Saturday, May 30, 2020
Wednesday, May 27, 2020
Necessary is... a reform of the law. Present law is only the law of the individual. It does not know the protection of the race, the protection of the folk community. Soiling of national honor, of national greatness (was) permitted. Law, which distances itself so much from the concept of the folk community, requires reform.
Speech of April 27, 1923 in Munich
Our legal system must first serve the preservation of this folk- community. The irremovability of the judges on the one side must correspond to an elasticity of judgment for the benefit of society. Not the individual can be the center point of legal concern, rather the folk. Treason against country and treason against folk should in the future be purged with all ruthlessness. The basis for the existence of jurisprudence can be no other than the basis of the existence of the nation.
Speech of March 23, 1933 in Berlin
All great legislative works have the advantage of making use of a certain lapidary brevity. In such cases the legislator has the task to seek out the damaged point on the motor of communal life and there create change. A sharp distinction must thus be made between the law and the temporary execution regulations. The purpose must not only lie at the basis of the law, rather the purpose must also be clearly visible in each line.
Open Letter to Brüning of December 13, 1931
The worth of a law lies neither in the time spent for it nor in the external magnitude, rather exclusively in the final spiritual content. The lightning of a genius has in all times more thoroughly enlightened the world than a thousand smoking pitch-torches of much of the art of decrees and legislation.
Open letter to Brüning of December 13, 1931
We have...begun the struggle for new law. We want to restore trust in our jurisprudence. For this purpose, we set the principle that everybody is equal before the law and before right, and we have hesitated not a second to reach into the Reich Cabinet in order to have an offender punished without consideration of who he was and what he was.
Speech of October 24, 1933 in Berlin
Sunday, May 24, 2020
Revealing the scientific truth about the CoVid-19 Virus and why the crisis is manmade!
Friday, May 22, 2020
Wednesday, May 20, 2020
By Dr. William L. Pierce
I’ve spoken before about the deliberately destructive role of the mass media in American society. I’ve talked about the psychology of liberalism, about what makes liberals do the crazy and destructive things they do. Today, though, instead of talking about the enemies of our society, the enemies of our people, let’s just talk about our people and the sort of society that we need.
You know, a society is a very complex thing: it is like a living organism. It responds to selective environmental forces, and it evolves. In past ages it was the struggle of our people to survive, the competition of our people against other peoples, other races, which determined the nature of our society. Societies which functioned well survived. Societies which didn’t function well perished. Historically, if some crazy liberal came along and were able to change all of the rules and structures in a society to suit some egalitarian fantasy of his, the society would sink like a rock, and its people would perish. And that’s what’s happening to our society today, although it may not be apparent to us because of the time scale. After the experimenters finish their deadly work, it may take a society 200 years to disintegrate completely and sink out of sight. That’s not long from a historical viewpoint, but it’s long enough so that most of the people involved never realize what’s happening to them.
The society we had in Europe up until the end of the 18th century — or one may say, the various national societies there, which really were very much alike when compared with any non-European society — this European society had evolved over a period of many, many generations of our people, and it had fine-tuned itself to our special nature; it had developed its institutions and its ways of doing things which suited us as a people and allowed us to form viable, efficient communities. And when we colonized North America and other parts of the world, we brought the essential elements of our society with us.
The first essential element was order. Everyone had a place in our society, whether he was the village blacksmith or the king, and he knew what that place was. He knew how he fitted in, what his responsibilities were, to whom he owed loyalty and respect, and to whom he in turn was obliged to provide guidance. It was a hierarchical society. There was no pretense that everyone was just as capable or just as creative or just as brave or just as suited for leadership as anyone else. People had social rank and social status and social authority commensurate with their social responsibilities and with their contributions to society.
The second essential feature that our society had was homogeneity. Everyone had the same roots, the same history, the same genes, the same sensibilities. Or at least, there was enough genetic similarity, there was a close enough family relationship among the people, so that people understood each other. A village, a province, a nation was like a large, extended family. People felt a sense of kinship, a sense of belonging, a sense of loyalty and responsibility that extended to the whole society. This feeling of belonging, this sense of a common history and a common destiny, this sense of identity, was the glue that held the society together and gave it its strength. And it gave men and women their individual strength too. Just knowing who they were, where they had been, and where they were going made an enormous difference in their sense of personal security, in their ability to plan ahead and be reasonably confident of what the future held for them.
