, the unofficial Danzig foreign minister and a close personal friend
of [League High Commisionar at Danzig] Burckhardt, had become openly aggressive
and was no longer a "repressed imperialist." Biddle failed to explain
why a man who desired the reunion of his native city with his native country,
according to the wishes of the vast majority of both parties, was an
imperialist.
By the beginning of August, tensions between Germany
and Poland are at the boiling point. The anti-German incidents have continued
unabated. Thousands of ethnic German refugees flee Poland and are sheltered by
Germany. Marshal Smigly-Rydz is more bellicose than ever. The Polish government
engages in provocations and takes economic reprisals at Danzig. On August 4th,
a Polish ultimatum is presented to the Danzig Senate, notifying it that the
frontiers of Danzig will be closed to the importation of all foreign food
products unless the Danzig government promises that it will not interfere with
the activities of Polish customs inspectors. Since the Danzig populace depends
in the main on food from the outside to survive, this is a formidable threat.
Germany is outraged.
Roosevelt Responds
to the Crisis of Early August
American Ambassador Bullitt at Paris informed
President Roosevelt on August 3, 1939, that Beck was predicting that an intense
and decisive phase of the crisis between Germany and Poland might occur before
August 15, 1939. President Roosevelt knew that Poland was obviously to blame
for the crisis which began at Danzig on August 4th, and he was alarmed at the
prospect that the American public might learn the truth about the situation.
This could be a decisive factor in discouraging his program for American
military intervention in Europe. He instructed Under-Secretary Sumner Welles on
August 11, 1939, to order American Ambassador Biddle to advise the Poles about
this problem. President Roosevelt urged the Poles to be more clever in making
it appear that German moves were responsible for any inevitable explosion at
Danzig.
The response of Beck to American intervention was not
encouraging. Biddle reported to President Roosevelt, at midnight on August
11th, that the Polish Government had decided that there could be absolutely no
concessions to Germany. Beck was obviously unwilling to engage in a series of
elaborate but empty maneuvers which might have been useful in deceiving the
American public. Beck wished the American President to know that he was content
at the moment to have full British support for his policy. Beck showed Biddle a
report from Polish Ambassador Raczynski at London on August 13, 1939. The
report contained the explicit approval of Halifax for recent Polish measures at
Danzig.
Since March Halifax has been courting Russia for an
AngloFrench-Soviet alliance, if not with Poland then without her (though her at
least passive acquiescence to any arrangement would have to be obtained). The
British and French missions to Moscow proceed into August, but the negotiations
bog down especially on the question of Poland's role. The British and French
give their OK to the possible movement of Soviet troops through Poland in a
"protector" role in the case of German-Polish war. But Poland
absolutely refuses any such deal. It is clear that time is running out,
especially as Stalin -distrustful, with reason, of the Western Powers, and
having given a series of diplomatic "hints" for months previous
-begins to eye Hitler favorably, and vice-versa. Stalin would like to see a war
of attrition between Germany and the West without his involvement, so that he
could move in and pick up the pieces after the combattants had bled themselves
dry. Hitler would like to have his hands freed in the East, after a defeat of
Poland, by an accomodation with Stalin. Ideally, he hopes that such an
accomodation will shock the Western Powers into thinking twice about their
apparent plans for what would then amount to a one-front Western war with
Germany. In this way Hitler hopes to prevent a general European war.
Roosevelt and the
Attempt at an Anglo-French-Soviet Alliance
American Ambassador Bullitt at Paris was not
enthusiastic about the Anglo-French attempt to conclude an alliance with the
Soviet Union. He was inclined to agree with the hostile Polish attitude toward
Russia. Bullitt had been American Ambassador at Moscow from 1933 to 1936, and he
had few illusions about the Soviet Union. He suggested in his final report from
Moscow on April 20, 1936, that the Russian standard of living was possibly
lower than that of any other country in the world. He reported that the
Bulgarian Comintern leader, Dimitrov, had admitted that Soviet popular front
and collective security tactics were aimed at undermining the foreign
capitalist systems. He insisted that relations of sincere friendship between
the Soviet Union and the United States were an impossibility. He admitted that
a conflict between Germany and France would expose Europe to the danger of
Communist domination. He believed that it was worth taking this risk in order
to destroy Germany, but he was fully aware of the danger involved.
President Roosevelt was aware that economic and social
conditions in Germany were far superior to those in the Soviet Union.
Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, who succeeded Bullitt at Moscow, reported to
Roosevelt on April 1, 1938, that the terror in Russia was "a horrifying fact."
Davies also complained about the gigantic Soviet expenditures on armaments, and
he reported that about 25% of the total Soviet national income in 1937 was
spent on defense, compared to 10% in Germany. Davies reported that Stalin, in a
letter to Pravda on February 14, 1938, had confirmed his intention to spread
the Communist system throughout the world. Stalin promised that the Soviet
Government would work with foreign Communists to achieve this goal. He
concluded his letter by stating: "I wish very much ... that there were no
longer on earth such unpleasant things as a capitalistic environment, the
danger of a military attack, the danger of the restoration of capitalism, and
so on." Davies mentioned that General Ernst Koestring, the veteran German
military attache in the Soviet Union, continued to hold a high opinion of the
Red Army despite the gigantic purges of 1937 in the Russian military services.
