By John Wear
Published: 2019-01-14
Great Britain’s Blank Check to Poland
On March 21, 1939, while hosting French Prime Minister
Édouard Daladier, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain discussed a joint
front with France, Russia and Poland to act together against German aggression.
France agreed at once, and the Russians agreed on the condition that both
France and Poland sign first. However, Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck
vetoed the agreement on March 24, 1939.[1] Polish
statesmen feared Russia more than they did Germany. Polish Marshal Edward
Śmigły-Rydz told the French ambassador, “With the Germans we risk losing our
liberty; with the Russians we lose our soul.”[2]
Another complication arose in
European diplomacy when a movement among the residents of Memel in Lithuania
sought to join Germany. The Allied victors in the Versailles Treaty had
detached Memel from East Prussia and placed it in a separate League of Nations
protectorate. Lithuania then proceeded to seize Memel from the League of
Nations shortly after World War I. Memel was historically a German city which in
the seven centuries of its history had never separated from its East Prussian
homeland. Germany was so weak after World War I that it could not prevent the
tiny new-born nation of Lithuania from seizing Memel.[3]
Germany’s occupation of Prague
in March 1939 had generated uncontrollable excitement among the mostly German
population of Memel. The population of Memel was clamoring to return to Germany
and could no longer be restrained. The Lithuanian foreign minister traveled to
Berlin on March 22, 1939, where he agreed to the immediate transfer of Memel to
Germany. The annexation of Memel into Germany went through the next day. The
question of Memel exploded of itself without any deliberate German plan of
annexation.[4] Polish leaders agreed that the return of
Memel to Germany from Lithuania would not constitute an issue of conflict
between Germany and Poland.[5]
What did cause conflict
between Germany and Poland was the so-called Free City of Danzig. Danzig was
founded in the early 14th century and was historically the key port
at the mouth of the great Vistula River. From the beginning Danzig was
inhabited almost exclusively by Germans, with the Polish minority in 1922
constituting less than 3% of the city’s 365,000 inhabitants. The Treaty of
Versailles converted Danzig from a German provincial capital into a League of
Nations protectorate subject to numerous strictures established for the benefit
of Poland. The great preponderance of the citizens of Danzig had never wanted
to leave Germany, and they were eager to return to Germany in 1939. Their
eagerness to join Germany was exacerbated by the fact that Germany’s economy
was healthy while Poland’s economy was still mired in depression.[6]
Many of the German citizens of
Danzig had consistently demonstrated their unwavering loyalty to National
Socialism and its principles. They had even elected a National Socialist
parliamentary majority before this result had been achieved in Germany. It was
widely known that Poland was constantly seeking to increase her control over
Danzig despite the wishes of Danzig’s German majority. Hitler was not opposed
to Poland’s further economic aspirations at Danzig, but Hitler was resolved
never to permit the establishment of a Polish political regime at Danzig. Such
a renunciation of Danzig by Hitler would have been a repudiation of the loyalty
of Danzig citizens to the Third Reich and their spirit of self-determination.[7]
Germany presented a proposal
for a comprehensive settlement of the Danzig question with Poland on October
24, 1938. Hitler’s plan would allow Germany to annex Danzig and construct a
superhighway and a railroad to East Prussia. In return Poland would be granted
a permanent free port in Danzig and the right to build her own highway and
railroad to the port. The entire Danzig area would also become a permanent free
market for Polish goods on which no German customs duties would be levied.