This homogeneity and the consequent sense of family, of identity, was thousands of years in developing, just like the hierarchical order in our society. And we developed, we evolved, along with our society. The type of society we had become imprinted on our genes. Of course, it wasn’t a perfect society. It was full of problems and imperfections. We always were developing new technologies, for example, and our society didn’t always have time to adjust itself to these innovations before even more innovations came along. But it was a society in which we were strong and confident and more or less spiritually healthy.
You know, the opponents of social order and racial homogeneity will try to confuse the issue by pointing out that we have a longer life span today, that our infant mortality rate is much lower, that we don’t have to work as hard to support ourselves, that we can buy all sorts of shiny gadgets that our ancestors couldn’t, and so on. They want you to believe that these changes came about as benefits of the breakdown of order and the destruction of homogeneity. But they didn’t. They are all the results of technological innovation. Our medical scientists learned how to control the diseases which shortened our lives. Our scientists and engineers learned how we could work more efficiently. And they learned how to make new tools and new toys for us.
Now, to be sure, not all of the degenerative changes in our society which have occurred in the past couple of centuries have been the consequence of the destructive efforts of the Jews and the liberals. The Industrial Revolution really was a huge shock to our traditional form of society. The Industrial Revolution took people off the farms and out of the villages and packed them into factory towns like sardines in a can. This was a great strain on the old order. The new relationship between factory owner and factory workers was not as healthy a one as had existed between landowner and workers on the land, nor was the new, urban life-style as spiritually healthy as the village life-style.
Unrest and revolution were fomented from the latter part of the 18th century and throughout the 19th and 20th centuries: egalitarianism, Communism, democracy, equal rights, no responsibilities, welfare programs, feminism. The old order was drowned in blood. In France the aristocrats and the landowners were butchered in response to the resentments which the liberals had stirred up among the rabble. Later in Russia the same process took place, when the Jewish Bolsheviks finally gained the upper hand and butchered not just the aristocrats, but everyone who had worked a little harder and been a little more successful than the rabble. The kulaks, the small farmers and landowners, were murdered en masse, by the millions, in order to “equalize” Russian society and destroy the last traces of the old, hierarchical order.
And into the social chaos of the 20th century the enemies of our people were able to introduce their idea of racial equality alongside their idea of social equality. We were told that the descendants of our slaves are just as good as we are — maybe better — and so they should become our social equals. We should bring them into our schools and neighborhoods, and we should intermarry with them, and we should buy Food Stamps for them with our taxes, and we should give them preference in hiring and promotions. And we should open our borders to all of the non-White wretched refuse of the Third World’s teeming shores. They also are our equals, we are told. The more diversity the better. Diversity is our strength. Et cetera. Et cetera. Blah, blah, blah.
We were too disoriented and confused by the destruction of our social order to resist this poisonous propaganda. And so here we are at the end of the 20th century. There are some people who will try to convince you that things never have been better. We certainly have more equality and less order, more diversity and less homogeneity than ever before. And that obviously suits some people, in addition to the liberals and the Jews who have been pushing for these changes.
Are these changes better for us?
The suicide statistics, the drug statistics, the crime statistics, the divorce statistics, and the mental illness statistics give us part of the answer. The statistics should help us keep our grip on reality when the Jewish media try to persuade us that we need more of the same poison they have been dishing out for so long: more equality, more chaos, more diversity.
And we should be able to look into our own souls for the rest of the answer. We should know that we need again to have an ordered, structured society, in which we all have a place and will be appreciated according to how effectively we fill that place. We should know that we need again to have a homogeneous society, in which we can feel a sense of belonging. We should know that we need a society in which we have a sense of permanence and stability, not chaos and uncertainty. We should know that we need a society in which everyone strives for quality, not for an imaginary equality. We should know that in order to be spiritually healthy again we need a society in which we can feel a sense of rootedness and responsibility, rather than the aimless, wandering, rootless, cosmopolitan, egoism which characterizes American society today.
If we are honest with ourselves we know that we all crave a healthy society again, we need it. But too many of us have let ourselves be persuaded by the enemies of our people that the type of society we need is no longer attainable. Our enemies tell us, “We have destroyed the order in your society. We have made everyone equal, and you dare not try to take that equality away. That would be like trying to take candy away from a child. We have opened the candy store and told all the children that they can have as much as they want, and it’s all free. They all will fight you if you try to change that, if you try to tell them that they must earn their candy.” And our enemies grin in triumph when they see how that demoralizes and discourages so many of us.