Davies concluded that the Soviet Union could best be described as "a
terrible tyranny." The presentation of these reports did not prompt
President Roosevelt to withdraw the statement he had made in his major address
at Chicago on October 6, 1937, that the Soviet Union was one of the
peace-loving nations of the world. Roosevelt was fully aware of the danger from
Communism, but he believed that this consideration was unimportant compared to
his preferred objective of destroying National Socialist Germany.
Premier Daladier of France would have been furious had
he known that Kennard was sabotaging British pressure on Poland with the
argument that American sensibilities had to be taken into account. He told
American Ambassador Bullitt at Paris on August 18th that he was shocked and
angered by the "violence" with which Lukasiewicz and Beck had
rejected Soviet aid to Poland. Daladier claimed that it would be easy to
internationalize Soviet aid to the Poles by sending two French and one British
divisions to Poland by way of Russia. Daladier repeated to Bullitt three times
with increasing emphasis that he would not send a single French peasant to give
his life for Poland if the Poles rejected Russian aid.
Bullitt was alarmed by this revelation of what he
considered a violently anti-Polish reaction on the part of Daladier. He had
applied pressure for months on Daladier and Alexis Leger, the Secretary-General
at the French Foreign Office, in the hope that they would distance themselves
from the peace policy of Georges Bonnet and repudiate that policy. He had
visited London in May 1939 to coordinate his strategy with the efforts of Sir
Robert Vansittart. The Diplomatic Adviser to His Majesty's Government
considered relations with France to be his own special province, and he hoped
to support the Halifax war policy by securing French participation in any war
against Germany. Vansittart assured Bullitt that Alexis Leger was his
"intimate friend," and that Leger could be relied upon to support the
efforts of Halifax and Roosevelt to involve France in war with Germany.
Bullitt, Vansittart, and Leger feared that Sir Eric
Phipps, the British Ambassador to France and brother-in-law of Vansittart,
shared the negative attitude of Prime Minister Chamberlain toward an alliance
between the Western Powers and Russia. Bullitt had begun to dislike Bonnet, and
he reported to President Roosevelt without any regard for accuracy: "in
point of fact both Bonnet and Sir Eric Phipps were opposed to bringing the
Soviet Union into close cooperation with France and England." Bullitt also
feared that Prime Minister Chamberlain might attempt to challenge the policy of
Halifax and restore his own control over the conduct of British policy.
American Ambassador Kennedy had reported from London on July 20, 1939, that
Chamberlain was "sick and disgusted with Russians." The British Prime
Minister believed that Hitler would welcome any tangible opportunity for a
peaceful settlement. Chamberlain knew that Hitler was not bluffing and that he
might gamble on a war, but he told Kennedy that Hitler "is highly
intelligent and therefore would not be prepared to wage a world war."
President Roosevelt had intervened directly in the
negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on August 4, 1939.
Lawrence Steinhardt, who had succeeded Davies as American Ambassador to Russia,
was instructed by confidential letter to tell Molotov that the interests of the
United States and the Soviet Union were identical in promoting the defeat of
Italy and Germany in a European war. President Roosevelt urged the Soviet Union
to conclude a military alliance with Great Britain and France, and he intimated
that the United States would ultimately join this coalition of Powers. The
American Ambassador was informed that President Roosevelt had told Soviet
Ambassador Konstantin Umansky, before the latter departed for Russia on leave,
that the United States hoped to achieve a position of solidarity with the
Soviet Union against Germany and Italy.
The Russians were pleased with the Roosevelt message
because it strengthened their position in negotiations with both the Western
Powers and Germany, and the support of Roosevelt made it easier for them to
gain consent for their ambitious program of expansion in Finland, Poland,
Rumania, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Russians had no desire to conceal
from the foreign Powers the contents of the confidential Roosevelt message. The
news of the message appeared in the Voelkischer Beobachter at Berlin on August
11, 1939, and its contents were published by the Ilustrowany Kurjer at Krakow
on August 13, 1939. Steinhardt knew that Umansky had been informed of the
contents of the Roosevelt message before leaving the United States. The letter
with the message was sent by way of Bullitt at Paris, and Steinhardt did not
receive it until August 15, 1939. He concluded that Molotov had instructed
Umansky to reveal the contents of the lettef before it reached Russia, and that
Molotov had proceeded to permit the news of the letter to reach the foreign
Powers before he had actually received it himself.
Steinhardt presented the Roosevelt letter to Molotov
on August 16, 1939 and the two diplomats proceeded to discuss its contents.
Roosevelt, in writing the letter, had hoped to influence Russian policy in
favor of the Western Powers, but it is not surprising that he failed completely
in this effort, and that Molotov used the message for his own purposes. Molotov
told Steinhardt that the British and French military missions had come to
Russia to discuss military collaboration in terms which the Soviet Foreign
Commissar characterized as "vague generalities." Molotov added that
these missions were unable to contend with the specific points which Russia had
raised.
Steinhardt reported to President Roosevelt on August
16th that he was personally convinced that the Soviet Union would seek to avoid
participation in the early phase of a European conflict. This annoyed President
Roosevelt, who seemingly would have led the United States into a European
conflict on the first day of war had American public opinion and the American
Congress permitted such a policy. The American President was perturbed to
learn, a few days later, that Alexis Leger at the French Foreign Office was not
the unconditional advocate of war-at-any-price which Bullitt had claimed. Leger
revealed his opinion that it would be exceedingly unwise for Great Britain and
France to attack Germany without military support from the Soviet Union. This
seemed to indicate that there would be virtually no support for a war policy in
France if the negotiations at Moscow failed. Roosevelt also learned that
Premier Daladier was continuing to denounce the "criminal folly" of
the Poles. President Roosevelt knew that Halifax would abandon his project for
war against Germany if he was unable to gain the military support of either the
Soviet Union or France. The possibility that the peace might be saved was
perturbing to the American President who hoped to utilize a European war to
achieve his dream for the perpetuation of his tenure and the increase of his
personal prestige and glory.