Germany would take the unprecedented step of recognizing and guaranteeing the
existing German-Polish frontier, including the boundary in Upper Silesia
established in 1922. This later provision was extremely important since the
Versailles Treaty had given Poland much additional territory which Germany
proposed to renounce. Hitler’s offer to guarantee Poland’s frontiers also
carried with it a degree of military security that no other non-Communist
nation could match.[8]
Germany’s proposed settlement
with Poland was far less favorable to Germany than the Thirteenth Point of
Wilson’s program at Versailles. The Versailles Treaty gave Poland large slices
of territory in regions such as West Prussia and Western Posen which were
overwhelmingly German. The richest industrial section of Upper Silesia was also
later given to Poland despite the fact that Poland had lost the plebiscite
there.[9] Germany was willing to renounce these
territories in the interest of German-Polish cooperation. This concession of
Hitler’s was more than adequate to compensate for the German annexation of
Danzig and construction of a superhighway and a railroad in the Corridor. The
Polish diplomats themselves believed that Germany’s proposal was a sincere and
realistic basis for a permanent agreement.[10]
On March 26, 1939, the Polish
Ambassador to Berlin, Joseph Lipski, formally rejected Germany’s settlement
proposals. The Poles had waited over five months to reject Germany’s proposals,
and they refused to countenance any change in existing conditions. Lipski
stated to German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop that “it was his
painful duty to draw attention to the fact that any further pursuance of these
German plans, especially where the return of Danzig to the Reich was concerned,
meant war with Poland.”[11]
Polish Foreign Minister Józef
Beck accepted an offer from Great Britain on March 30, 1939, to give an
unconditional guarantee of Poland’s independence. The British Empire agreed to
go to war as an ally of Poland if the Poles decided that war was necessary. In
words drafted by British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, Chamberlain spoke in
the House of Commons on March 31, 1939:
I now have to inform the House…that in the event of
any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish
Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national
forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend
the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish
Government an assurance to that effect.[12]
Great Britain for the first
time in history had left the decision whether or not to fight a war outside of
her own country to another nation. Britain’s guarantee to Poland was binding
without commitments from the Polish side. The British public was astonished by
this move. Despite its unprecedented nature, Halifax encountered little
difficulty in persuading the British Conservative, Liberal and Labor parties to
accept Great Britain’s unconditional guarantee to Poland.[13]
Numerous British historians
and diplomats have criticized Britain’s unilateral guarantee of Poland. For
example, British diplomat Roy Denman called the war guarantee to Poland “the
most reckless undertaking ever given by a British government. It placed the
decision on peace or war in Europe in the hands of a reckless, intransigent,
swashbuckling military dictatorship.”[14] British
historian Niall Ferguson states that the war guarantee to Poland tied Britain’s
“destiny to that of a regime that was every bit as undemocratic and
anti-Semitic as that of Germany.”[15] English military
historian Liddell Hart stated that the Polish guarantee “placed Britain’s
destiny in the hands of Poland’s rulers, men of very dubious and unstable
judgment. Moreover, the guarantee was impossible to fulfill except with
Russia’s help.…”[16]
American historian Richard M.
Watt writes concerning Britain’s unilateral guarantee to Poland: “This
enormously broad guarantee virtually left to the Poles the decision whether or
not Britain would go to war. For Britain to give such a blank check to a
Central European nation, particularly to Poland—a nation that Britain had
generally regarded as irresponsible and greedy—was mind-boggling.”[17]
When the Belgian Minister to
Germany, Vicomte Jacques Davignon, received the text of the British guarantee
to Poland, he exclaimed that “blank check” was the only possible description of
the British pledge. Davignon was extremely alarmed in view of the proverbial
recklessness of the Poles. German State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker attempted
to reassure Davignon by claiming that the situation between Germany and Poland
was not tragic. However, Davignon correctly feared that the British move would
produce war in a very short time.[18]
Weizsäcker later exclaimed
scornfully that “the British guarantee to Poland was like offering sugar to an
untrained child before it had learned to listen to reason!”[19]
The Deterioration of German-Polish Relations
German-Polish relationships
had become strained by the increasing harshness with which the Polish
authorities handled the German minority. The Polish government in the 1930s
began to confiscate the land of its German minority at bargain prices through
public expropriation. The German government resented the fact that German
landowners received only one-eighth of the value of their holdings from the
Polish government. Since the Polish public was aware of the German situation
and desired to exploit it, the German minority in Poland could not sell the
land in advance of expropriation. Furthermore, Polish law forbade Germans from
privately selling large areas of land.
German diplomats insisted that
the November 1937 Minorities Pact with Poland for the equal treatment of German
and Polish landowners be observed in 1939. Despite Polish assurances of fairness
and equal treatment, German diplomats learned on February 15, 1939, that the
latest expropriations of land in Poland were predominantly of German holdings.
These expropriations virtually eliminated substantial German landholdings in
Poland at a time when most of the larger Polish landholdings were still intact.
It became evident that nothing could be done diplomatically to help the German
minority in Poland.[20]
Poland threatened Germany with
a partial mobilization of her forces on March 23, 1939. Hundreds of thousands
of Polish Army reservists were mobilized, and Hitler was warned that Poland
would fight to prevent the return of Danzig to Germany. The Poles were
surprised to discover that Germany did not take this challenge seriously.
Hitler, who deeply desired friendship with Poland, refrained from responding to
the Polish threat of war. Germany did not threaten Poland and took no
precautionary military measures in response to the Polish partial mobilization.[21]
Hitler regarded a
German-Polish agreement as a highly welcome alternative to a German-Polish war.
