By Walter N.
Sanning
The Soviet scorched-earth policy has many facets:
Military, economic, and so on. In The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry
I touched only on those which are of importance in connection with the
demographic changes of Eastern European Jewry. Here I want to emphasize the
economic side of a little-known portion of the Second World War. However, in
order to present the whole picture I must refer to portions of the subject
which have already been covered in The Dissolution. Space allows only
the most important references to those findings, and anybody who wishes to know
more about this is advised to check The Dissolution.
The German-Soviet
Non-Aggression Treaty of 23 August 1939 provided for the following territorial
divisions: Estonia and Latvia would fall into the Soviet sphere of interest
while Lithuania would fall into the German. From Lithuania the line of
demarcation would run toward East Prussia, from there along the Narew, Vistula,
and San rivers toward the Carpathian mountains (Map 1). /1 After the Polish
defeat, the Soviet government immediately exerted heavy pressure on Germany for
a revision of the treaty. In order to maintain peace, Hitler agreed in the
second treaty, the so-called Border and Friendship Agreement of 28 September
1939, that Germany would relinquish its interest in most of Lithuania in
exchange for the area between the Vistula and the Bug rivers with a population
of about 3.5 million, including more than 300,000 Jews. /2 This area had been
occupied by the Soviets for only a few days, but the Red Army had taken the
area's food supplies and livestock with it as it departed. As a result the
Germans actually had to bring in large quantities of food to forestall
starvation in this agricultural area. /3 This episode should have been a lesson
to Germany. It was not.
While Germany was engaged in
the Western Campaign from 10 May until 24 June, 1940, the Soviet Union occupied
the entirety of Lithuania between 16 and 22 June following the ultimatum of 15
June - that is, including even that portion which was to remain within the
German sphere of interest according to the treaty. This occupation constituted
not only a gross violation of the two Soviet-German treaties but also of the
Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty of Mutual Assistance (10 October 1939). The German
government was neither consulted nor informed of this Soviet action as required
under the treaty provisions. /4 The northern Bukovina region of Rumania, which
was outside the agreed-upon Soviet sphere of interest, was similarly
appropriated by the Soviets, although in this case the Soviets pressured
Germany into giving its "consent" within an ultimative time period of
24 hours before occupation (Map 2). I mention these developments only because
they demonstrate the determination with which Russia removed German strategic
advantages while improving her own. They also show that Germany had no definite
military objectives against the Soviet Union because otherwise it is
inconceivable that she would have tolerated Soviet usurpation of the
strategically invaluable Lithuanian gateway to Leningrad and Moscow.
Scorched Earth
Faced with a massive build-up
of Soviet military strength across the line of demarcation, concerned by the
Soviet breach of the so-called Hitler-Stalin Pact and forewarned by new and
enormous Soviet demands for geographic concessions in Europe, Germany invaded
the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. The Soviets immediately began to execute
German prisoners-of-war right after capture or a short interrogation. Even
seriously wounded soldiers were not spared. Numerous high level orders to this
effect are on record. The West German Military History Research Institute (Militaergeschichtliche
Forschungsamt), which is not known for its pro-German bias, puts the
percentage of captured German soldiers who died while in Soviet captivity in
the years 1941-1942 at 90-95 percent. /5a Within days after hostilities began,
the Kremlin's Central Committee issued orders to the effect that only scorched
earth be left to the enemy. Everything of value was ordered to be destroyed,
regardless of the needs of the civilian population left behind. For this
purpose special demolition battalions were sent into action. The
above-mentioned Military Research Institute commented further: "From the
very beginning of the war Stalin and the leadership of the Soviet Union
indicated through these measures that as far as they were concerned the armed
conflict with Germany was of an entirely different character than the
historical 'European national wars'." /5b
The measures taken by the
Soviet Union between 1940 and 1942 aimed not only at furthering the Soviet war
effort, but also at harming the German enemy even at the cost of huge losses of
life among Soviet civilians. The Soviet scorched-earth strategy included
the deportation of millions of men, women and children; the resettlement and
reestablishment of thousands of factories; the withdrawal of almost the entire
railway rolling stock; the-annihilation of raw material depots; the removal of
most of the agricultural machinery, cattle and grain stocks; the systematic
destruction, burning and blowing up of the immovable infrastructure,
inventories of all kinds, factory buildings, mines, residential areas, public
buildings, public records, and even cultural monuments; and the intentional
starvation of the civilian population which remained behind to face German
occupation. It was basically a policy which unscrupulously used the civilian
population as a strategic pawn. The extent and timing of this policy action is
confirmed by so many sources that no real difference of opinion exists in this
regard. What is strange is how scantily it has been covered so far in the
scholarly literature. Until now, this policy has not been analyzed to the
extent it deserves with an eye to identifying the party responsible for the
conflict, nor to appreciating the German difficulties in prosecuting a war
along established civilized lines, nor to assessing the claims of German
brutality in Russia, nor to sizing up the numerical potential of the alleged
German genocide of Soviet Jews, or indeed, of the Soviet Slavs.
Long before the outbreak of
the German-Soviet conflict, Stalin had begun to prepare for a future war in
Europe when he began to develop heavy industry in the Urals and Western Siberia
starting with the first Five-Year Plan which commenced in 1928. His plans were
for the long run. In the early 1930s he had already announced his determination
to overtake the most advanced industrialized countries with respect to
industrial and military capacity not later than 1941 /6 -- the year when,
according to numerous admissions of Soviet leaders, including Stalin's son, the
Red Army would strike Germany late that summer. /7 With the help of thousands
of engineers and experts from Europe and North America, the core of the Soviet
armaments industry was established in the region where Europe meets Asia.
Millions of Soviet citizens were also mercilessly sacrificed in the drive to
attain Soviet military supremacy. The Ural industrial region was covered with a
far-flung network of power lines and electric-power generation plants. In 1940,
this rather underpopulated area, with just four percent of the Soviet
population, produced 4 billion kWh of electricity, and the existing capacity
allowed for a great expansion. /8 By comparison, the Soviet territory later
occupied by Germany - the so-called Occupied Eastern Territories - produced no
more than 10 billion kWh before the war even though it accounted for about 40
percent of the Soviet population. In other words, on a per capita basis the
electric power output of the Urals region was four times larger. In preparation
for the coming conflict, substitute factory building shells were raised all
across the southern Urals and western Siberia for the purpose of accepting the
machinery from the territory the German enemy might threaten during the anticipated
hostilities. A railroad network far out of proportion to the needs of this
thinly populated area was vigorously expanded right up to the outbreak of war.