By August 11th, even as negotiations with the British
and French are still in progress, Stalin decides to exercise the option with
Germany. A definite indication is sent to Berlin the next day. Russian Foreign
Minister Molotov and German Ambassador Schulenberg engage in preliminary talks.
With the final failure of the British and French missions, the way is open for
a German-Soviet agreement. On August 23rd, after the settling of a commercial
treaty, Ribbentrop flies to Moscow; that night a GermanSoviet nonaggression
pact is signed and announced to the world. It is a desperate, quickly-snatched
triumph for Hitler, whose satisfaction at his position is marred only by the
knowledge that Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, had backed Italy down
and out of the "united front" with Germany in the face of an evident
Anglo-French determination to go to war over Danzig.
The German-Soviet
Pact
Hitler hoped to recover the diplomatic initiative
through his Kremlin pact of August 23, 1939. The effort launched by Halifax on
March 17, 1939, to build a formidable British alliance front in Eastern Europe
had failed. Hitler also hoped that Great Britain and France would react to this
situation by withdrawing their support from Poland. He knew that his pact with
Russia placed him in a strong position to resume negotiations with the Western
Powers. His recent success was too sensational to permit new negotiation
efforts to be readily confused with weakness. The British Government gave
Hitler an excellent opening for his new diplomatic campaign by commissioning Chamberlain
to write to him. The British leaders, of course, did not intend to embark on
major negotiations, but Hitler had other plans. The presentation of the
Chamberlain letter by Henderson on August 23, 1939, was the signal for a major
German diplomatic offensive in Great Britain.
The situation would have been relatively simple for
Hitler by August 23, 1939, had it not been for the unpardonable indiscretion of
Ciano and the incredible conduct of General Gamelin. The statement of Ciano on
August 18th that Italy would not support Germany cushioned Halifax from the
impact of the German treaty with Russia, and it gave General Gamelin an excuse
to rationalize the unfavorable French military situation, which had been
created by the Russian agreement with Germany. The action of Ciano was
especially unwarranted because the Italian Foreign Minister knew that Hitler
hoped to create the maximum effect of surprise with his Russian pact. Ciano
knew that his own pledge to the British would greatly reduce the impact of Hitler's
diplomacy. It was easy to argue in London that the position of Hitler would be
insecure if the Italians refused to be loyal to their engagements with him.
Italian loyalty to Hitler and a clear decision from France against war on
behalf of the Poles would surely have pulled the teeth from the Halifax
campaign to launch a preventive war against Germany. The absence of these
contingencies made it exceedingly difficult for Hitler to capitalize on his
Russian success in negotiations with the British leaders. He was not fully
aware of this situation on August 23rd. He knew nothing of the Italian pledge
to the British on August 18th, or of the crucial debate in the meeting of the
French Defense Council. He failed to appreciate the adamant determination of Halifax
for war. He knew that British Ambassador Henderson was opposed to war, and he
hoped that the views of the British diplomat at Berlin were shared to some
extent by his master at London. Hitler was more optimistic than the facts
warranted, but this was mainly because he was not fully aware of the existing
situation.
The Russians too were unduly optimistic about their
prospects on August 23, 1939. They overestimated the military power of France,
and they expected a hopeless military stalemate on the Franco-German front
reminiscent of World War 1. Stalin hoped to expand his position in Eastern
Europe, and to intervene militarily against Germany in the latter phase of a
European war, when both Germany and the Western Powers were exhausted. There
was one notably great difference in the attitudes of Stalin and Hitler. The
Soviet Dictator, like Halifax and Roosevelt, was hoping for the outbreak of a
general European war. Hitler considered that a European war would be a great
evil, and he was anxious to prevent it. It is ironical to anticipate that the
leaders of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States ultimately
joined together in true Orwellian fashion, at Nuremberg in 1945-1946, to
condemn the German leaders for deliberately seeking, as "aggressors,"
to destroy the peace of the world.
In July, Hitler had launched a private program for
peace at the suggestion of Reichsmarshall Göring. Göring's friend Birger
Dahlerus, a Swedish engineer with many contacts in both Britain and Germany,
arranged unofficial meetings throughout July and August between Germans and
British supporters of the Chamberlain government. Other private contacts
between the Germans and the British developed. Potentially good news about the
attitude of influential Britons-their desire to see peace between Britain and
Germany maintained-came from these conferences, including a report stating that
William S. Ropp, who had been selected to head the British Air Ministry
intelligence service division for Germany in wartime, claimed that there was
lively opposition to war with Germany in the British Air Ministry. Ropp had
further suggested that a British-French declaration of war on Germany need not
be taken seriously, because it would be possible to conclude peace after the
completion of the Polish phase of hostilities. Göring, ever suspicious,
suspects the Ropp remarks may be a British ploy, designed to lure Hitler into
gambling in Poland. But Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Foreign Policy office of
the National Socialist Party, believes the sentiments may well be genuine and
accurate. His report on the matter is forwarded to the German Foreign Office
and to Hitler.