And they tell us, “We have destroyed the homogeneity in your society. We have replaced your homogeneity with diversity. We have brought every non-White type on the face of the earth into your midst, we have brought them in by the millions, and we have forced you to mix with them. Now there’s nothing you can do to restore your homogeneity.” And again they grin and say, “What will you do? Will you try to root out every non-White and every mongrel and send them all away or get rid of them? You don’t have the stomach for that. So you’d better just learn to live with all of these non-Whites and mongrels. Pretty soon you’ll be a minority in your own land.” And they gloat.
And it is true, of course, that many of us do not yet have the stomach to do what must be done. And so the suicide rate and the divorce rate and the abortion rate will keep rising. The government will continue building more prisons. The cults will continue thriving. And the Jews and the liberals will keep telling us how wonderful everything is, how things have never been better, how we should appreciate all of the equality and diversity.
But, you know, all the while the number of us who do have the stomach to do what must be done will be growing. Our numbers are growing, because more and more of our people are coming to understand that the only alternative is death: death for our society, death for our children, death for our kind. What the Jews and liberals have done to our society is lethal. It cannot be sustained.
Order and homogeneity, a sense of identity and belonging, are not just luxuries for us. They are essential. Without them our society sickens and dies. The liberals may not be able to understands that, and the Jews, with their media propaganda, try to keep the rest of us from understanding it, but we can see the proof of it all around us. And we are determined to do whatever we must do to have once again a society for our own kind, a society to which we can really belong and feel a sense of responsibility to, a society in which we have a place and are appreciated if we fill that place well, a society based on order and quality and structure and commonality. We will have it. We will do what is necessary.
From Free Speech, May 1997, Volume III, Number 5
Sunday, May 17, 2020
Here is a newly uploaded interview (given in 2009) by British „Real History“ Historian, David Irving. The interview itself is an unedited, uncut „privately filmed interview” lasting over 2 hours, and entitled, „Talking Frankly”. This interview was only, until now, available on DVD. It was filmed in April 2009.
NOTE: About 4 seconds are cut off right at the end of the interview. The end of his sentence, and the talk, is „… to try and find the answers. Thank you for listening.”
The blurb on the DVD jacket states:
In April 2009 David Irving sat for a privately filmed interview lasting many hours, designed to become the basis of a major documentary on his life and his often controversial opinions on history. Eventually the film will be released with full documentation, newsreel inserts, and all the other paraphernalia and embellishments of film history. What we have here however is film in the raw, uncut and unedited, ready for the producer’s knife and the editor’s brush and palette.
In the first part of this film, the writer talks about the England he comes from, the way in which he formed his beliefs, and how he became one for the world’s bestselling historians - through perseverance with sources, and fair play towards defeated enemies. The story takes a sinister turn, as he relates how the traditional enemies of free speech mounted a global vendetta to silence him around the world - but failed.
In the second part, the writer talks about the controversy surrounding what has, since the 1970s, become known as the Holocaust, and what historians should make of it. he will enrage both friend and foe in this two-hour unvarnished talk; but they may find it hard to fault his arguments.
And on Irving’s website, Jaenelle writes:
As the description says, this DVD is completely unedited. Mr Irving really is „talking frankly“. The first part of the DVD is about his life and career and the second part addresses a lot of FAQ about the holocaust. Fans of David Irving, particularly those who don’t have an opportunity to attend his talks in person, will enjoy this DVD about their favourite author and historian.
It is actually a very interesting and entertaining interview. Most notable I thought was he comments, as someone else as stated, that the ‘death toll in the Rheinhardt camps to around 2 million’, that he claims, ‘that limited gassings took place at Auschwitz in „the red room“ and „the white room“ (the „red” and „blue” houses, or „bunker 1” and „bunker 2.”) out back when jews that were too old or couldn’t work arrived’, and that ‘this comes from the personal papers of Auschwitz Deputy Kommadant Hans Aumeier which he found back in 1992.’
Thursday, May 14, 2020
Tuesday, May 12, 2020
By John Wear
The Treaty of Versailles is sometimes said to have been the beginning of World War II. The Versailles Treaty crushed Germany beneath a burden of shame and reparations, stole vital German territories, and rendered Germany defenseless against enemies from within and without. Britain’s David Lloyd George warned the treaty makers at Versailles: “If peace is made under these conditions, it will be the source of a new war.”