/9
As soon as the Germans crossed
the frontier, the Soviets put their Plan of Economic Mobilization into
action. This plan incorporated the possibility that the enemy might succeed in
occupying large sections of the country - as had happened during the First
World War. For this reason detailed plans specified the locations to which the
dismantled factories should be transported and the successive steps in which
the removal was to take place. The interrelationships between the individual
enterprises and their dependence on one another were painstakingly taken into
account. /10 The carefully executed plan included the removal and evacuation of
equipment and people 8-10 days before the retreat of the Red Army, followed by
24 hours of extensive destruction by special demolition squads just prior to
the retreat. If necessary, the Soviet troops would put up last-ditch resistance
to provide sufficient time for their demolition squads to complete their tasks.
Destination addresses found by
the surprised Germans pointed practically always in the direction of the Ural
industrial region, specifically to the area encompassed by Sverdlovsk, Molotov,
Ufa, Chkalov, and Magnitogorsk. This was the region where the factory shells
had been built years before the war and where the equipment dismantled in the
factories of the western Soviet Union was reassembled. /11
In just the first three months
after the outbreak of war more than 1360 large industrial enterprises were
transplanted and the movable equipment of thousands of collective farms was
transported to the interior. It seems that owing to the brutal regimentation of
the miserable deportees the evacuated enterprises rose in an unbelievably short
time at their new locations: it took just three to four weeks to reassemble
large factories and enterprises. The workers had to labor 12 to 14 hours a day,
seven days a week. Within three to four months Soviet production had again
reached prewar levels. /12
The Soviet feat was possible
only because millions of trained workers, managers, engineers and specialists
had been transported to those areas along with their factories. As early as
February 1940, German intelligence had reported the systematic deportation of
the Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish population from the western Ukraine. /13 In
June 1940, up to one million Jewish refugees from German-occupied Poland along
with many hundreds of thousands of Poles were deported to Siberia. Then, a few
weeks before 22 June 1941, mass deportations of the civilian populations along
the entire frontier with Germany, Hungary, and Rumania took place. The Soviets,
informed by their own spies, Allied intelligence, and German traitors, lost no
time in removing those civilians who were most critically needed in the Ural
armaments centers. /14
Soviet historians admitted
years ago that the Soviet Union had laid plans long before the war to put the
entire Soviet railroad system on a war footing overnight. The purpose was to
prevent the Germans from getting hold of the strategic rolling equipment. The
Soviet success in this endeavor was almost total: Despite the huge number of
rail cars, locomotives, and special transportation equipment in the frontier
areas, and the deployment of troops and war materials for the gigantic Soviet
military build-up in preparation for an attack on central Europe, most of the
rolling stock was removed in time before the Germans struck in a lightning
preventive action on 22 June 1941. During the first five weeks, when German
armies pushed hundreds of miles into the Soviet interior, only 577 locomotives,
270 passenger cars and 21,947 rail freight cars were captured. In relative
terms, this amounted to just 2.3. 0.8 and 2.5 percent
respectively. /15
During the first few months of
the war one million railroad cars loaded with industrial equipment, raw
materials, and people departed from the frontline areas. /16 I won't delve into
specifics of the scale of the Soviet program of deporting the civilian
population. This I have done in some detail in The Dissolution. Suffice
it here to note that before the war upward of 90 million people were living in
the Soviet areas conquered by Germany during the Second World War. The Soviets
deported anywhere between 25 and 30 million of them. They concentrated their
deportation efforts on specific groups. Thus, they preferred the urban to the
rural population, the skilled to the unskilled, and large educated minorities
(Jews and Russians in the Ukraine, White Russia, and in the Baltic countries)
to the more hostile native population. Because the Soviets had begun their
deportation program long before the outbreak of the war and because the western
frontier areas were generally not densely populated, the Soviet cities which
fell into German hands during the first few days and weeks of the war were
greatly depopulated - up to 90 percent in some cases and over 50 percent on the
average. The cities tended to show greater deportation percentages if they were
located in the Ukraine or White Russia, rather than in the Baltic countries; if
they were located near the western frontier rather than further east; and if
they had large educated minorities than if the native population predominated.
/17
In summary, the scorched-earth
policy was extremely well geared to Soviet objectives. A huge armaments program
had been initiated 13 years before 1941 and long before Adolf Hitler was in
sight as a serious contender for German leadership. Extensive investments had
been made in a rather thinly populated and underdeveloped area in order to
develop its transportation facilities, power stations and network, and heavy
industry. Last but not least, substitute factories had been systematically
erected, ready to accept the industrial equipment from the more developed
Soviet areas to the west should an unfavorable course of the war necessitate
their removal to safer areas. What was lacking, however, was the social infrastructure,
such as housing and hospitals, to accommodate the many millions of civilians
deported there between 1940 and 1941. As a result, 15-20 million civilians died
of epidemics, hunger, overwork, lack of housing, lack of clothing and the
brutal Siberian winter.
The Economic Breakdown in the
Occupied Eastern Territories
The picture presenting itself
to the advancing German troops was one of despair. Of the railroad system only
the tracks remained. The rolling stock was gone. Water works and power stations
were destroyed. In order to organize the production of war-essential raw
materials and mineral oil products, the Germans created the so-called Economic
Staff East.
However, the Soviet strategy
of scorching the earth very quickly forced the Economic Staff to reactivate all
productive facilities of any kind. Even the production of consumer goods was
included in its program, because domestic industry was incapable of resuming
production on its own following the almost total destruction and dismantling by
the Soviets and the deportation of most of the managerial personnel and
technical specialists.
Of the original power
generation capacity of 2.57 million kW in the Occupied Eastern Territories -
which was equivalent to roughly one-fourth of total prewar Soviet generating
capacity-less then one-eighth (300,000 kW) was found to be intact. Soviet
demolition efforts were so thorough that until the end of March 1943, capacity
could be increased to not more than 630,000 kW, which was still only
one-quarter of the prewar level. /18 (See Table 1.)
|
Table 1
Power Generation in the Occupied Eastern Territories (1,000 kW) |
||||
|
Total
|
RK Ukraine (incl. Military
Area South)
|
RK Ostland
|
Military Area North and
Center
|
|
|
Before the war
|
2570 (100%)
|
2200 (100%)
|
270 (100%)
|
100 (100%)
|
|
After Soviet retreat
|
300 (12%)
|
145 (7%)
|
135 (50%)
|
20 (20%)
|
|
March 1943
|
630 (24%)
|
350 (16%)
|
240 (90%)
|
40 (40%)
|
|
Source: Wirtschaftsgrößenordnungen für die
besetzen Ostgebiete, 9 March 1943, Berlin: Chefgruppe W im
Wirtsschaftsstab Ost (Military Archives Freiburg; Bestand RW 31/260).
|
||||
And yet, regional differences
were quite obvious. In the Reichskommissariat (RK) Ostland (Baltic countries
and White Russia) about half of the original capacity of 270,000 kW was found
to be intact and until the end of March 1943 almost 90 percent of the former
capacity was returned to operation. But in the Ukraine only 7 percent (145,000
kW) of the original power-generation capacity of 2.2 million kW was still
operational. The thoroughness of the Bolsheviks is shown by the fact that until
the end of March 1943, not more than 350,000 kW were usable again. This was
just 16 percent of prewar capacity. These figures refer only to available
capacities. In practice, these were rarely operated fully because of the
growing partisan menace and an almost total lack of coal supplies. Obviously,
industrial production had been dealt a fatal blow. As mentioned already,
electric power generation before the war amounted to 10 billion kWh annually in
the Occupied Eastern Territories. The German administration succeeded in
producing only 750 million kWh from the time of occupation until the end of
1942. For the year 1943 the planned increase to 1.4 billion kWh - which would
still have been 86 percent below pre-war levels -was never attained as
only 1 billion kWh were actually produced. /19 It is significant that the
planned increases in manufacturing and mining production for the year 1943 were
realized in only a few cases. Actual production of essential raw materials or
energy supplies fell far short of stated goals despite the high priority
attached to redeveloping the Ukrainian economy.