Hitler Hopes for
Peace -- Despite Roosevelt
The German Foreign Office also received a confidential
report on August 16,1939, from Paul Legrenier, a French journalist who was
sincerely friendly toward Germany. Legrenier insisted that Great Britain and
France would not go to war against Germany in a conflict between Germany and
Poland arising from trouble at Danzig. He was basing his report on the
determination of French Foreign Minister Bonnet not to fight for Polish
interests at Danzig, and on the obvious fact that Great Britain would not
attack Germany without French support. Joseph Barnes, the Berlin correspondent
of the New York Herald Tribune, estimated to the German diplomats on the
same day that there was still at least a 50-50 chance that Great Britain and
France would not attack Germany. Barnes added that he was basing his estimate
on the assumption that Germany would make a great effort to avoid needless
provocation of Great Britain and France. The reports of Ropp, Legrenier, and
Barnes were received by Hitler on August 16, 1939, before the announcement of
the Russo-German Pact. Hitler was convinced that the conclusion of the Pact
with Russia would increase the chances for peace. It is not astonishing under
these circumstances that he was more optimistic than Göring or Mussolini about
the possibilities of avoiding an Anglo-German war.
The German Foreign Office was under no illusion about
the official policy of President Roosevelt in the current crisis. They knew
that his policy was based on the twin assumptions that there should and would
be a general European war. There was also reason to believe that some of the
American diplomats in Berlin did not share this attitude. British Ambassador
Henderson informed the Germans that American Charge d'Affaires Kirk was
constantly prodding him to insist that Great Britain would fight rather than
retreat, but there was ample evidence that Kirk hoped a show of British
firmness would prompt Hitler to make new proposals for a settlement. The
Germans also knew that Kirk had severely reprimanded Louis P. Lochner, the
American journalist, for questioning the determination of Germany to go to war.
Lochner was following the tactics of the Polish journalists by claiming that
Hitler was bluffing, because he knew that these tactics would encourage German
defiance and make war more likely. It was obvious that Kirk would not have
intervened with Lochner on his own initiative had he personally favored war,
and the German diplomats were pleased to learn that Kirk had denounced his
warmongering.
The Roosevelt
Messages to Germany and Poland
President Roosevelt sent insincere peace messages to
Germany and Poland at 9:00 P.m. on August 24, 1939. He ignored in his message
to Germany the rebuff he had received from Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on
April 28th by claiming that "to the message which I sent you last April I
have received no reply." He proposed a settlement between Germany and
Poland by direct negotiation, arbitration, or mediation. He was treading on
difficult ground, because Poland, whom he favored, rather than Germany, whom he
opposed, blocked the resumption of negotiations. The messages from President
Roosevelt forced President Moscicki of Poland to pay lip service to
negotiation, although the Polish Government did not desire to resume contact
with the Germans. The reply of President Moscicki was a definite pledge to
President Roosevelt that Poland would negotiate, although the Poles actually
had no intention of doing so.
President Roosevelt informed Hitler that "it is
understood, of course, that upon resort to any one of the alternatives I
suggest, each nation will agree to accord complete respect to the independence
and territorial integrity of the other." President Roosevelt imagined that
this arrangement would preclude in advance any tangible Polish concessions to
Germany, but its terms were entirely consistent with the Hitler offer of
October 1938 which the Poles had rejected. The original German proposals were
actually based upon the respect of the independence and territorial integrity
of Poland. This had not prevented the Poles from rejecting them and from
ordering the partial mobilization of the Polish armed forces against Germany.
Hitler had revealed to the world the inaccuracies and fallacies in the
Roosevelt proposals of April 15, 1939, to Germany and Italy, but President
Roosevelt rarely accepted criticism. He blandly concluded his message to Hitler
with the statement that the United States was prepared to contribute to peace
"in the form set forth in my messages of April 14 (advance release of the
messages to the American press on that date)." The Roosevelt messages to
Germany and Poland were made public at Washington, D.C., at 10:00 p.m. on
August 24, 1939. The message to Hitler was not submitted to the German Foreign
Office by American Charge d'Affaires Kirk until 9:00 a.m. on August 25th.
Hitler decided to defer his reply to President Roosevelt for several days. He
was intent, because of the importance of German-American relations, upon
preparing a carefully cogent and courteous exposition of the German position
for the benefit of the American President.
German Ambassador Mackensen had a satisfactory
conversation with Mussolini about the Russo-German treaty early on August 25,
1939. The Italian leader warmly assured Mackensen that he approved of this
Pact, and he recalled that he had suggested this himself the previous Spring. Mussolini
told Mackensen that he was whole-heartedly in accord with Germany's position in
the Polish question. The Italian leader described the worsening of
German-Polish relations as "so acute that an armed conflict can no longer
be avoided." He was convinced that the Polish mentality was "no
longer responsive to reasonable suggestions, no matter from which side they
might come."
Mackensen was immensely impressed by the attitude
displayed by Mussolini in the absence of Ciano or [Italian Ambassador to Germany]
Attolico. Mussolini claimed that the Poles should have responded to Hitler's
original offer by accepting the German annexation of Danzig as an indication
that they were sincere in their desire to come to a general agreement with
Germany. Mussolini was convinced that "a general conference might have
followed" which would have "assured European peace for fifteen to
twenty years, as is desired by all." The attitude of the Italian leader on
the morning of August 25th was everything which Hitler could have desired, and
the German leader concluded that it would be possible to rely on Mussolini's
full support. He expected a favorable statement from Italy later in the day in
response to the earlier initiative of Ribbentrop.
