Source: http://www.renegadetribune.com/the-forced-war-on-germany-when-peaceful-revision-failed/
Many efforts were made by German, French, Italian, and other European leaders to avert the catastrophe, but these efforts eventually failed, and the Halifax war policy, with the secret blessings of President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin, emerged triumphant. World War II had its origins in the British (Yiddish) attempt to destroy National Socialist Germany. The story culminated in the hideous tragedy of an unnecessary war.
NOTE: To further investigate by name and position the principal perpetrators of both world wars consult this article by Thomas Dalton.
The Jewish Hand in the World Wars
That jews were so active at so many points along the way we cannot avoid attributing to them a significant portion of blame for the world wars and accompanying revolutions.
http://www.renegadetribune.com/the-jewish-hand-in-the-world-wars/
The Forced War – When Peaceful Revision Failed
By David L. Hoggan
CONCLUSION
A marked trend toward a new arrangement of European relations based on the peaceable revision of the old Versailles settlement was rudely interrupted by the unexpected and unnecessary outbreak of World War II in September 1939. Germany had regained her rightful position as the dominant Power in Central Europe during 1938. At that time it seemed only a question of months before she would succeed in establishing relations with all of her immediate neighbors on a solid and dependable basis.
It is necessary to consider briefly in retrospect the European scene immediately after the Munich Conference. Germany was prosperous, and there were numerous indications that France, Great Britain, and Italy were recovering from the effects of the world depression of 1929. There were also hopeful indications that the leaders of France were by this time fully aware of the new realities, and that they were prepared to abandon their old policies of active intervention in Central Europe. This means that the last obstacles to successful Franco-German amity could be removed, because there were no longer any territorial problems or disputes between France and Germany.
Italy had gracefully accepted the reunion of Austria with Germany, and there were no clouds on the horizon of Italo-German relations.
German-Polish relations had shown general improvement for several years prior to 1938, and Hitler’s moderate and reasonable attitude toward Poland was highly auspicious for successful cooperation between the two countries in the future.
There were friendly relations between Germany and Hungary, and there was also increasing confidence and friendliness in German relations with such Balkan nations as Rumania and Yugoslavia.
The Soviet Union had been excluded from the deliberations of the Munich Conference, and there was every indication that the Communist Colossus would remain isolated behind the cordon sanitaire established shortly after World War I.
Hitler’s friendly attitude toward the British Empire was well known. It was evident that Germany had no intention of resuming her earlier rivalry with [602] Great Britain either in naval or in colonial questions. British world trade was increasing along with German prosperity, and hence there was no reason to expect new economic tensions of a serious nature between the former principal rivals of world trade.
All of this should have meant the beginning of a new era of peaceful development for Europe. Instead, Europe the following year, in 1939, was precipitated into the horrors, decline, and eclipse implicit in World War II.
It has been necessary to take a long and penetrating look behind the curtains of the European scene to discover how the tragedy of 1939 intruded its ugly visage on the world. The major aspects of the situation have been examined, but in the end it has been the marth of events in London and Warsaw which has demanded the principal share of the observer’s attention.
Halifax in London succeeded in imposing a deliberate war policy on the British Government in 1938-1939 despite the fact that most of the leading official British experts on Germany favored a policy of Anglo-German friendship. Beck in Warsaw adopted a position of full cooperation with the war plans of Halifax despite the numerous warnings he received from Poles aghast at the prospect of witnessing their country hurtle down the road to destruction.
Many efforts were made by German, French, Italian, and other European leaders to avert the catastrophe, but these efforts eventually failed, and the Halifax war policy, with the secret blessings of President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin, emerged triumphant. These events have been depicted in the course of the previous narrative. The story culminated in the hideous tragedy of an unnecessary war.