Unfairness of the Versailles Treaty
In an address to Congress on January 8, 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson set forth his Fourteen Points as a blueprint to peacefully end World War I. The main principles of Wilson’s Fourteen Points were a non-vindictive peace, national self-determination, government by the consent of the governed, an end to secret treaties, and an association of nations strong enough to check aggression and keep the peace in the future. Germany decided to end World War I by signing an armistice agreement on November 11, 1918, which bound the Allies to make the final peace treaty conform to Wilson’s Fourteen Points.
The Treaty of Versailles presented to German officials, however, was a deliberate violation of the armistice agreement. The Allied representatives at Versailles decided that Germany should lose all of her colonies. All private property of German citizens in German colonies was also forfeited. Even worse, the Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to cede 73,485 square kilometers of her territory in Europe, inhabited by 7,325,000 people, to neighboring states. Germany lost 75% of her production of zinc ore, 74.8% of iron ore, 7.7% of lead ore, 28.7% of coal, and 4% of potash. Of her annual agricultural production, Germany lost 19.7% in potatoes, 18.2% in rye, 17.2% in barley, 12.6% in wheat, and 9.6% in oats. The Saar and other regions to the west of the Rhine were occupied by foreign troops and were to remain occupied for 15 years until a plebiscite was held. Germany had to pay the total costs of 3.64 billion gold marks to fund the Allied occupation of the Saar.
Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles placed upon Germany the sole responsibility “for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.” This so-called “war-guilt clause” was fundamentally unfair and aroused deep resentment among virtually all Germans. It linked Germany’s obligations to pay reparations with a blanket self-condemnation to which almost no German could subscribe.
The Allies under the Versailles Treaty could set reparations at any amount they wanted. In 1920, the Allies set the final bill for reparations at the impossible sum of 269 billion gold marks. The Allied Reparations Committee in 1921 lowered the amount of reparations to 132 billion gold marks, or approximately $33 billion – still an unrealistic demand.
The Versailles Treaty also forced Germany to disarm almost completely. The treaty abolished the general draft, prohibited all artillery and tanks, allowed a volunteer army of only 100,000 troops and officers, and abolished the air force. The navy was reduced to six capital ships, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, 15,000 men and 500 officers. After the delivery of its remaining navy to the Allies, Germany also had to hand over its merchant ships to the victors with only a few exceptions. All German rivers had to be internationalized and overseas cables ceded to the victors. An international committee oversaw the process of Germany’s disarmament until 1927.
Germany eventually signed the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, because she faced death by starvation and invasion if she refused to sign the treaty. Germany could not feed her people because U.S. warships supported an Allied naval blockade against Germany, and Germany’s merchant ships and even Baltic fishing boats were sequestered. Germany’s request to buy 2.5 million tons of food was also denied by the Allies. With German families starving, Bolshevik uprisings occurring in several German cities, Trotsky’s Red Army driving into Europe, Czechs and Poles ready to strike from the east, and Allied forces prepared to march on Berlin, Germany was forced to sign the treaty.
Despite the unfairness of the Treaty of Versailles, its provisions remained in effect and were formally confirmed by the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928. Germans regarded the provisions of the Versailles Treaty as chains of slavery that had to be broken. One German commented in regard to the Versailles Treaty, “The will to break the chains of slavery will be implanted from childhood on.” Adolf Hitler referred to the Versailles Treaty in Mein Kampf as “…a scandal and a disgrace…the dictate signified an act of highway robbery against our people.” Hitler was committed to breaking the chains of Versailles when he came to power in Germany in 1933.
Initial Steps to Break the Chains of Versailles
Hitler’s first success in breaking the chains of Versailles was a legal victory in the Saar plebiscite on January 13, 1935. This highly industrialized region had been detached from Germany and placed under the administration of the League of Nations by the Treaty of Versailles. The terms of the Versailles Treaty called for a plebiscite after 15 years with three choices: return to Germany, annexation by France, or continuation of League of Nations rule. In an unquestionably free election, the vote was 477,119 in favor of union with Germany and only 46,613 in favor of the continuance of the existing regime. Despite offering the Saar citizens a number of tax and customs advantages if they decided to become part of France, only 0.40% of voters voted to join France; 8.85% voted for independence of the Saar, and 90.75% voted for union with Germany.