The effects of the systematic
destruction by the Soviets on industrial production are shown in Table 2.
|
Table 2
Industrial Production in the Occupied Eastern Territories from the Time of Occupation until the End of 1943 |
||||||
|
Category
|
Unit
|
Production before Occupation
|
Production percent of until
end of 1942
|
1941-1943 prewar pro in 1943
|
Induction average until year
end 1943
|
Plan fulfillment in the year
1943
|
|
Electricity
|
bill. kWh
|
10.0
|
7.5%
|
10.0%
|
8.8%
|
71%
|
|
Coal
|
mill. tons
|
85.0 (1940)
|
2.1%
|
2.7%
|
2.4%
|
26%
|
|
Iron ore
|
mill. tons
|
16.5 (1938)
|
|
2.3%
|
1.2%
|
10%
|
|
Crude Steel
|
mill. tons
|
12.0 (1940)
|
0.2%
|
0.1%
|
0.1%
|
2%
|
|
Cement
|
mill. tons
|
2.0 (1938)
|
15.0%
|
8.2%
|
11.6%
|
31%
|
|
Lignite
|
mill. tons
|
0.5 (1938)
|
56.0%
|
90.0%
|
73.0%
|
23%
|
|
Peat
|
mill. tons
|
8.0 (1938)
|
56.0%
|
35.1%
|
45.6%
|
51%
|
|
Manganese ore
|
mill. tons
|
1.4 (1938)
|
45.0%
|
81.4%
|
63.6%
|
80%
|
|
Shale
|
mill. tons
|
1.7 (1938)
|
50.6%
|
76.2%
|
63.5%
|
68%
|
|
Shale oil
|
1000 tons
|
160.0 (1938)
|
33.8%
|
67.3%
|
50.5%
|
82%
|
|
Petroleum*
|
1000 tons
|
370.0 (1938)
|
67.8%
|
21.0%
|
44.7%
|
31%
|
|
Phosphate rock
|
1000 tons
|
175.0 (1938)
|
7.6%
|
47.9%
|
27.8%
|
98%
|
|
Mercury
|
tons
|
300.0 (1938)
|
7.6%
|
4.0%
|
5.5%
|
12%
|
|
* Inculding mineral oil production of
Drohobycz (Galicia/General Government of Poland)
Source: Bericht über die Tätigkeit der
Chefgruppe Wirtschaft in Reichsministererium für die besetzen Ostgebiete,
20 November 1943, Berlin: Wirtschaftsstab Ost (Military Archives Freiburg;
Bestand RW 31/260). Wirtschaftsgrößenordnungen für die besetzen Ostgebiete,
9 March 1943, Berlin: Chefgruppe W im Wirtsschaftsstab Ost (Military Archives
Freiburg; Bestand RW 31/260).
|
||||||
The basic industrial structure
-- coal, iron ore, crude steel, electricity, and cement -- was for all
practical purposes totally destroyed. Compared with pre-war levels, coal mining
averaged 2.4 percent, iron ore production 1.2 percent, crude steel production
nothing, electricity 8.8 percent, and cement production 11.6 percent!
Another indication of the
sorry state of the economy in German occupied Russia was the size of industrial
manpower. In 1940, Soviet blue and white-collar workers numbered 31.2 million.
/20 Even if their proportionate share in the regions later occupied by Germany
was less than the Soviet average, it is reasonable to assume that there was a
total of at least 10 million blue- and white-collar workers in these areas
before the war. At the end of 1942, employment in industry (excluding the food
industry) totalled only 750,000. In the purely industrial enterprises, that is,
excluding the handicrafts, the number of employees was just 600,000 (Table 3)
|
Table 3
Number of Employees in Industry (excl. food) in the Occupied Eastern Territories - End of 1942 |
||
|
Area
|
Employees
|
(percent)
|
|
Baltic countries (of RK Ostland)
|
140,000
|
(24%)
|
|
White Russia (General District)
|
25,000
|
|
|
Military Area North
|
14,475
|
|
|
Military Area Center
|
40,000
|
(76%)
|
|
RK Ukraine
|
150,000
|
|
|
Military Area South
|
219,893
|
|
|
Total
|
600,000
|
(100%)
|
|
Source: Bericht über die Tätigkeit der
Chefgruppe Wirtschaft in Reichsministererium für die besetzen Ostgebiete,
20 November 1944, Military Archives Freiburg; Bestand RW 31/260, p. 4.
|
||
Six hundred thousand in an
area which prior to the war had a population of perhaps 75 million! Even if we
add the unknown number of people employed in the food industry, it is obvious
that industrial employment under German administration was equivalent to
one-tenth of prewar levels at most. To make matters worse, the productivity
of this remnant manpower was far below prewar standards. It is noteworthy that
although the Baltic countries (the largest of which, Lithuania, had very little
industry) accounted for only 8 percent of the prewar population of the Occupied
Eastern Territories, they nevertheless furnished one quarter of the industrial
manpower under German administration (Table 3).
Soviet deportations reduced
skilled personnel to such an extent that not enough local managerial or
technical experts could be found in the Occupied Eastern Territories for even
the tiny number of remaining industrial employees. The Germans were forced to
bring in about 10,000 civilian specialists from the Reich in order to overcome
the most severe personnel shortages. /21 On the basis of available statistics I
estimate that the Soviets deported at least 70 percent of the workers prior to
German occupation. This means that the number of workers available to the
German administration (generally lesser-skilled) was about 2 to 3 million.
Inasmuch as not more than a million could be put back to work despite the
enormous need for every kind of production, unemployment assumed huge
proportions (50-70 percent) in the midst of a vociferous demand for goods of
any kind.
According to Soviet Prof.
Telpuchowski, the areas occupied by the Germans until November 1941 accounted
for 63 percent of the coal, 68 percent of pig iron, 58 percent of the steel, 60
percent of the aluminum, 38 percent of grains and 84 percent of the sugar
produced in the entire Soviet Union before the war. /22 The documents of the
German Economic Staff East show essentially very similar magnitudes. The
Soviets managed to make all this unavailable to the German enemy. The means
employed were ruthless dismantling, demolition, fire, sabotage and deportation.