World War II had its origins in the British attempt to destroy National Socialist Germany. Lord Halifax later recalled the “wholly irrational pacifist sentiment” in Great Britain when Hitler came to power. Halifax’s principal achievement on the British home front, prior to the declaration of war on September 3, 1939, was to persuade the people to “face up to Hitler.’” He was completely successful in this effort, and the Anglo-American scalping party, as described by General Albert C. Wedemeyer, against Hitler and the German people, and incidentally also against the Italians and Japanese, ended in Europe in the ephemeral triumph of Germany’s unconditional surrender. The British Empire since the end of World War II in 1945 has, however, been “facing down” to many nations large and small throughout the world, and the end is not yet.
There was little reason to believe, prior to March 1939, that Great Britain would lead another “crusade” against Germany. The British Government had pursued a strangely inconsistent policy toward Germany throughout the entire 1933-1939 period. It was difficult to say before March 1939 whether more prominent Englishmen approved or disapproved of Hitler. 2
The British leaders condoned the first important steps in the remilitarization of Germany in 1935 by concluding an Anglo-German naval pact which violated the Treaty of Versailles. France and Italy both indicated that they would have refused to approve of such a measure had the British consulted them. The British, however, evaded their treaty obligation to do so.
British Foreign Secretary Eden later denied, in March 1936, that the military reoccupation of the Rhineland by Hitler was a “flagrant violation” of the principal Locarno treaty. This was regarded in Paris as tantamount to condoning [603] Hitler’s action, but Eden confused the issue by denying that France had previously violated her Locarno engagements in concluding the Franco-Soviet alliance. The German case was built on the contention of such a prior French violation.
This British policy of seemingly supporting both France and Germany in a crucially important Franco-German dispute was mysterious and confusing at that time. The same can readily be said of the ambivalent British role during the Austrian and Czech crises in 1938. It should excite no surprise that the eager acceptance of the Munich agreement in France was based on the assumption that the British intended to abide by this highly realistic new type of approach to the problems of Central Europe.
The secret British shift to a war policy in October 1938, when Halifax took over control of British foreign policy from Chamberlain, was followed by the public proclamation of this new policy by Chamberlain himself at Birmingham on March 17, 1939. This culminated, in turn, in the launching of the new “crusade” against Germany on September 3, 1939.
It is a great temptation to judge the outcome of the events of 1939 by the condition of the British Empire today, but such an approach might easily confuse the major issue. Even an increase in the power and prestige of the British Empire following the War would scarcely have excused the slaughter which produced the ruin and military defeat of such continental European states as France, Italy, Germany, and Poland, not to mention the many neutrals of Europe ultimately devastated in the same maelstrom. Denunciation of the British foreign policy of 1938-1939, by pointing to the vicissitudes now afflicting Great Britain, is like ridiculing a reckless man because he has lost a leg. It does not meet Toynbee’s claim that Great Britain had no other choice.
Therefore, a further analytical examination of the record is highly advisable. The Germany of Adolf Hitler had made no move whatsoever during the 1933-1939 period that threatened the areas of traditional British interest in Western Europe. There was no indication during those years that Germany intended to present selfish or provocative demands on such countries as France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, or Denmark. The problem of the Czechs in Central Europe after the Munich Conference presented a special case. Their homeland was outside the sphere of traditional British interest. The Munich agreement itself had actually been a dead letter since October 1938, when Halifax persuaded the Czechs and Hungarians to ignore Great Britain and France in seeking arbitration of their frontier dispute.
The British Government, after October 1938, repeatedly evaded acceptance of any of the commitments in the Bohemian area which had been suggested at Munich. The British Government, according to both Chamberlain and Halifax, had no right to be consulted about the Hitler-Hacha treaty of March 15, 1939, which represented, as Professor A.J.P. Taylor put it, a conservative solution of the Bohemia- Moravian problem. ’
The Polish problem and the Danzig dispute followed the latest Czech crisis. The British Government had certain nominal obligations at Danzig as a member of the League of Nations, but similar British commitments to the League regime at Memel had been ignored without difficulty when that traditionally German city was seized by Lithuania. The Germans had presented only friendly [604] suggestions and no belligerent demands involving Danzig by March 31, 1939, when the British Government extended a definite guarantee to Poland which also gave full support to the Polish attitude toward Danzig. German proposals concerning Danzig had previously been rejected by Poland in a manner deliberately calculated to create tension, but official German policy toward Poland before March 31st was exemplary, and was based exclusively on the desire to reach an amicable understanding with the Poles. There was no German action of any kind to justify British intervention in Poland at that time. Indeed, the guarantee of March 31, 1939, revealed that Great Britain was encouraging Poland to adopt a hostile policy toward Germany despite the generous terms which Hitler had offered for a lasting German-Polish settlement. The German offer, it must be repeated, was in no sense accompanied by demands for a settlement within any specific period of time.