However, no further negotiations for a German-Polish agreement occurred after
the British guarantee to Poland because Józef Beck refused to negotiate. Beck
ignored repeated German suggestions for further negotiations because Beck knew
that Halifax hoped to accomplish the complete destruction of Germany. Halifax
had considered an Anglo-German war inevitable since 1936, and Britain’s
anti-German policy was made public with a speech by Neville Chamberlain on
March 17, 1939. Halifax discouraged German-Polish negotiations because he was
counting on Poland to provide the pretext for a British pre-emptive war against
Germany.[22]
The situation between Germany
and Poland deteriorated rapidly during the six weeks from the Polish partial
mobilization of March 23, 1939, to a speech delivered by Józef Beck on May 5,
1939. Beck’s primary purpose in delivering his speech before the Sejm, the
lower house of the Polish parliament, was to convince the Polish public and the
world that he was able and willing to challenge Hitler. Beck knew that Halifax
had succeeded in creating a warlike atmosphere in Great Britain, and that he
could go as far as he wanted without displeasing the British. Beck took an
uncompromising attitude in his speech that effectively closed the door to
further negotiations with Germany.
Beck made numerous false and
hypocritical statements in his speech. One of the most astonishing claims in
his speech was that there was nothing extraordinary about the British guarantee
to Poland. He described it as a normal step in the pursuit of friendly
relations with a neighboring country. This was in sharp contrast to British
diplomat Sir Alexander Cadogan’s statement to Joseph Kennedy that Britain’s
guarantee to Poland was without precedent in the entire history of British
foreign policy.[23]
Beck ended his speech with a
stirring climax that produced wild excitement in the Polish Sejm. Someone in
the audience screamed loudly, “We do not need peace!” and pandemonium followed.
Beck had made many Poles in the audience determined to fight Germany. This
feeling resulted from their ignorance which made it impossible for them to
criticize the numerous falsehoods and misstatements in Beck’s speech. Beck made
the audience feel that Hitler had insulted the honor of Poland with what were
actually quite reasonable peace proposals. Beck had effectively made Germany
the deadly enemy of Poland.[24]
More than 1 million ethnic
Germans resided in Poland at the time of Beck’s speech, and these Germans were
the principal victims of the German-Polish crisis in the coming weeks. The
Germans in Poland were subjected to increasing doses of violence from the dominant
Poles. The British public was told repeatedly that the grievances of the German
minority in Poland were largely imaginary. The average British citizen was
completely unaware of the terror and fear of death that stalked these Germans
in Poland. Ultimately, many thousands of Germans in Poland died in consequence
of the crisis. They were among the first victims of British Foreign Secretary
Halifax’s war policy against Germany.[25]
The immediate responsibility
for security measures involving the German minority in Poland rested with
Interior Department Ministerial Director Waclaw Zyborski. Zyborski consented to
discuss the situation on June 23, 1939, with Walther Kohnert, one of the
leaders of the German minority at Bromberg. Zyborski admitted to Kohnert that
the Germans of Poland were in an unenviable situation, but he was not
sympathetic to their plight. Zyborski ended their lengthy conversation by
stating frankly that his policy required a severe treatment of the German
minority in Poland. He made it clear that it was impossible for the Germans of
Poland to alleviate their hard fate. The Germans in Poland were the helpless
hostages of the Polish community and the Polish state.[26]
Other leaders of the German
minority in Poland repeatedly appealed to the Polish government for help during
this period. Sen. Hans Hasbach, the leader of the conservative German minority
faction, and Dr. Rudolf Wiesner, the leader of the Young German Party, each
made multiple appeals to Poland’s government to end the violence. In a futile
appeal on July 6, 1939, to Premier Sławoj-Składkowski, head of Poland’s
Department of Interior, Wiesner referred to the waves of public violence
against the Germans at Tomaszów near Lódz, May 13-15th, at
Konstantynów, May 21-22nd, and at Pabianice, June 22-23, 1939. The
appeal of Wiesner produced no results. The leaders of the German political
groups eventually recognized that they had no influence with Polish authorities
despite their loyal attitudes toward Poland. It was “open season” on the Germans
of Poland with the approval of the Polish government.[27]
Polish anti-German incidents
also occurred against the German majority in the Free City of Danzig. On May
21, 1939, Zygmunt Morawski, a former Polish soldier, murdered a German at
Kalthof on Danzig territory. The incident itself would not have been so unusual