Instead of adding to Germany's military strength, these areas became a
tremendous drain on her already strained industrial capacity.
Hunger
As for the conquered raw
material supplies, the following secret report of the German Economic Staff for
the period 1-10 October 1941, provides a vivid description of the situation:
Few supplies of any size have
been found so that care will have to be taken during the hostilities ... It
appears that all raw material stocks were either systematically removed from
the areas conquered so far or made unusable. Thus, the small quantities found
until now are not a significant help in relieving the raw material needs of the
Reich.... The factories have not been supplied with raw materials for some
time. /23
The same situation applied in
the case of food, especially grains. An interdepartmental proposal of the
Economic Staff dated 3 October 1941 on the supplies needed for Russian cities
even went so far as to suggest that the remaining larger cities not yet in
German hands should be cut off and encircled, and that their capitulation
should not be accepted.
This, of course, was
militarily quite out of the question, but it shows the desperation with which
the German authorities of the conquered areas viewed the effects of the Soviet
strategy of leaving it up to the occupying armies to feed millions of starving
Soviet citizens! The report continued:
It has been our experience
that the Russians remove or destroy systematically all of the food supplies
before retreating. The urban population of the conquered cities thus will
either have to be fed by the Wehrmacht or it will have to starve. Obviously, by
forcing us to provide additional food to the Russian population, the Russian
leadership intends to worsen the already difficult food situation of the German
Reich through a reduction of the domestic German food supply. As a matter of
fact, the present food situation permits us to feed the Russian urban
population from our own stocks only if we reduce the supplies to the Army or if
we lower the rations at home. /24
During the very early period
of the war, Soviet destruction in the agricultural sector was confined to the
machine and tractor stations. As a rule, these stations were found empty and
the machines and vehicles left behind had been made unusable. At first, cattle
stocks were relatively intact. But this changed rapidly during the following
weeks. As the war progressed from west to east, almost no cattle, grain and
gasoline supplies were found. The Luftwaffe and prisoners of war reported that
the Soviets busily harvested the fields as they retreated. After the Ukraine
was liberated, it became obvious that the food situation would slowly but
surely become catastrophic. In many cases even seed grains had to be
distributed to help the starving Ukrainians. This, in turn, reduced the acreage
that could be planted at a time when the lack of tractors, gasoline, and draft
horses had already made its negative effects felt. It is estimated that the
so-called Occupied Eastern Territories produced 43 million tons of grain under
Soviet rule in 1940. Under German administration the recorded harvest in 1941
was not more than 13 million tons. One reason for this small harvest was the
fact that the German drive into Russia was swiftest in the northern and center
sections of the theater of war, thus enabling the Soviets to take with them or
destroy considerable parts of the harvest in the Ukraine. In 1942 even less was
harvested, only 11.7 million tons. According to Dallin, the German
administration succeeded in seeding not more than three quarters of the prewar
acreage. Fertilizer was practically unavailable and the yield per acre was
correspondingly lower in 1942. Compared to the average yields per hectare of
approximately 2200 pounds (14 bushels/acre) in the Ukraine in the late 1930s,
the Germans managed to obtain just 1500 pounds (10 bushels/acre). /25
Furthermore, the Soviet scorched earth policy now began to show its full
effects: The use of seed grains to relieve the worst hunger in the cities, the
increasing partisan menace and the dearth of personnel and machinery reduced
the harvest potential drastically.
German supervisory personnel
in the countryside were much too thinly spread to enforce effectively a strict
delivery of agricultural products. To be sure, at the expense of the goodwill
and the pro-German attitude of the peasant population, it was possible to locate
and requisition some additional agricultural produce for the cities, but,
judging by the misery in the cities, this was by far not rigorous enough. Of
course, the Germans periodically tried to "comb through" the
countryside to find these hoarded stocks but their efforts were marked with
little success. The retreating Red Army had removed the entire organization
necessary to collect and distribute the harvest of the collectivized
agriculture system, and the German administration was forced to set up its own
collection and distribution system for agricultural products-not an easy task
considering the harrowing wartime conditions. Not only was time much too short
and wartime conditions simply too severe to organize such an administration
successfully, but the brutality with which the Bolsheviks had enforced their
claims on agricultural production was simply not in keeping with the German
mentality or German policy which -- contrary to Allied and Soviet propaganda --
aimed at finding a basis of mutual understanding with the liberated Slavic and
Baltic populations.
Far from the ruthlessness
which supposedly characterized German occupation rule in Russia, the plain fact
is that, as a central European nation, the Germans never came to grips with the
inhumane concept of total warfare as applied by their Soviet foe. As even
Jewish historian Alexander Dallin admits: "Soviet collection (of the
harvest) had, in practice, been far more efficient (italics added) than
the German. As a result, peasants in German-held areas were often able to hide
larger stocks than before the war. In all probability concealed reserves
remained substantial,..." /26 From 1941 until 1943, 15,000 rail cars
loaded with agricultural equipment and machines left Germany for the Occupied
Eastern Territories under the so-called Ostackerprogramm ("Eastern
soil program"). This included 7,000 tractors, 20,000 generators, 250,000
steel plows, and 3,000,000 scythes. Furthermore, thousands of bulls, cows,
swine, and stallions were sent to those areas for breeding purposes to raise
the quality of the livestock. Available statistics indicate that German
agricultural assistance between July 1941 and tune 1943 amounted to 445 million
RM (Reichsmarks). /27
The net prewar Soviet harvest
of 1940 yielded 82 million tons of grain, of which about 30 percent was set
aside for seed and feed purposes. Theoretically, the Soviet population thus had
available 57 million tons, or a little less than 800 grams daily per person. In
practice, of course, it was less, because part of this volume was set aside in
reserve in anticipation of the coming war with Germany. /28 Assuming that 30
percent of the recorded harvest of only 13 millions tons under German
occupation in 1941 was set aside for seed and feed purposes, only 9 million
tons were left for the native population. Of that amount 2 million tons were
taken by the German army. The amount requisitioned by the German army was
rather moderate indeed. This is shown by the fact that the Red Army used 31/4
million tons of grain in 1940, the last year of peace! While another 350,000
tons were shipped off to Germany, this was offset by the significant but
unknown portion of the grain volume sequestered by the German army but used to
feed the native urban civilian population. /29 In any case, the civilian
population of about 50 million was thus left with only about 7 million tons. On
a per capita basis this amounted to less than 400 grams daily (less than one
pound) - only half as much as in 1940. Meat and fats were not available as a general
rule. But this average does not mean very much. On the one hand, we noted that
the harvests probably were considerably larger than German statistics indicate.
This means that at least the rural population which was the majority, was able
to enjoy a considerably better and more plentiful diet. Also, many urban
dwellers were able to obtain food from the peasants on the illegal, but
difficult to control black market. In this way the cities obtained from the
peasants some of the food which German authorities were unable to trace On the
other hand, transportation was often an insurmountable problem so that even the
minimal supply of food arrived in the cities either late or not at all.