Hitler was friendly toward the Poles, whom he liked, and he had also offered innumerable indications that he strongly favored Anglo-German friendship. There had been no German actions against Great Britain or her interests. There was no valid excuse for the British Government to encourage a German-Polish conflict in the hope of involving Germany in a new World War. The warmongering tactics of pro-Soviet intellectuals in Great Britain and the United States, prior to the Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939, provided no excuse; rather, they should have been a warning. The personal desire of Maxim Litvinov for a war between Germany and the Western Powers was clearly a hint that such a war might be advantageous for Communism and equally injurious to all other parties. There was no justification for a British Conservative Government to engage in war because it was desired by the Communists and their friends. The British Government had ample popular support for a conservative foreign policy.
The actual British foreign policy moves after March 31, 1939, were directed unrelentingly toward war. Everything possible was done to undermine several excellent opportunities for a negotiated settlement of the German-Polish dispute, and for the negotiation of a new Czech settlement based on international guarantees. Instead of working for a satisfactory agreement with Germany – Hitler was willing to be moderate and reasonable in dealing with both the Polish and the Czech questions – Halifax concentrated on intimidating Italy and bullying France because they both favored peace instead of war. The Polish Government was advised by Halifax to reject negotiations with Germany, and Warsaw was constantly assured that British support would be available for any war. The numerous requests of the German Government for mediation between Germany and Poland, or for a direct Anglo-German agreement, were either answered with deceptions or ignored. A maximum effort was made to present the American leaders with a distorted picture of the actual situation in Europe. All of these British moves had their roots in the obsolete, traditional policy of the balance of power.
The unreasonable attitude adopted by the Polish Government in 1939 is no mystery when one considers the grandiose British assurances to Poland after August 1938. The general policy of Jozef Beck against Germany was eminently satisfactory to Lord Halifax, although there was no mutual admiration between the two men and much disagreement arose between them about policy toward the Soviet Union, Rumania, and other countries. The prospect of unlimited [605] British support for dreams of aggrandizement at the expense of Germany was an irresistable lure to Polish chauvinism. The refusal of the British to guarantee Poland against Soviet aggression was carelessly ignored. The Polish leaders made a German-Polish war inevitable by creating a permanent crisis and refusing to negotiate for its solution. The situation probably would have been entirely different had Poland’s former great leades, JozefPilsudski, been at the helm.
The policy of Hitler was governed by the fact that the British were goading Poland into war against Germany, and that Germany was again threatened by the prospect of a protracted two-front struggle. The German leader showed restraint in the face of Polish provocations, such as partial mobilization, before the British guarantee of March 31, 1939. He concluded after the guarantee that the key to his problems was in London, and he made many efforts to persuade the British Government to change its course, and to encourage a negotiated settlement. It would have been more profitable for him to concentrate his major diplomatic effort at Paris. The French leaders were genuinely inclined toward peace, and the British would not have waged war against Germany without the support of France.
Hitler eventually launched operations in Poland, following the failure of his numerous negotiation efforts, but this was only after he had decided that war with the Poles had become inevitable in any event. Germany would surely have been ruined very quickly had she become involved in a stalemate in Poland during the October rainy season, and had the French and British on the western front elected such a lime to attack with their superior forces. Nevertheless, there was no time before the British declaration of war on September 3, 1939, when Hitler would have opposed a negotiated solution with Poland. An indication of this was shown by his favorable response to the Italian conference plan on September 2, 1939, and his willingness at that time to consider an immediate armistice in Poland. His peace policy foiled because the British Empire decided to challenge Germany before Hitler had completed his program of arriving at amicable understandings with his immediate neighbors.