Mussolini and Ciano had renewed their discussion about
a general peace conference with [British Ambassador to Italy] Sir Percy Loraine
after the announcement of the Russo-German pact. Loraine reported to Halifax on
August 23rd that Mussolini wanted peace, and that he would like to mediate in
the GermanPolish dispute. Mussolini assured Loraine that Hitler would not
accept the terms of a general settlement unless they included the German
annexation of Danzig. Loraine reported that the Italians were concentrating on
an attempt to gain a British concession on this one decisive point. Loraine
informed Halifax that both Mussolini and Ciano were convinced that a successful
diplomatic conference was the only hope for a solution of the current
difficulties.
American Ambassador William C. Bullitt was advising
both Halifax and the French leaders to maintain their military missions in
Moscow, and to continue their efforts to detach Italy from Germany. Halifax
recognized that the situation in Russia was untenable by this time. The
Anglo-French teams had no choice other than to leave Russia empty-handed.
Molotov granted an audience to French Ambassador Naggiar on August 25th,
immediately after the British and French military men departed from the Russian
capital. The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs took pleasure in announcing
to the West that the Poles were exclusively responsible for the failure of
Anglo-French negotiations with the Russians for a mutual assistance pact. This
announcement confirmed suspicions which French Foreign Minister Bonnet had entertained
for many days, and he was inclined for this reason to accept the Russian
explanation at face value. Bonnet continued to be furious with the Poles. They
had allowed Lipski to engage in an inconclusive conversation with Marshal
Göring the previous day, but they had haughtily rejected his suggestion for
Franco-Polish consultation on Danzig. The French Foreign Minister was resolved
to retaliate by seizing the first opportunity of releasing France from her
military obligations to Poland.
Halifax was no longer concerned about Russia, and he
did not share the desire of Bonnet to repress Polish excesses at Danzig. He was
primarily interested in creating the impression everywhere in the world that
the Russo-German pact had not caused him to reconsider his policy toward
Germany. Halifax dispatched uniform instructions to British diplomatic missions
in all countries on August 24th. He urged them to accept the superhuman task of
correcting the impression that the pact had been a blow to the "peace
front" headed by England and France. He also claimed that the pact
"had produced no effect" on the British Cabinet. He exhorted his
diplomats that the British course was straight ahead under the slogan of
"preventing the domination of Europe by Germany." Halifax did not
explain how a revived German nation of eighty million German citizens could
fail to be the leading continental power. After all, it had been said after
1871 that the Germany of Bismarck, with her forty million inhabitants,
dominated Europe. The policy of Halifax was calculated to destroy Germany
rather than to permit that normal growth and development which for centuries
had been considered the natural right of every nation. It was a policy which
led to the destruction of a friendly Germany and to the domination of Europe by
a hostile Union pledged to overthrow the capitalist system in Great Britain.
Percy Loraine in Rome exposed himself to ridicule in
an effort to meet the diplomatic requirements of Halifax. He informed Ciano on
August 24 that the Russo-German pact had given him "the first hearty laugh
he had had for some weeks." The same man had previously informed the
Italian leaders that a pact of mutual assistance with Russia was a necessary
feature of the British program. The Italians could be pardoned for suspecting
that his "hearty laugh" closely resembled an hysterical scream,
because they had never heard him laugh. Loraine soon learned that Halifax was
under heavy pressure at home on August 24th to modify the uncompromising
British stand at Danzig. The British Foreign Secretary confided to Loraine,
despite his earlier circular instructions, that Great Britain might ultimately
consider the return of Danzig to Germany as part of an international
settlement. Loraine was bewildered by this information, and he wondered if
Halifax intended after all to encourage Mussolini to take the initiative for a
conference, which again might resolve British difficulties. There had been no
similar suggestion from Halifax during the entire period from the British guarantee
to Poland of March 31 st to the conclusion of the Russo-German pact.
Unfortunately, the momentary weakening of Halifax's rigid stand at Danzig was
of short duration, and he soon concluded that he could maintain his original
position against the mounting opposition at home. Gilbert and Gott, in The
Appeasers, attempt to present this incident as a sustained effort on the
part of Halifax to come to terms with Germany at Danzig. Unfortunately, this
was not the case.
The Polish Pledge
to Roosevelt
President Roosevelt received the text of President
Moscicki's message on August 25,1939, and forwarded it to Hitler. Roosevelt
emphasized to Hitler that he had a binding promise from Moscicki that Poland
would engage in direct negotiations with Germany. The American President added
that "all the world prays that Germany, too, will accept." Hitler
knew that the message from President Roosevelt was merely a propaganda gesture
to discredit Germany, and he was sufficiently shrewd to recognize that a
promise made by Poland to the United States was not worth the paper on which it
was written. The Poles knew that Roosevelt would support any Polish move to
increase the prospect of conflict with Germany and that the American President
would not react unfavorably if they refused to honor a pledge to negotiate with
Germany. Hitler also knew this, and hence he concentrated on his effort to
convince the British that the Poles should negotiate rather than seek to
exploit the meaningless Polish response to President Roosevelt.
Beck assured American Ambassador Biddle shortly before
midnight on August 25, 1939, that war between Germany and Poland was
inevitable. He claimed that Poland had an adequate legal basis for a
declaration of war against Germany, in case the Germans failed to take the
initiative against Poland within the next few days. Beck denied that there was
any truth in the Bielitz massacre, which had been confirmed by neutral sources.