except for the fact that Polish officials acted as if Poland and not the League
of Nations had sovereign power over Danzig. Polish officials refused to
apologize for the incident, and they treated with contempt the effort of Danzig
authorities to bring Morawski to trial. The Poles in Danzig considered
themselves above the law.[28]
Tension steadily mounted at
Danzig after the Morawski murder. The German citizens of Danzig were convinced
that Poland would show them no mercy if Poland gained the upper hand. The Poles
were furious when they learned that Danzig was defying Poland by organizing its
own militia for home defense. The Poles blamed Hitler for this situation. The
Polish government protested to German Ambassador Hans von Moltke on July 1,
1939, about the Danzig government’s military-defense measures. Józef Beck told
French Ambassador Léon Noël on July 6, 1939, that the Polish government had
decided that additional measures were necessary to meet the alleged threat from
Danzig.[29]
On July 29, 1939, the Danzig
government presented two protest notes to the Poles concerning illegal
activities of Polish custom inspectors and frontier officials. The Polish
government responded by terminating the export of duty-free herring and
margarine from Danzig to Poland. Polish officials next announced in the early
hours of August 5, 1939, that the frontiers of Danzig would be closed to the
importation of all foreign food products unless the Danzig government promised
by the end of the day never to interfere with the activities of Polish customs
inspectors. This threat was formidable since Danzig produced only a relatively
small portion of its own food. All Polish customs inspectors would also bear arms
while performing their duty after August 5, 1939. The Polish ultimatum made it
obvious that Poland intended to replace the League of Nations as the sovereign
power at Danzig.[30]
Hitler concluded that Poland
was seeking to provoke an immediate conflict with Germany. The Danzig
government submitted to the Polish ultimatum in accordance with Hitler’s
recommendation.[31]
Józef Beck explained to
British Ambassador Kennard that the Polish government was prepared to take
military measures against Danzig if it failed to accept Poland’s terms. The
citizens of Danzig were convinced that Poland would have executed a full
military occupation of Danzig had the Polish ultimatum been rejected. It was
apparent to the German government that the British and French were either
unable or unwilling to restrain the Polish government from arbitrary steps that
could result in war.[32]
On August 7, 1939, the Polish
censors permitted the newspaper Illustrowany Kuryer Codzienny in
Kraków to feature an article of unprecedented candor. The article stated that
Polish units were constantly crossing the German frontier to destroy German
military installations and to carry captured German military materiel into
Poland. The Polish government failed to prevent the newspaper, which had the
largest circulation in Poland, from telling the world that Poland was
instigating a series of violations of Germany’s frontier with Poland.[33]
Polish Ambassador Jerzy
Potocki unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Józef Beck to seek an agreement
with Germany. Potocki later succinctly explained the situation in Poland by
stating “Poland prefers Danzig to peace.”[34]
President Roosevelt knew that
Poland had caused the crisis which began at Danzig, and he was worried that the
American public might learn the truth about the situation. This could be a
decisive factor in discouraging Roosevelt’s plan for American military
intervention in Europe. Roosevelt instructed U.S. Ambassador Biddle to urge the
Poles to be more careful in making it appear that German moves were responsible
for any inevitable explosion at Danzig. Biddle reported to Roosevelt on August
11, 1939, that Beck expressed no interest in engaging in a series of elaborate
but empty maneuvers designed to deceive the American public. Beck stated that
at the moment he was content to have full British support for his policy.[35]
Roosevelt also feared that
American politicians might discover the facts about the hopeless dilemma which
Poland’s provocative policy created for Germany. When American Democratic Party
Campaign Manager and Post-Master General James Farley visited Berlin, Roosevelt
instructed the American Embassy in Berlin to prevent unsupervised contact
between Farley and the German leaders. The German Foreign Office concluded on
August 10, 1939 that it was impossible to penetrate the wall of security around
Farley. The Germans knew that President Roosevelt was determined to prevent
them from freely communicating with visiting American leaders.[36]
Polish Atrocities Force War
On August 14, 1939, the Polish
authorities in East Upper Silesia launched a campaign of mass arrests against
the German minority. The Poles then proceeded to close and confiscate the
remaining German businesses, clubs and welfare installations. The arrested
Germans were forced to march toward the interior of Poland in prisoner columns.