The Saar inhabitants, who voted overwhelmingly to return to Germany were mostly industrial workers – Social Democrats or Roman Catholics. They knew what awaited them in Germany: a dictatorship, the destruction of trade unions, and restrictions on freedom of expression. They knew of the establishment of the Dachau Prison Camp and the execution of scores of SA members in the Röhm purge on June 30, 1934. The German economy in January 1935 was also not substantially better than that of France or other countries in Europe. The Saar election was evidence that the appeal of German nationalism was powerful.
Hitler began an assault on the Versailles provisions with the creation of a German air force on March 9, 1935. On March 16, 1935, Hitler announced the restoration of compulsory military service. Germany regarded the army of the Soviet Union at 960,000 men as excessively large, and France had recently increased the terms of service in her armies. Hitler wanted to increase German military strength to 550,000 troops because of this Franco-Russian threat.
Germany continued to modify the Versailles provisions by signing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement on June 18, 1935. This treaty fixed the size of the German fleet at 35% of the total tonnage of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Germany could also build a submarine force equal to that of Great Britain. Hitler was elated with this agreement. Hitler had dreamed of an Anglo-German alliance ever since he had fought Britain in World War I. Britain’s naval treaty with Germany also effectively undermined the Stresa Front that Britain had established with France and Italy earlier in 1935.
Germany was forbidden under the Treaty of Versailles to build fortifications or maintain troops in a wide demilitarized zone along its western frontier. This arrangement made the vital Ruhr and Rhineland industrial areas vulnerable to a swift attack from France. The Treaty of Locarno, of which Britain and Italy were co-guarantors, also endorsed the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Hitler challenged this limitation when he sent troops into the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. Although this was a major gamble by Hitler, France was unwilling to challenge Hitler without British support. Britain was unwilling to authorize anything resembling war because there was a general feeling in Britain that Germany was only asserting a right of sovereignty within her own borders.
Germany was now able to protect her western borders by constructing the Siegfried Line. Lloyd George, the former prime minister of Great Britain, commended Hitler in the House of Commons for having reoccupied the Rhineland to protect his country:
France had built the most gigantic fortifications ever seen in any land, where, almost a hundred feet underground you can keep an army of over 100,000 and where you have guns that can fire straight into Germany. Yet the Germans are supposed to remain without even a garrison, without a trench…If Herr Hitler had allowed that to go on without protecting his country, he would have been a traitor to the Fatherland.
On later meeting Hitler, Lloyd George was “spellbound by Hitler’s astonishing personality and manner” and referred to Hitler as “indeed a great man. Führer is the proper name for him, for he is a born leader – yes, a statesman.”
Other British statesmen were also impressed with Hitler. In a book published in 1937, Winston Churchill expressed his “admiration for the courage, the perseverance, and the vital force which enabled [Hitler] to challenge, defy, conciliate, or overcome, all the authorities or resistances which barred his path.” Hitler and his Nazis had shown “their patriotic ardor and love of country.”
Churchill also wrote: “Those who have met Herr Hitler face to face have found a highly competent, cool, well-informed functionary with an agreeable manner, a disarming smile, and few have been unaffected by a subtle personal magnetism. Nor is this impression merely the dazzle of power. He exerted it on his companions at every stage in his struggle, even when his fortunes were in the lowest depths.”
By March 1936 Germany had taken important steps in overcoming the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Hitler made no more moves in Europe for the next two years. Until 1938, Hitler’s foreign policy moves had been bold but not reckless. From the point of view of the Western Powers, his methods constituted unconventional diplomacy whose aims were recognizably in accord with traditional German nationalist clamor.
The victors at the Paris Peace Conference had wanted to divide rather than unify Austria and Germany. Austria had asked Allied permission at the Paris Peace Conference to enter into a free-trade zone with Germany. Austria’s request was denied. As far back as April and May of 1921, plebiscites on a union with Germany were held in Austria at the Tyrol and at Salzburg. The votes in the Tyrol were over 140,000 for the Anschluss and only 1,794 against. In Salzburg, more than 100,000 voted for union with Germany and only 800 against. Despite the overwhelming desire of Austrians to join with Germany, the Treaty of St. Germain signed by Austria after World War I prevented the union.