He claimed instead that a Polish soldier had been killed by the Germans on August
16, 1939, and that the Germans had proceeded to cut open the stomach of the
corpse and to conceal in it the skull of a baby. This story was widely repeated
by Polish spokesmen in the days and years which followed, although no attempt
was ever made to document the incident. They failed to realize that this type
of savagery was based upon certain primitive voodoo-like superstitions in
Eastern Europe which were not shared by the Germans. It would have been an
unique historical event had modern Poland elected to base a declaration of war
on this fantastic charge. American Ambassador Biddle was much impressed by the
aggressive attitude of Beck. He predicted to President Roosevelt that Poland
would present a series of ultimata to Germany if Hitler backed down in
the Danzig dispute.
Beck was impressed by a public German announcement on
August 25, 1939, that the Tannenberg and Nuremberg conclaves had been
cancelled. The cancellation announcement, and the impressive number of
incidents between the Germans and Poles on the following day, convinced the
Polish Foreign Minister that a German attack would come at any moment. He did
not conclude until August 27th that Hitler, after all, had taken no decisive
military measures. French Ambassador Noel claimed that Beck was a very sick man
at t1iis time. The French diplomat charged that he was suffering from
aggravated fatigue, tuberculosis, and an excessive addiction to stimulants. The
Polish Foreign Minister ultimately died of tuberculosis in Rumania in 1944,
after the British authorities had denied him permission to come to England. The
French Ambassador, who detested Beck, delighted in conveying the impression
that the Polish Foreign Minister was both morally and physically decadent.
German troops at the Slovak-Polish frontier had begun
their advance on the morning of August 26, 1939, before countermanding orders
reached them, and they crossed into Poland at Jablonka Pass. Fortunately, the
Poles were not holding a position there, and an engagement was avoided when the
Germans speedily retreated a considerable distance across the frontier and into
Slovakia. The Poles engaged German patrols in nearly a dozen skirmishes in the
Dzialdowo region directly north of Warsaw and across the East Prussian
frontier. The engagements ended when the German units were suddenly withdrawn.
It was significant that these serious incidents occurred on two of the most
crucial sectors of the German operational plan. A massacre of minority Germans
in the Lodz area and constant violations of the German frontier from the Polish
side tended to deflect attention from these incidents. A Polish warship on
August 26, 1939, fired at a German civilian transport airplane on which State
Secretary Wilhelm Stuckardt of the Ministry of Interior was returning from Danzig.
Stuckardt and the Danzig leaders had discussed the legal problems involved in
the projected return of Danzig to the Reich.
Hitler's reversal of military orders naturally created
perplexity in the German Army. One of the German Generals was dispatched to the
Wilhelmstrasse on the night of August 25, 1939, to inquire indignantly why the
soldiers had been sent out if it was intended to settle differences with Poland
by diplomatic means. The German Foreign Office had no ready answer with which
to meet this embarrassing question.
In Berlin, British Ambassador Henderson, a sincere
advocate of a British-German understanding who privately sympathizes with
Germany in the Polish question, works tirelessly for peace in the difficult
position of having to officially represent Halifax's war policy. He tries to
persuade Halifax of the reality of the German minority's sufferings in Poland.
He stresses that unless Poland finally negotiates with Germany there will
undoubtedly be war. He remarks that from the beginning "the Poles were
utterly foolish and unwise. "
Roosevelt Hopes
for War and Strives to Coordinate Policy
Phipps reported from Paris that Bullitt had received
new instructions from President Roosevelt designed to facilitate a closer
coordination of British and American policy against Germany. The American
President suggested that everything possible should be done by propaganda to
bring down the German regime in revolutionary chaos. Roosevelt believed that
wireless propaganda should be broadcast to Germany around the clock. He
expected that it would produce a great effect to argue in advance that Hitler
would be solely responsible for any war. He hoped that the pacific desires of
the German people might be exploited to undermine the loyalty of Germans toward
their government after the outbreak of war.
Henderson continued to do what he could at Berlin to
preserve peace. He contacted Polish Ambassador Lipski again on August 25th and
urged him to discuss the problem of the German minority in Poland with the German
Government. Henderson reported to Halifax that Italian Ambassador Attolico was
horrified at the prospect of war. Attolico had declared with indignation that
warmongers such as Anthony Eden should be hanged. Henderson avoided criticizing
Attolico's statement about Eden in any way. Eden, to be sure, had worked with
Churchill to sabotage appeasement, but the chief role in the scuttling of the
appeasement policy had been played by Halifax, the man to whom Henderson
addressed his report.
Sir Ronald Lindsay the British Ambassador to the
United States, addressed a series of final reports to Halifax prior to his
return to England and his replacement by Lord Lothian. Lindsay indicated that
Roosevelt was delighted at the prospect of a new World War. The American
President had damaged his prospects in May 1939 with his unsuccessful attempt
to pull the teeth from the American neutrality laws, but he assured Lindsay
that he would succeed in emasculating this legislation after the outbreak of
war. He admitted that he would be forced to delay a new effort to do so
"until war broke out." The American President also promised that he
would not actually abide by the neutrality laws if he was compelled to invoke
them. He would frustrate the purpose of the laws by delaying a proclamation of
neutrality for at least five days after the outbreak of war. He would see that
war material in the interim was rushed to the British in Canada in enormous
quantities. Lindsay reported with his usual excessive moderation that there "was
every indication in his language that the American authorities would be anxious
to cheat in favor of His Majesty's Government."