Moreover, partisans either destroyed or confiscated large parts of the harvested
grain. Finally, German authorities often tried to obtain extra rations for
workers in war-essential factories. Of course, this was only possible at the
expense of the rest of the population. The fact that German authorities did not
even succeed in getting the special rations for the workers in war-essential
industries or for those doing heavy manual labor, as they were entitled, shows
how serious the situation was. /30 Those urban residents who were either
unemployed or did not have anything to trade with the peasants were really in
trouble: Starvation was their fate.
To show the desperate food
situation in the cities of German occupied Russia, I will quote from the
regular secret reports of the Economic Staff East sent to Berlin:
11 November 1941: The scarcity
of food and the lack of even the most essential consumer goods are the main
reason why the morale of the Russian and Ukrainian population is becoming more
and more depressed ... Kiev received no grain whatever since its occupation on
19 September 1941 ... The partisans take food from the civilian population at
night and force physically able men to join them. In part, food supplies are
being burned down by the partisans. Especially great difficulties exist in the
southern area where it is impossible to feed all of the prisoners of war
because of their huge numbers.... The authorities are constantly at pains to
find enough to eat for the prisoners, although gruel and buckwheat are
available only in limited quantities.... We are very concerned about our
ability to feed the urban population in the southern areas. /31
8 December 1941: The food
situation in the city of Kharkov is extremely critical. There is almost nothing
for the population to eat. Bread is not available. /32
22 January 1942: The regular
distribution of food to the urban civilian population in the southern area must
be restricted more and more, and this is not likelv to change in the
foreseeable future. /33
23 February 1942: The supply
of food to the civilian population of the larger cities is so critical that it
is cause for the most serious warnings. /33
1 March 1942: The morale is
low because of food problems.... In the densely populated Donets area
especially no food has been distributed at all to the population. As a result,
several thousand people have died of hunger so far. In some cases even highly
qualified specialists and professors were among the victims. /33
5 March 1942: The food
situation continues to be very serious and in some cities there is actual
starvation. In Pushkin it was discovered that there was a trade in human flesh
which was offered to the population as pork. /33
16 March 1942 (Report by the
commander of the military rear central areas): In the large cities (the food
situation) continues to be unsatisfactory and in Kharkov it is catastrophic. As
time goes on it becomes ever more difficult to feed the urban population ...
/33
3 June 1942: The food
situation in the cities grows worse and worse because part of the food supplies
collected for the population had to be used for seeding and part of the
supplies were destroyed bv the partisans. /33
The unceasing efforts by the
German civil and military authorities to provide a sufficient supply of food to
the civilian population within their narrow means were brought to naught by the
terribly poor harvests, the catastrophic transport situation, the partisan
menace, the removal of the food depots by the Soviets and the impossibility of
organizing a satisfactory regular exchange of goods between the large cities
and the countryside. While the food supply of the rural population and the
small towns was relatively secure, the civilian population of the large cities
and the millions of prisoners faced naked starvation. Soviet savagery thus
became a legacy of German guilt.
German Counter-Measures
If for no other reason than
self-interest, the Germans tried to relieve the catastrophic economic situation
and stabilize the economy by importing huge amounts of capital from Germany.
Equipment worth one billion RM was imported from the Reich for the mining,
energy and manufacturing sectors alone. To this must be added the considerable
costs incurred for the transportation sector as well as for road-building
equipment, the value of which has been estimated at more than one billion RM.
After adding the considerable quantities of coal used as fuel for civilian
railroad freight transport, German reconstruction aid for industry and the
infrastructure may have totalled more than 2.5 billion RM. /34 This amount does
not include agricultural assistance worth about a half-billion RM. The extent
of German aid to the civilian sector may be better appreciated if one realizes
that the gross value of industrial production in those areas (valued on the
basis of domestic German prices) from the beginning of the occupation until the
end of 1943 amounted to approximately 5 billion RM. (This figure includes the
industrial raw materials, finished goods, and repairs furnished by that economy
to the German army.) /35 Although it is not known precisely what portion of
this gross value was actual value-added, comparisons with other countries would
suggest that it must have been a little more than 2 billion RM./36 In other
words, German non-agricultural economic aid was larger than the entire
industrial output of these territories during the time of occupation! The
annual net output per worker amounted to 1,000 RM per year. By comparison: The
German worker attained a net production of 4,000 RM in the year 1936. /37
Naturally, a large part of the
much-reduced volume of industrial production was absorbed by the German
occupation army. Thus, German army requirements and, to an even greater extent,
the Soviet scorched-earth strategy, reduced the supply of consumer goods for a
native population of about 50 million to almost nothing. The reason for the
failure of the German administration to provide sufficient food for the native
urban population is best demonstrated by this dilemma. Consumer goods
production was practically non-existent because of Soviet destruction and
evacuation of all industrial plants and raw materials, the deportation of the
trained industrial manpower, and the impossibility of quickly repairing
damages. Thus, there was nothing the urban populations could offer to the
peasants in exchange for their food. And since the peasant was unable to buy
anything for the money he received, he was unwilling to part with his produce.
German economic aid to the
occupied Soviet territories amounted to roughly one percent of German gross
national product of those years. /38 Even today, this figure is not matched by
the level of foreign aid of the industrial nations to developing countries.
West Germany, for example, extended foreign aid amounting to about one-half of
one percent of GNP since 1960, that is, at a time of relative prosperity and
low defense outlays. Indeed, the economic assistance of about 3 billion RM (including
both industrial and agricultural aid) furnished to the economy of the
occupied Soviet area is even more remarkable when one realizes this this
amount was equivalent to one-fourth of aggregate gross fixed investment in
Greater Germany in the years 1942 and 1943 (12 billion RM). /39
A comparison of the straight
economic tonnage exchanged between the Reich and the Occupied Eastern Territories
provides additional information on non-military exchange between those two
years. Unfortunately, only data for the year 1943 could be found. (Table 4)
|
Table 4
Non-military Transports between the German Reich and the Occupied Eastern Territories in the Year 1943 (1,000 tons) |
||
|
From the Occupied Eastern Territories into the Reich
|
||
|
By Rail
|
4,259
|
|
|
On waterways
|
536
|
4,795
|
|
From the Reich into the
Occupied Eastern Territories
|
||
|
By Rail
|
2,126
|
|
|
On waterways
|
1,911
|
4,037
|
|
Source: Reichsministererium fuer die besetzen
Ostgebiete. Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Chefgruppe Wirtschaft in
Reichsministererium für die besetzen Ostgebiete, 20 November 1944,
Military Archives Freiburg; Bestand RW 31/260.
|
||
In terms of tonnage, about 20
percent more freight entered Germany than was delivered by the Reich.