The various German groups in Poland were frantic by this time; they feared the
Poles would attempt the total extermination of the German minority in the event
of war. Thousands of Germans were seeking to escape arrest by crossing the
border into Germany. Some of the worst recent Polish atrocities included the
mutilation of several Germans. The Polish public was urged not to regard their
German minority as helpless hostages who could be butchered with impunity.[37]
Rudolf Wiesner, who was the
most prominent of the German minority leaders in Poland, spoke of a disaster
“of inconceivable magnitude” since the early months of 1939. Wiesner claimed
that the last Germans had been dismissed from their jobs without the benefit of
unemployment relief, and that hunger and privation were stamped on the faces of
the Germans in Poland. German welfare agencies, cooperatives and trade
associations had been closed by Polish authorities. Exceptional martial-law
conditions of the earlier frontier zone had been extended to include more than
one-third of the territory of Poland. The mass arrests, deportations,
mutilations and beatings of the last few weeks in Poland surpassed anything
that had happened before. Wiesner insisted that the German minority leaders
merely desired the restoration of peace, the banishment of the specter of war,
and the right to live and work in peace. Wiesner was arrested by the Poles on
August 16, 1939 on suspicion of conducting espionage for Germany in Poland.[38]
The German press devoted
increasing space to detailed accounts of atrocities against the Germans in
Poland. The Völkischer Beobachter reported that more than 80,000 German
refugees from Poland had succeeded in reaching German territory by August 20,
1939. The German Foreign Office had received a huge file of specific reports of
excesses against national and ethnic Germans in Poland. More than 1,500
documented reports had been received since March 1939, and more than 10
detailed reports were arriving in the German Foreign Office each day. The
reports presented a staggering picture of brutality and human misery.[39]
W. L. White, an American
journalist, later recalled that there was no doubt among well-informed people
by this time that horrible atrocities were being inflicted every day on the
Germans of Poland.[40]
Donald Day, a Chicago
Tribune correspondent, reported on the atrocious treatment the Poles had
meted out to the ethnic Germans in Poland:
…I traveled up to the Polish corridor where the German
authorities permitted me to interview the German refugees from many Polish
cities and towns. The story was the same. Mass arrests and long marches along
roads toward the interior of Poland. The railroads were crowded with troop
movements. Those who fell by the wayside were shot. The Polish authorities
seemed to have gone mad. I have been questioning people all my life and I think
I know how to make deductions from the exaggerated stories told by people who
have passed through harrowing personal experiences. But even with generous
allowance, the situation was plenty bad. To me the war seemed only a question
of hours.[41]
British Ambassador Nevile
Henderson in Berlin was concentrating on obtaining recognition from Halifax of
the cruel fate of the German minority in Poland. Henderson emphatically warned
Halifax on August 24, 1939, that German complaints about the treatment of the
German minority in Poland were fully supported by the facts. Henderson knew
that the Germans were prepared to negotiate, and he stated to Halifax that war
between Poland and Germany was inevitable unless negotiations were resumed
between the two countries. Henderson pleaded with Halifax that it would be
contrary to Polish interests to attempt a full military occupation of Danzig,
and he added a scathingly effective denunciation of Polish policy. What
Henderson failed to realize is that Halifax was pursuing war for its own sake
as an instrument of policy. Halifax desired the complete destruction of
Germany.[42]
On August 25, 1939, Ambassador
Henderson reported to Halifax the latest Polish atrocity at Bielitz, Upper
Silesia. Henderson never relied on official German statements concerning these
incidents, but instead based his reports on information he received from
neutral sources. The Poles continued to forcibly deport the Germans of that area,
and compelled them to march into the interior of Poland. Eight Germans were
murdered and many more were injured during one of these actions.
Hitler was faced with a
terrible dilemma. If Hitler did nothing, the Germans of Poland and Danzig would
be abandoned to the cruelty and violence of a hostile Poland. If Hitler took
effective action against the Poles, the British and French might declare war
against Germany. Henderson feared that the Bielitz atrocity would be the final
straw to prompt Hitler to invade Poland. Henderson, who strongly desired peace
with Germany, deplored the failure of the British government to exercise
restraint over the Polish authorities.[43]
On August 23, 1939, Germany
and the Soviet Union entered into the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. This
non-aggression pact contained a secret protocol which recognized a Russian
sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. German recognition of this Soviet sphere
of influence would not apply in the event of a diplomatic settlement of the
German-Polish dispute. Hitler had hoped to recover the diplomatic initiative
through the Molotov-Ribbentrop nonaggression pact. However, Chamberlain warned
Hitler in a letter dated August 23, 1939, that Great Britain would support
Poland with military force regardless of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement.