Roosevelt also promised Lindsay that he would delay
German ships under false pretenses in a feigned search for arms, so that they
could be easily seized by the British under circumstances which would be
arranged with exactitude between the American and British authorities. The
British Ambassador was personally perturbed that the President of one of the
important countries could be gay and joyful about a tragedy which seemed so
destructive of the hopes of all mankind, He reported that Roosevelt "spoke
in a tone of almost impish glee and though I may be wrong the whole business
gave me the impression of resembling a school-boy prank." It was an
American and world tragedy to have at this important juncture a President whose
emotions and ideas could be rated by a friendly Ambassador as childish.
Halifax was inclined to regard the attitude of the
American President as a product of one of the most successful British efforts
in colonial propaganda. The American President, who was an enthusiastic
militarist, had accepted the idea of World War II as his best escape from the
economic depression in the United States. The British Foreign Secretary had
studied the fantastic Lochner report about the alleged remarks of Hitler to his
military men on the Obersalzberg on August 22nd. He wired Loraine in Rome on
August 26th that recent information from Berlin indicated that Hitler had some
kind of Polish partition in mind. His purpose was to convey to Mussolini the
idea that the German leader was too extreme in his plans, at the expense of the
Poles, to be amenable to a reasonable settlement of GermanPolish difficulties.
Halifax hoped in this way to discourage Mussolini's ideas for a diplomatic
conference.
Thomsen's View of
Roosevelt
State Secretary Weizsaecker had invited American
Charge d'Affaires Kirk to call at the German Foreign Office on the evening of
August 26th. Weizsaecker conveyed Hitler's acknowledgment of the two recent
messages from President Roosevelt, and Kirk expressed his pleasure at this act
of courtesy. Weizsaecker advised Kirk that it would be more timely to present
warnings in Warsaw than at Berlin. German Charge d'Affaires Thomsen reminded
Hitler on August 28th that Roosevelt would do everything he could to encompass
the downfall of Germany. He predicted that Roosevelt would employ ruthless
tactics to force active American participation in a European war despite
opposition from American public opinion. Thomsen was convinced that American
raw materials and machines would be made available to Great Britain and France
immediately after the outbreak of war, and that this measure would be popular
because it would aid in overcoming the extensive unemployment. Thomsen
concluded that the existing American neutrality legislation would be either
abrogated or circumvented.
On August 25th, the British guarantee to Poland
becomes a formal military alliance. Hitler appeals to Britain and France not to
make a German-Polish dispute the cause of general European war. He offers a
remarkable alliance to Britain in which German troops would guarantee the
British empire around the world. The offer is brushed aside. Henderson
continues his attempt to save the situation at Berlin; he urges Lipski to enter
into discussions with the Germans, to no avail. Henderson's exertions are
joined by those of Dahlerus, by now communicating directly between Hitler and
Chamberlain and Halifax. France strongly urges Poland to negotiate with
Germany. Britain does not. Poland calls up more reservists to active service.
On August 29th, Hitler presents a moderate 16-point basis for direct
negotiations with Poland. Poland does not respond. Beck refuses to go to Berlin
to take part in discussions. On August 31st, Lipski, minus plenipotentiary
powers, meets with Hitler but refuses to consider one final German proposal.
Chamberlain and
Halifax
No one in the position of the British Ambassador could
be blamed for desisting from further efforts to prevent war, but Henderson
never stopped trying. It is this fact, combined with his unquestionable British
patriotism and his determination to stand by his own country through thick and
thin, regardless of the dreadful blunders of the British leaders, that make his
mission to Berlin a study in courage. He tried every possible tactic to
persuade Chamberlain to express his own views, and to encourage the British
Prime Minister to resume leadership at the British Foreign Office before it was
too late. He made a special effort to convince the British leaders that he had
always been firm with Hitler, and he recalled that he had bombarded Hitler with
arguments and answers in the conversation of August 28th, which had apparently
turned out very favorably for Great Britain.
Halifax continued to advise Chamberlain to ignore the
complaints of Henderson and others about the attitude and policies of Poland.
He received a very useful letter from Count Raczynski on August 30th. The
Polish Government in this letter solemnly swore that no persecution of the
German minority was taking place in Poland. The American journalist, W.L.
White, later recalled that there was no doubt among well-informed persons by
this time that horrible atrocities were being inflicted every day on the
Germans of Poland. The pledge from Raczynski had about as much validity as the
civil liberties guaranteed by the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union.
Chamberlain complained to American Ambassador Kennedy
after the outbreak of World War II "that America and the world Jews had
forced England into the war." Kennedy himself was convinced that
"neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war
if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington." Kennedy in
1939 was subjected to constant pressure from the American Ambassador at Paris,
and he placed primary emphasis on "Bullitt's urging on Roosevelt in the
summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland." Kennedy
was instructed by President Roosevelt on the telephone "to put some iron
up Chamberlain's backside," a gratuitous instruction because Chamberlain
had abdicated control over British policy to Lord Halifax in October 1938.
Kennedy, Bullitt, and Roosevelt never succeeded in understanding this
situation. They were neither well-informed, nor astute about discovering facts
for themselves, and Halifax never chose to confide in them. The subsequent
sting of conscience which caused Chamberlain to complain to Kennedy about
America and the Jews was an attempt to shift the blame rather than a full
confession. He was merely saying in different words that he and his friends
might have found the courage to challenge Halifax had not the latter enjoyed
the support of President Roosevelt. This was undoubtedly a defensive
rationalization, because none of them ever displayed the slightest inclination
to oppose Halifax. Furthermore, Halifax had decided upon a policy of war with
Germany long before the German occupation of Prague, and before Roosevelt attempted
to exert any considerable bellicose pressure on the British leaders. Halifax
had stirred Roosevelt against the Germans before Hitler went to Prague, rather
than the other way around. Roosevelt was a novice in international affairs
compared to Halifax, and it was inconceivable that he could exert a decisive
influence on the British Foreign Secretary.