It is quite likely that a more extensive German armament program after 1936 would have persuaded the British to hold their hand, at least in 1939. Hitler’s many appeals to British good-will were quite futile. It is also clearly evident that the situation would have been saved for Hitler had Italy maintained her previous diplomatic solidarity with Germany. The Italian defection from Germany and her neutrality pledge to Great Britain on August 18, 1939, was the decisive factor in frustrating Bonnet’s attempt to separate France from Poland at the French Defense Council meeting on August 23, 1939. It gave General Gamelin the excuse to argue that the French military position had improved since the previous Defense Council meeting on March 13, 1939. At that previous meeting, when the attitude of Italy was uncertain, Gamelin had confessed that France was unprepared for a conflict with Germany. The changed position of Italy (neutrality in the event of war) was the only conceivable excuse Gamelin could have used to modify his earlier statement on French military prospects.
Halifax’s “success” in promoting World War II resulted primarily from his masterful technique in dealing with prominent Englishmen, and with the Italians and French. His dominant role after the Munich Conference was never challenged in England, and the effectiveness of his diplomacy at Paris and Rome [606] during the last few weeks of peace is beyond dispute. He was far less capable of dealing with the Russians, but the Soviet Union was an alien world which he regarded with indifference, distaste, and contempt. The failure of his negotiations with the Soviet Union made it more difficult to hold France in line, but Halifax ultimately succeeded in even that objective. His main asset in that connection, apart from his successful intimidation of the Italians, was the timidity of French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet. Bonnet wanted Gamelin, or anyone else, to bear the brunt of British wrath when France refused to go to war. He refused at the last moment to assume that burden himself and to preserve peace.
The indifference of Halifax toward the fate of the Poles made it possible to employ them as an instrument of British policy without compunctions about the inevitably tragic consequences for Poland.
The motives of Halifax in 1939 were clearly derived from the ancient tradition of maintaining British superiority over the nations of Western and Central Europe. He had never questioned the role of his kinsman. Sir Edward Grey, in promoting World War I. Halifax did not propose to tolerate the existence in 1939 of a German Reich more prosperous and more influential than the Hohenzollern Empire which had been destroyed in 1918. It was for the prestige of Great Britain rather than for such mundane considerations as national security or immediate British interests that Halifax became a proponent of war in 1938. The traditional British aim to dominate policy in Continental Europe was the underlying reason why the world experienced the horrors of World War II. It was in pious service to this hoary ideal rather than for personal prestige or profit – he was amply endowed with both prior to 1938 – that Halifax conducted his policy. He recognized no restraint of any kind in the pursuit of his objective. He was satisfied that his goal was legitimate and in the closest possible harmony with the ideal expressed in his maiden speech to Parliament so many years earlier: the eternal glory and superiority of the British Empire. That the triumph shared by the British in the subsequent struggle was illusory and temporary, Halifax attributed to the will of Providence.
Others have not so easily achieved even this momentary solace, the solace of the principal perpetrator of World War II. The German people, especially, have been laden with an entirely unjustifiable burden of guilt. It may safely be said that this is the inevitable consequence of English wars, which for centuries have been waged for allegedly moral purposes. It is equally evident that the reconciliation which might follow from the removal of this burden would be in the interest of all nations which continue to reject Communism.
A sober view of the blunders of recent years and their consequences would be the best possible aid in now facing the difficult task of the future. The worst of these blunders was undoubtedly the British decision to encompass the destruction of Germany. Further research within the context of traditional British foreign policy will surely add a great deal to our understanding of this blunder, but it will not justify it. 4 There can be no real justification for the ruin of Europe in this greatest of all wars, waged as a consequence of the antique policy, illusions, and ruthless actions of Lord Halifax, an impressively old fashioned and pious British aristocrat.
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