Considering that about 2 million tons of grain were furnished by the Occupied
Eastern Territories to the German armies in 1943, /40 the tonnage ration of exchange
of 7 to 4 was indeed favorable to Germany. However, the goods made available by
those territories were mainly staples (raw materials, ores, etc.) with
relatively low weight-specific values, while the products from Germany had very
high weight-specific values (with the exception of coal to run the railroads,
of course). Inasmuch as finished goods tend to be many times more valuable,
pound for pound, than staple products, it would seem that the exchange was much
more favorable for the Occupied Eastern Territories, even though this rough
approximation certainly does not permit us to calculate the actual value of the
trade even within a wide margin of error. On balance, the Occupied Eastern
Territories delivered agricultural products worth 1.6 billion RM to the Reich
and the German armies. /41 The deliveries of German machines, tractors,
generators, equipment of all kinds for industry and agriculture, vehicles,
railroad coal, etc., amounted to roughly 3.0 billion RM, leaving a difference
of about 1.4 billion RM in favor of the Occupied Eastern Territories. From this
we would have to deduct the value of captured raw material supplies, the ores
and other raw materials produced during the period of occupation, as well as
repair services for the German army. It is unknown what value should be applied
to these items. However, in view of the very small raw material depots found
and the extremely low production of the largely defunct industry (a large part
of the industrial output was actually used to rebuild the factories) it must be
doubted whether more than 25 percent of industry's meager output of 2 billion
RM was absorbed by the occupation forces. In short, the Occupied Eastern
territories as such added little in economic terms to the fight against the
common Bolshevik enemy. In fact, they were the beneficiaries of an almost
unbelievably generous reconstruction assistance. This aid, like all so-called
foreign aid, was hardly made for purely altruistic reasons. Nevertheless, it
was unique in the history of relations between an occupying power and the
conquered territory of a country with which it was still locked in mortal
combat.
It would be too simplistic to
attribute the German economic failure in Russia simply to the Soviet success in
dismantling, removing and destroying the industrial base, infrastructure and
raw material supplies, to the deportation of millions of workers or to the
increasing partisan threat. All of these factors were no doubt very important.
Another aspect, however, was at least as significant. When Germany invaded the
USSR she did so despite an almost total lack of knowledge of real Soviet
military strength, of the size of Soviet arms production, of the capacity of
the main centers of military industrial output, or of Soviet preparations for
total war. Even worse, Germany was totally unprepared to overcome the serious
transportation bottlenecks which developed almost immediately and had no plans
whatever for running an economy which had depended on centralized planning
directives from Moscow, where every kind of private initiative had been
stifled, where the entire administrative, managerial and technical class had
been deported and where public records had been largely removed. Not only did
Soviet brutality and lack of any restraint differ from the practice during the
historic national wars in Europe, but it soon also became apparent that the
challenge of a smoking remains of an economy, run on an organizational pattern
vastly different from that familiar to Europeans, posed insurmountable problems.
The added liability of the disappearance of the entire organizational,
administrative and technical apparatus turned a task which was almost
impossible to begin with into chaos. Chaos brought starvation, and starvation
brought support for the partisans. The book has not yet been written which
analyses the German military defeat in Russia in terms of her failure to get
the economy of the occupied territories organized effectively and producing
again.
The lack of success in finding
a solution to the food problem was partly due to Germany's inability to
effectively revamp Soviet agriculture during the limited time available and to
her scruples in burdening an already downtrodden population even further. Thus,
assistance measures like the so-called Ostackerprogramm, while gigantic
in terms of absolute aid to the agriculture of the Occupied Eastern
Territories, were really doomed to failure from the start because they did not
remove the cause of the problem. In effect, Germany tried to keep alive by
artificial means the amputated trunk of a society devoid of its brains and
muscles.
Implications
It is an indisputable fact
that the systematic Soviet dismantling of factories and their shipment to the
Urals, the carefully planned removal and destruction of raw materials stocks
and food supplies, and the large-scale deportation of civilians were started
long before 22 June 1941. Indeed, evidence indicated that these efforts were
greatly intensified ten to fourteen days prior to that date. Now, we do not
know whether Stalin believed that a German attack would come on the precise
date of 22 June 1941, although Sorge and others had provided such information
to him. Possibly, Stalin thought that Germany's military build-up was
insufficient to allow her to strike on the day reported to him. But this is
really beside the point. Both sides knew that the other would attack as soon as
it was ready. This fact demolishes forever the charge of a German sneak attack
on an unprepared, peace-loving Soviet Union. The initial German military
successes were achieved not because of the element of surprise but despite
Stalin's knowledge of German preventive action and despite a huge Soviet
military build-up for an attack on central Europe, which was the reason for
Germany's preventive war in the first place. Furthermore, the allegation of
systematic German brutality in Russia is exposed as plain Soviet propaganda. It
is true that starvation was widespread in the large cities of the
German-occupied Soviet Union, that large numbers of Soviet prisoners-of-war
died of hunger, that the Soviet cities were in ruins after the German armies
retreated, and that the Soviet population suffered tens of millions of dead
during the Second World War. However, we also know that the inhumane Soviet scorched-earth
strategy was the cause of hunger in the German-occupied Soviet territories, of
an orgy of destruction previously unknown in warfare, and of the death of up to
20 million Soviet civilians, many of whom had been deported to the frozen
wastes of Siberia and the Urals where epidemics, lack of housing and medical
care, unimaginably hard work loads, and an extreme climate allowed only the
toughest to survive. Add the costly human-wave tactics of Soviet military
strategy and it is evident that Soviet brutality alone was responsible for the
unbelievably huge losses of life suffered by the peoples of the Soviet Union -
more than 30 million dead!
The real number of Soviet war
losses is not the main focus of this paper, and space does not permit a
detailed examination of this subject here. However, an appendix has been added
which attempts to arrive at a more realistic estimate of Soviet war casualties
based on an analysis of postwar USSR census figures from 1959, 1970 and 1979
and a comparison with the Soviet census of 1939 adjusted to the extent possible
for border and population changes between 1939 and 1945. Suffice it here to say
that the Soviets lost more than 25 percent of their male and almost 9 percent
of their female population. For the population left under Stalin's control at
the height of German expansion in Russia, the equivalent losses are 33 percent
and 13 percent. It is curious that contemporary standard treatments of Soviet
wartime losses generally admit to just 20 million dead. Why this unusual
understatement for a wartime ally? Well, to admit that the Soviets lost almost
20 million civilians rather than 6-7 million during the Second World War would
place the responsibility for most of the non-military losses on the Soviets
themselves.
Naturally, the alleged German
rampage in Russia fits neatly into the "Holocaust" tale. After all,
the area of the Soviet Union occupied by Germany had been populated by more
than 3.5 million Jews before 22 June 1941. /42 If one adds the nearly one
million Jewish refugees in eastern Poland in early 1940, it is obvious that to
maintain the genocide charge it has been necessary to draw a curtain of silence
around the Soviet long-term preparation, anticipation, thoroughness, brutality,
and scale of scorching the earth during the Second World War. Since the
historical framework within which the alleged German mass murder is supposed to
have been perpetrated simply did not exist, it became necessary to create the
myths which superficially appeared to be substantiated by what was obvious to
everyone: The initial swift German advances and the horrible destruction of
Soviet cities and countryside after the Germans were forced out again.