Józef Beck also continued to refuse to negotiate a peaceful settlement with
Germany.[44]
Germany made a new offer to
Poland on August 29, 1939, for a last diplomatic campaign to settle the
German-Polish dispute. The terms of a new German plan for a settlement, the
so-called Marienwerder proposals, were less important than the offer to
negotiate as such. The terms of the Marienwerder proposals were intended as
nothing more than a tentative German plan for a possible settlement. The German
government emphasized that these terms were formulated to offer a basis for
unimpeded negotiations between equals rather than constituting a series of
demands which Poland would be required to accept. There was nothing to prevent
the Poles from offering an entirely new set of proposals of their own.
The Germans, in offering to
negotiate with Poland, were indicating that they favored a diplomatic
settlement over war with Poland. The willingness of the Poles to negotiate
would not in any way have implied a Polish retreat or their readiness to
recognize the German annexation of Danzig. The Poles could have justified their
acceptance to negotiate with the announcement that Germany, and not Poland, had
found it necessary to request new negotiations. In refusing to negotiate, the
Poles were announcing that they favored war. The refusal of British Foreign
Secretary Halifax to encourage the Poles to negotiate indicated that he also
favored war.[45]
French Prime Minister Daladier
and British Prime Minister Chamberlain were both privately critical of the
Polish government. Daladier in private denounced the “criminal folly” of the
Poles. Chamberlain admitted to Ambassador Joseph Kennedy that it was the Poles,
and not the Germans, who were unreasonable. Kennedy reported to President
Roosevelt, “frankly he [Chamberlain] is more worried about getting the Poles to
be reasonable than the Germans.” However, neither Daladier nor Chamberlain made
any effort to influence the Poles to negotiate with the Germans.[46]
On August 29, 1939, the Polish
government decided upon the general mobilization of its army. The Polish
military plans stipulated that general mobilization would be ordered only in
the event of Poland’s decision for war. Henderson informed Halifax of some of
the verified Polish violations prior to the war. The Poles blew up the Dirschau
(Tczew) bridge across the Vistula River even though the eastern approach to the
bridge was in German territory (East Prussia). The Poles also occupied a number
of Danzig installations and engaged in fighting with the citizens of Danzig on
the same day. Henderson reported that Hitler was not insisting on the total
military defeat of Poland. Hitler was prepared to terminate hostilities if the
Poles indicated that they were willing to negotiate a satisfactory settlement.[47]
Germany decided to invade
Poland on September 1, 1939. All of the British leaders claimed that the entire
responsibility for starting the war was Hitler’s. Prime Minister Chamberlain
broadcast that evening on British radio that “the responsibility for this
terrible catastrophe (war in Poland) lies on the shoulders of one man, the
German Chancellor.” Chamberlain claimed that Hitler had ordered Poland to come
to Berlin with the unconditional obligation of accepting without discussion the
exact German terms. Chamberlain denied that Germany had invited the Poles to
engage in normal negotiations. Chamberlain’s statements were unvarnished lies,
but the Polish case was so weak that it was impossible to defend it with the
truth.
Halifax also delivered a
cleverly hypocritical speech to the House of Lords on the evening of September
1, 1939. Halifax claimed that the best proof of the British will to peace was
to have Chamberlain, the great appeasement leader, carry Great Britain into
war. Halifax concealed the fact that he had taken over the direction of British
foreign policy from Chamberlain in October 1938, and that Great Britain would
probably not be moving into war had this not happened. He assured his audience
that Hitler, before the bar of history, would have to assume full
responsibility for starting the war. Halifax insisted that the English
conscience was clear, and that, in looking back, he did not wish to change a
thing as far as British policy was concerned.[48]
On September 2, 1939, Italy
and Germany agreed to hold a mediation conference among themselves and Great
Britain, France and Poland. Halifax attempted to destroy the conference plan by
insisting that Germany withdraw her forces from Poland and Danzig before Great
Britain and France would consider attending the mediation conference. French
Foreign Minister Bonnet knew that no nation would accept such treatment, and
that the attitude of Halifax was unreasonable and unrealistic.
Ultimately, the mediation
effort collapsed, and both Great Britain and France declared war against
Germany on September 3, 1939. When Hitler read the British declaration of war
against Germany, he paused and asked of no one in particular: “What now?”[49] Germany was now in an unnecessary war with three
European nations.