Halifax had considered an Anglo-German war inevitable
ever since 1936, and he never wavered in his campaign to destroy Germany, from
October 1938, when he assumed personal control over British policy, to the
outbreak of World War II in September 1939. He was more than a match for
Chamberlain, the Unitarian business leader from the Midlands, or for any of his
soft-spoken friends. He had refrained from wresting control over foreign policy
from Chamberlain until the British leader returned from Munich to face the
hostile critics within his own Conservative Party. He had never seriously
criticized Chamberlain's conduct of policy until he was in a position to dominate
it himself. Halifax would have been amused to hear Winston Churchill telling
his friends in August 1939 that he feared the British Government "would
run out over Poland." This was the wrong way to put it. Halifax was
primarily worried by the possibility that France would run out over Poland.
This was the only event which would prompt him to abandon his own policy of war
against Germany.
On the morning of September 1st, German troops attack
Poland. Hitler announces the invasion before the Reichstag, stating that the
brutal suppression of the ethnic German minority and the lack of freedom and
self-determination for Danzig necessitated military action. Mussolini makes
last-minute pleas for a grand peace conference dealing with all causes of
European conflict, to meet on September 5th, on the precondition that Danzig is
returned to Germany in advance. Hitler and, initially, France, are agreeable.
Britain is not, and goads France into joining with Britain in insisting on a
precondition that fighting must stop in Poland. The conference plan fails. On
the night of September 2nd, British ministers led by Halifax virtually demand
of Chamberlain that an ultimatum be issued to Germany. It is presented the next
morning, demanding not only that the fighting cease but that all German troops
withdraw from Poland. With the expiration of the ultimatum at 11 a.m., Britain
declares war on Germany. A French ultimatum follows, somewhat reluctantly. With
its expiration at 5 p.m., France declares war on Germany. World War II begins.
Halifax and
Roosevelt
It was clever of Halifax to claim that further
intimate Anglo-German conversations would displease President Roosevelt.
Chamberlain had been severely criticized for failing to respond favorably to an
impractical proposal from Roosevelt, in January 1938, for a grandiose
diplomatic conference, which would not only have failed to commit the United
States to the British imperialistic program, but undoubtedly would have
weakened the effort of Chamberlain to increase British influence in Italy. Lord
Lothian had succeeded Sir Ronald Lindsay as British Ambassador to the United
States. Lothian, like Henderson at Berlin, favored a peaceful understanding
with Germany, but he was a disciplined diplomat who subordinated his own
personal views to the requirements of Halifax's war policy. The new British
Ambassador was destined to play a more active role behind the scenes of
American politics than any previous British diplomat. Lothian confirmed
Lindsay's judgment that there was "nothing neutral" about Roosevelt's
attitude. The American President insisted that "the most serious danger
from the standpoint of American public opinion would be if it formed the
conclusion that Herr Hitler was entangling the British Government in negotiations
leading to pressure on Poland by England and France to abandon vital
interests." It was obvious to Lothian that Roosevelt wanted war in Europe.
The American President knew that a diplomatic
settlement of the European crisis would extinguish his own plans for American
military aggression in Europe. Lord Lothian assured Halifax that the
partisanship of Roosevelt extended to the minute details. Roosevelt intended to
urge the belligerents at the outbreak of the expected war not to bombard
civilians, because he hoped in this way to protect Warsaw, one of the Allied
capitals. Lothian knew that Roosevelt would never object to a later effort by
Great Britain to massacre the civilian population of Germany by means of mass
bombing attacks. Roosevelt confided to Lothian that his primary objective at
the moment was to evade American neutrality legislation after the outbreak of
war. He was intent on renewing the struggle in the American Congress to remove
the legal embargo on war material. He promised that he would refuse to admit
from the very start of hostilities that aluminum sheets for airplanes were
"aeroplane parts" or that airplane engine blocks had anything to do
with airplanes.
Lothian confirmed the report of his predecessor that
Roosevelt was delighted at the prospect of a new World War. This warlike
attitude of Roosevelt was exploited by Halifax in adducing artificial arguments
for closing the door on further negotiations with Hitler. There was actually no
reason to fear that President Roosevelt would be in a position to cause trouble
for Great Britain in the event of a negotiated settlement in Europe. The
American President did not have the support of Congress or public opinion for
his aggressive foreign policy, and he was nearing the end of his final
presidential term, final according to the sacrosanct political tradition
established by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. It was obvious that he
would need a crisis of the greatest dimensions, such as a big war in Europe, to
campaign successfully for further terms of office. It would have been easy for
the British Government to improve relations with a more conciliatory successor
had war been averted and had Roosevelt been defeated in the American election
of 1940.
For space reasons the 98 footnotes with which Professor
Hoggan supports his case in this article are omitted from this issue of The
JHR. They appear in the German edition
of The Forced War (Der erzwungene
Krieg: Die Ursachen und Urheber des 2. Weltkriegs [Tuebingen: Grabert Verlag]), the latest
(12th) revised edition of which contains some substantial supplementations, and
of course appear in the English edition.
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