It is up to us to lift this
curtain of silence and concealment and to replace the myth of Soviet
unpreparedness with the horrible truth of Soviet scorched earth.
Appendix
Soviet Casualties During the
Second World War
The USSR has never published
any data on Soviet war casualties. But the censuses taken in the post-war
period can help give a good idea of the probable size of the Soviet losses. A
distinction between military and non-military losses, however, still is not
possible with any great degree of accuracy. The census of 17 January 1939 found
a population of 170.56 million, of which 81.70 million (47.9%) were male. The
first post-war census conducted in December 1959 counted 208.83 million
inhabitants; males accounted for 94.05 million (45%) of them. A direct
comparison between these two counts is not possible, though, because the Soviet
Union annexed huge territories in eastern Europe in the period from September
1939 to the summer of 1940 and then again in 1945: the Baltic countries,
eastern Poland, northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, and the Carpathian Ukraine. In
the course of its territorial expansion in the years 1939 and 1940 the Soviet
Union absorbed at least 24 million Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Jews,
White Russians, Ukrainians, Poles and Rumanians, to name just the most
important nationalities. Also, between January 1939 and June 1941 the natural
excess of births over deaths added another 7-8 million people. Thus, at the
beginning of the war with Germany in June 1941 there were about 202 million
people under Soviet rule.
The sex structure of the
Soviet population of 202 million (June 1941) was not affected by the
incorporation of 24 million people between 1939 and 1940, because most of the
absorbed territories had belonged to the Tsarist empire until 1917 and thus the
enormous male casualties suffered during the First World War were reflected in
the demographic structure of those areas as well. But the excess births over
deaths between 1939 and 1941 did result in a very slight improvement of the
male share to 48 percent. To summarize: Of the 202 million people in the Soviet
Union at the beginning of the war in June 1941, 97 million were male (48%) and
105 million female (52%). A comparison of these figures with the census of 1959
is encumbered by the fact that after the war further territorial changes and
forcible population exchanges with neighboring satellite countries took place.
For example, the area around Bialystok, which was occupied by the Soviet Union
in 1939, was returned to Communist post-war Poland. At the same time, the
Soviets annexed the Carpathian Ukraine. Then, too, many Poles residing in
eastern Poland were removed after the war to areas previously populated by
Germans, while many Ukrainians living west of the line of the Bug and San
rivers were transferred to Ukraine.
|
Development of the Soviet
Population: 1939 to 1979 (millions)
|
|||
|
|
Male (percent)
|
Female (percent)
|
Total
|
|
Increase
|
|||
|
Census of January 1939
|
81.70 (47.9)
|
88.86 (52.1)
|
170.56
|
|
a) Estimated resident population of eastern Poland, Baltic countries,
northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Polish refugees from central Poland
|
+11.50 (47.9)
|
+12.50 (52.1)
|
+24.00
|
|
b) Estimated natural population growth until June 1941
|
+3.80 (51.0)
|
+3.64 (49.0)
|
+7.44
|
|
Estimate for June 1941
|
97.00 (48.0)
|
105.00 (52.0)
|
202.00
|
|
Soviet War Casualties*
|
23.87
|
9.00
|
32.87
|
|
Estimate for June 1945
|
73.13 (43.2)
|
96.00 (56.8)
|
169.13
|
|
Net increase 1945-1959
|
|||
|
Births (at least)
|
30.10
|
30.10
|
60.2
|
|
Deaths (estimate)
|
9.18
|
11.32
|
20.5
|
|
Net total
|
20.92 (52.7)
|
18.78 (47.3)
|
39.70
|
|
Census of December 1959
|
94.05 (45.0)
|
114.78 (55.0)
|
208.83
|
|
Net increase 1959-1970
|
17.35 (52.7)
|
15.54 (47.3)
|
32.89
|
|
Census of January 1970
|
111.40 (46.1)
|
130.32 (53.9)
|
241.72
|
|
Net increase 1970-1979
|
10.90 (52.7)
|
9.78 (47.3)
|
20.68
|
|
Census of January 1979
|
122.30 (46.6)
|
140.10 (53.4)
|
262.40
|
|
* Difference between the 1941 and 1945
population estimates.
|
|||
Whether all of these changes
provided the Soviet Union with a net population gain or loss cannot be
determined today with certainty. In addition, there is the well-known fact that
many former Soviet citizens fled to the West when the German armies withdrew
from Russia. Many of them were able to find their way to western countries
despite Allied efforts to force them to return to the Soviet Union after 1945.
But these lucky ones are more than matched by the millions deported by the
Soviets from central and eastern Europe after the war. It is just about
impossible to obtain even approximate figures for these population changes, but
it can be argued (and this analysis starts from the basis) that these changes
did not produce major additions or subtractions.
The total number and the sex
composition of the Soviet population at the end of the war in 1945 can be
estimated if we draw on the post-war censuses of December 1959, January 1970
and January 1979. The age groups of 0 to 15 years (1945-1959) accounted for
60.2 million people according to the census of December 1959. Available
statistics indicate that the mortality rate averaged 0.72% between 1945 and
1959; on the basis of an average population of 190 million the total number of
deaths during this period may be estimated at 20.5 million. Thus, the net
population growth until 1959 was almost 40 million. Subtracting this figure
from the 1959 population of about 209 million we arrive at a 1945-population of
only 169 million! Finally, if we compare the 1941 figure (202 million) with the
one for 1945, it is obvious that the Soviet Union's total war casualties
amounted to 33 million! The distribution of this immense loss of life among
both sexes can also be estimated by using the post-war censuses. Between 1959
and 1970 the net population gain was 32.89 million, and between 1970 and 1979
it was 20.68 million. Males accounted for 52.74 percent of this total increase
of 53.57 million. Applying this percentage to the increase of barely 40 million
between 1945 and 1959, it is obvious that males increased by almost 21 million.
The Soviet censuses of 1939,
1959, 1970 and 1979, as well as the estimates for the years 1941 and 1945, are
listed above.
Despite the above-mentioned
uncertainties pertaining to the various population movements, it is
nevertheless possible to state with a great degree of probability that Soviet
war losses during the Second World War exceeded 30 million and that only 73
million of the previous 97 million males survived the war. In short, more than
25 percent of the males had to sacrifice their lives for the Soviet cause! The
female Soviet population suffered 9 million dead, or almost 9 percent. Citing
official sources, the Swiss newspaper Die Tat (January 1955) reported
13.6 million Red Army deaths during the Second World War. The same figure was
published by the Ploetz Publishing House in Wuerzburg/Germany, and other
sources -- for example, the West German Historical Military Research Institute
-- mentioned similar figures. If this huge military loss is accurate, Soviet civilian
losses must have been 19.3 million, of which, in turn, 9 million were female
and 10.3 million male. The terrible conditions behind Soviet lines, which
included hunger, exhaustion, deaths from exposure to cold, epidemics, lack of
medications and medical care, catastrophic living conditions (tents, earth
huts), and the terror of an inhumane regime fighting for its survival, caused
most of these deaths, as the 9 million female casualties indicate.