Similar to the other British
leaders, Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Germany, later claimed
that the entire responsibility for starting the war was Hitler’s. Henderson
wrote in his memoirs in 1940: “If Hitler wanted peace he knew how to insure it;
if he wanted war, he knew equally well what would bring it about. The choice
lay with him, and in the end the entire responsibility for war was his.”[50] Henderson forgot in this passage that he had
repeatedly warned Halifax that the Polish atrocities against the German
minority in Poland were extreme. Hitler invaded Poland in order to end these
atrocities.
Polish Atrocities Continue against German
Minority
The Germans in Poland
continued to experience an atmosphere of terror in the early part of September
1939. Throughout the country the Germans had been told, “If war comes to Poland
you will all be hanged.” This prophecy was later fulfilled in many cases.
The famous Bloody Sunday in
Toruń on September 3, 1939, was accompanied by similar massacres elsewhere in Poland.
These massacres brought a tragic end to the long suffering of many ethnic
Germans. This catastrophe had been anticipated by the Germans before the
outbreak of war, as reflected by the flight, or attempted escape, of large
numbers of Germans from Poland. The feelings of these Germans were revealed by
the desperate slogan, “Away from this hell, and back to the Reich!”[51]
Dr. Alfred-Maurice de Zayas
writes concerning the ethnic Germans in Poland:
The first victims of the war were Volksdeutsche,
ethnic German civilians resident in and citizens of Poland. Using lists
prepared years earlier, in part by lower administrative offices, Poland
immediately deported 15,000 Germans to Eastern Poland. Fear and rage at the
quick German victories led to hysteria. German “spies” were seen everywhere,
suspected of forming a fifth column. More than 5,000 German civilians were
murdered in the first days of the war. They were hostages and scapegoats at the
same time. Gruesome scenes were played out in Bromberg on September 3, as well
as in several other places throughout the province of Posen, in Pommerellen,
wherever German minorities resided.[52]
Polish atrocities against
ethnic Germans have been documented in the book Polish Acts of Atrocity
against the German Minority in Poland. Most of the outside world dismissed
this book as nothing more than propaganda used to justify Hitler’s invasion of
Poland. However, skeptics failed to notice that forensic pathologists from the
International Red Cross and medical and legal observers from the United States
verified the findings of these investigations of Polish war crimes. These
investigations were also conducted by German police and civil administrations,
and not the National Socialist Party or the German military. Moreover, both
anti-German and other university-trained researchers have acknowledged that the
charges in the book are based entirely on factual evidence.[53]
The book Polish Acts of
Atrocity against the German Minority in Poland stated:
When the first edition of this collection of documents
went to press on November 17, 1939, 5,437 cases of murder committed by soldiers
of the Polish army and by Polish civilians against men, women and children of
the German minority had been definitely ascertained. It was known that the
total when fully ascertained would be very much higher. Between that date and
February 1, 1940, the number of identified victims mounted to 12,857. At the
present stage investigations disclose that in addition to these 12,857, more
than 45,000 persons are still missing. Since there is no trace of them, they
must also be considered victims of the Polish terror. Even the figure 58,000 is
not final. There can be no doubt that the inquiries now being carried out will
result in the disclosure of additional thousands dead and missing.[54]
Medical examinations of the
dead showed that Germans of all ages, from four months to 82 years of age, were
murdered. The report concluded:
It was shown that the murders were committed with the
greatest brutality and that in many cases they were purely sadistic acts—that
gouging of eyes was established and that other forms of mutilation, as
supported by the depositions of witnesses, may be considered as true.
The method by which the individual murders were
committed in many cases reveals studied physical and mental torture; in this
connection several cases of killing extended over many hours and of slow death
due to neglect had to be mentioned.
By far the most important finding seems to be the
proof that murder by such chance weapons as clubs or knives was the exception,
and that as a rule modern, highly-effective army rifles and pistols were
available to the murderers. It must be emphasized further that it was possible
to show, down to the minutest detail, that there could have been no possibility
of execution (under military law).[55]
The Polish atrocities were not
acts of personal revenge, professional jealously or class hatred; instead, they
were a concerted political action. They were organized mass murders caused by a
psychosis of political animosity. The hate-inspired urge to destroy everything
German was driven by the Polish press, radio, school and government propaganda.
Britain’s blank check of support had encouraged Poland to conduct inhuman
atrocities against its German minority.[56]
The book Polish Acts of
Atrocity against the German Minority in Poland explained why the Polish
government encouraged such atrocities:
The guarantee of assistance given Poland by the
British Government was the agent which lent impetus to Britain’s policy of
encirclement. It was designed to exploit the problem of Danzig and the Corridor
to begin a war, desired and long-prepared by England, for the annihilation of
Greater Germany. In Warsaw moderation was no longer considered necessary, and
the opinion held was that matters could be safely brought to a head. England
was backing this diabolical game, having guaranteed the “integrity” of the Polish
state. The British assurance of assistance meant that Poland was to be the
battering ram of Germany’s enemies. Henceforth Poland neglected no form of
provocation of Germany and, in its blindness, dreamt of “victorious battle at
Berlin’s gates.” Had it not been for the encouragement of the English war
clique, which was stiffening Poland’s attitude toward the Reich and whose
promises led Warsaw to feel safe, the Polish Government would hardly have let
matters develop to the point where Polish soldiers and civilians would
eventually interpret the slogan to extirpate all German influence as an
incitement to the murder and bestial mutilation of human beings.[57]
ENDNOTES
[1] Taylor, A.J.P., The
Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, p.
207.
[2] DeConde, Alexander, A
History of American Foreign Policy, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1971, p. 576.
[3] Hoggan, David L., The
Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for
Historical Review, 1989, pp. 25, 312.
[4] Taylor, A.J.P., The
Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, p.
209.
[5] Hoggan, David L., The
Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal: Institute for
Historical Review, 1989, p. 50.
[6] Ibid., pp. 49-60.
[7] Ibid., pp. 328-329.
[8] Ibid., pp. 145-146.
[9] Ibid., p. 21.
[10] Ibid., pp. 21,
256-257.
[11] Ibid., p. 323.
[12] Barnett, Correlli, The
Collapse of British Power, New York: William Morrow, 1972, p. 560; see also
Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1961, p. 211.
[13] Hoggan, David L., The
Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for
Historical Review, 1989, pp. 333, 340.
[14] Denman, Roy, Missed
Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century, London: Indigo, 1997,
p. 121.
[15] Ferguson, Niall, The War
of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the West, New
York: Penguin Press, 2006, p. 377.
[16] Hart, B. H. Liddell, History
of the Second World War, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1970, p. 11.
[17] Watt, Richard M., Bitter
Glory: Poland and Its Fate 1918 to 1939, New York: Simon and Schuster,
1979, p. 379.
[18] Hoggan, David L., The
Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal: Institute for
Historical Review, 1989, p. 342.
[19] Ibid., p. 391.
[20] Ibid., pp. 260-262.
[21] Ibid., pp. 311-312.
[22] Ibid., pp. 355, 357.
[23] Ibid., pp. 381, 383.
[24] Ibid., pp. 384, 387.
[25] Ibid., p. 387.
[26] Ibid., pp. 388-389.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid., pp. 392-393.
[29] Ibid., pp. 405-406.
[30] Ibid., p. 412.
[31] Ibid. p. 413.
[32] Ibid., pp. 413-415.
[33] Ibid. p. 419. In a
footnote, the author notes that a report of the same matters appeared in the New
York Times for August 8, 1939.
[34] Ibid., p. 419.
[35] Ibid., p. 414.
[36] Ibid., p. 417.
[37] Ibid., pp. 452-453.
[38] Ibid., p. 463.
[39] Ibid., p. 479.
[40] Ibid., p. 554.
[41] Day, Donald, Onward
Christian Soldiers, Newport Beach, Cal.: The Noontide Press, 2002, p. 56.
[42] Hoggan, David L., The
Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for
Historical Review, 1989, pp. 500-501, 550.
[43] Ibid., p. 509
[44] Ibid., pp. 470, 483,
538.
[45] Ibid., pp. 513-514.
[46] Ibid., pp. 441, 549.
[47] Ibid., pp. 537, 577.
[48] Ibid., pp. 578-579.
[49] Ibid., pp. 586, 593,
598.
[50] Henderson, Nevile, Failure
of a Mission, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940, p. 227.
[51] Hoggan, David L., The
Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for
Historical Review, 1989, p. 390.
[52] De Zayas, Alfred-Maurice, A
Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of the East European Germans, 2nd
edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 27.
[53] Roland, Marc, “Poland’s
Censored Holocaust,” The Barnes Review in Review: 2008-2010, pp.
132-133.
[54] Shadewalt, Hans, Polish
Acts of Atrocity against the German Minority in Poland, Berlin and New
York: German Library of Information, 2nd edition, 1940, p. 19.
[55] Ibid., pp. 257-258.
[56] Ibid., pp. 88-89.
[57] Ibid., pp. 75-76.
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