Notes
1. Helmdach, Erich. Täuschungen
und Versäumnisse, Berg am See: 1979, p. 155.
2. Brennecke, Gerhard. Die
Nürnberger Geschichtsentstellung, Tuebingen: 1970, p. 303.
3. Fischer, Ludwig, and Friedrich
Gollert. Warschau unter deutscher Herrschaft, Cracow: 1942, p. 186.
4. Brennecke, Die Nürnberger
Geschichtsentstellung, pp. 303 and 322.
5. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite
Weltkrieg
(Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Ed.), Stuttgart: 1983, Volume 4, p. 785.
b. ibid., p. 782.
b. ibid., p. 782.
6. Scott, John. Jenseits des
Ural, Stockholm: 1944, p. 304.[English edition: Behind the Urals,
Boston: 1942.]
7. Helmdach, Erich. Überfall? Der
sowjetisch-deutsche Aufmarsch 1941, Neckargemuend/Germany: 1978, 4th
Chapter.
8. Scott, Jenseits des Ural,
p. 310.
9. ibid., pp. 303 and 310.
10. Telpuchowski, Boris
Semionowitsch. Die Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges 1941-1945,
(Andreas Hillgruber and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, eds.), Frankfurt/Main: 1961, pp.
81-83, 86.
11. Wirtschaftsstab Ost. Vierzehntagesbericht
Wi Stab Ost (3.8.-16.8. 1941), 30 August 1941, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany,
Bestand RW 31/11.
12. Telpuchowski, Die Geschichte
des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges, p. 81 and 82.
13. Aschenauer, Rudolf. Krieg ohne
Grenzen, Leoni, 1982, p. 115.
14. Sanning, Walter N. The
Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry, Torrance, Calif.: 1983, 3rd Chapter.
15. Reichswirtschaftsministerium. Die
UdSSR Anfang 1941, (Date unknown), Federal Archives Koblenz/Germany,
Bestand R 24/817.
16. Telpuchowski, Die Geschichte
des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges, p. 84.
17. Sanning, The Dissolution,
pp. 86-101.
18. Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Chefgruppe
W. Wirtschaftsgrößenordnungen für die besetzten Ostgebiete, 3 March
1943, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/260.
19. Reichsministerium fuer die
besetzten Ostgebiete. Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Chefgruppe Wirtschaft
im Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, 20 November 1944.
Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/260.
20. Telpuchowski, Die Geschichte
des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges, p. 85.
21. Bericht über die Tätigkeit der
Chefgruppe Wirtschaft im Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, 20 November 1944, p. 4.
22. Telpuchowski, Die Geschichte
des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges, p. 78.
23. Wirtschaftsstab Ost. Halbmonatsbericht
Wi Stab Ost (1.-15.10.41), 2 November 1941, Military Archives
Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/310.
24. Memorandum dated 3 October 1941,
titled Die Versorgung der Städte Rußlands im noch unbesetzten Gebiet,
Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/11.
25. Dallin, Alexander. German
Rule in Russia 1941-1945, London: 1957, p. 367.
26. ibid.
27. ibid., p. 368.
28. Perspektiven zur
Verpflegungsversorgung der U.d.S.S.R. im Winterfeldzug 1942/43, (Date unknown), Chef
d.Vers.d.200.Schtz. Div. der 5. Armee, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW
31/23Z.
29. Dallin, German Rule in
Russia, p. 375.
30. Letter from the Reichsminister
fuer die besetzten Ostgebiete dated 5 August 1942 to Ministerialdirektor Riecke
concerning the food supply of the civilian population in the Occupied Eastern
Territories (Versorgung der Zivilbevölkerung in den besetzten Ostgebieten),
Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/310: contains excerpts from
the secret monthly and special reports made by the Economic Staff East, the
German military and the German civilian administration of the RK Ostland and
the RK Ukraine.
31. Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Halbmonatsbericht
Wi Stab Ost (16.-31.10.41), 27 November 1941, Military Archives
Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/68.
32. Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Halbmonatsbericht
Wi Stab Ost (1.-15.11.41), 8 December 1941, Military Archives
Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/68.
33. Letter from the Reichsminister
für die besetzten Ostgebiete dated 5 August 1942 to Ministerialdirektor Riecke.
34. Bericht über die Tätigkeit der
Chefgruppe Wirtschaft im Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, p. 5.
35. ibid.
36. Statistisches Jahrbuch für die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1952 (Statistical Yearbook of the Federal Republic of
Germany), Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, lists the value of production of
industrial countries before the Second World War. Net production reached the
following shares of gross production in the years indicated: U.S.A. (1939) 43%;
United Kingdonl (1935) 42%; Canada (1937) 42%; Norway (1937) 36%; Denmark
(1939) 47%; Finland (1937) 42%; South Africa (1937) 45%.
37. ibid.
38. Klein, Burton H. Germany's
Economic Preparations for War, Cambridge/Mass.: 1959, p. 256. The gross
national product of the German Reich for 1942 and 1943 was given as RM 143 and
RM 160 billion, respectively. Relative to the entire reconstruction assistance
of about RM 3 billion (incl. agricultural aid of RM 445 million) provided to
the Occupied Eastern Territories this amounts to 1%.
39. ibid.
40. Dallin, German Rule in
Russia 1941-1945, p. 375.
41. ibid.
42. Sanning, The Dissolution,
p. 52.
43. ibid., 4, Chapter.
From The Journal of
Historical Review, Spring 1985 (Vol. 6, No. 1), pages 91-116. This paper
was first presented at the Sixth IHR Conference, February 1985, in Anaheim,
California.
About the Author
Walter N. Sanning is the pen
name of a scholar and businessman who was born in 1936 into an ethnic German
family in an area that for decades was a part of the former Soviet Union. After
a childhood in wartime Germany, he migrated in the 1950s to the United States,
where he met his wife. He graduated from a prominent Pacific Northwest
university with a bachelor’s degree (high honors) in business.
With a scholarship, he was a
graduate student at an East Coast Ivy League university, where he concentrated
on international business, finance and economics. He then taught business,
finance and economics at both the undergraduate and graduate levels at a major
West Coast university. The Sanning family moved to Germany in 1970, where he
then worked for years for a major financial institution.
After teaching for some years
at a prominent West Coast University, in the 1970s he went into private
business, and assumed a leading position. He has devoted considerable time and
effort to research in US and German archives. He is married, and speaks English
and German. He and his wife have four children, all of them born in the United
States.
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