Under the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, Germany and Austria could not even enter into a customs union without permission from the League of Nations. In 1931, hard-hit by the Great Depression, Germany asked again for permission to form an Austro-German customs union. The League of Nations denied Germany’s request. Germany later requested an end to its obligation to pay war reparations under Versailles because of Germany’s economic crisis caused by the Great Depression. Germany’s request was again refused. Many historians believe the resulting economic distress contributed to the rapid rise of National Socialists to power in Germany. The Allied refusals also frustrated the desire of German and Austrian nationalists to exercise their right of self-determination.
Edward Frederick Lindley Wood (Lord Halifax) gave Hitler encouragement to peacefully incorporate Austria into Germany at Berchtesgaden on November 19, 1937. Lord Halifax brought up the important questions of Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia on his own initiative without any prompting from Hitler. Halifax told Hitler that Great Britain realized that the Paris Treaties of 1919 contained mistakes that had to be rectified. Halifax stated that Britain would not go to war to prevent an Anschluss with Austria, a transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, or a return of Danzig to the Reich. Britain might even be willing to serve as an honest broker in effecting the return of what rightfully belonged to Germany, if this was all done in a gentlemanly fashion.
British historian A. J. P. Taylor wrote:
This was exactly what Hitler wanted... Halifax’s remarks, if they had any practical sense, were an invitation to Hitler to promote German nationalist agitation in Danzig, Czechoslovakia, and Austria; an assurance also that his agitation would not be opposed from without. Nor did these promptings come from Halifax alone. In London, Eden told Ribbentrop: “People in Europe recognized that a closer connection between Germany and Austria would have to come about sometime.” The same news came from France. Papen, on a visit to Paris, “was amazed to note” that Chautemps, the premier, and Bonnet, then finance minister, “considered a reorientation of French policy in Central Europe as entirely open to discussion…” They had “no objection to a marked extension of German influence in Austria obtained through evolutionary means”; nor in Czechoslovakia “on the basis of a reorganization into a nation of nationalities.”
Lord Halifax’s message to Hitler underscores a crucial point in the history of this era: Hitler’s agenda was no surprise to European diplomats. Any German nationalist would demand adjustments to the frontiers laid down at Versailles. With Great Britain’s approval of the peaceful annexation of Austria into Germany, the problem was how to get the Austrians to peacefully agree to unification with Germany. Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg would soon force the issue.
Since the summer of 1934, Austria had been governed by a conservative dictatorship headed by Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg. Schuschnigg persecuted Austrians who favored unification with Germany. Political dissidents landed in concentration camps, and the regime denied persons of “deficient civic reliability” the right to practice their occupation.
In January 1938, Austrian police discovered plans of some Austrian National Socialists to overthrow Schuschnigg in violation of a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” entered into with Germany on July 11, 1936. Schuschnigg met with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938, complaining of the attempted overthrow of his government by Austrian National Socialists. Hitler and Schuschnigg reached an agreement that day, but Schuschnigg claimed that Hitler had been violent in manner during the first two hours of conversation. Some accounts of their meeting say that Schuschnigg was bullied by Hitler and subjected to a long list of indignities.
Schuschnigg began to consider means of repudiating the agreement made with Hitler in their meeting of February 12, 1938. Schuschnigg’s solution was to hold a rigged plebiscite. On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that a plebiscite would be held four days later on March 13, 1938, to decide, finally and forever, whether Austria was to remain an independent nation.
The planned plebiscite was completely unfair. There was only one question, which asked the voter, “Are you for a free and German, independent and social, Christian and united Austria, for peace and work, for the equality of all those who affirm themselves for the people and the Fatherland?” There were no voting lists; only yes ballots were to be provided by the government; anyone wishing to vote no had to provide their own ballot, the same size as the yes ballots, with nothing on it but the word no. During preparations for the election, the government press in Austria announced that anyone voting “no” would be guilty of treason.
The Austrian government took additional steps to ensure that the vote would swing in their direction. The qualification age to vote was raised to 24, making it impossible for young National Socialists to register their views. Schuschnigg and his men also distributed a huge number of flyers, scattering some by aircraft in Austria’s most-remote and -snowbound corners. Trucks drove around the country transmitting the message of Austrian independence by loudspeaker. Everywhere the “German” theme was driven home: Being Austrian was being a good German; being “German” was to be free [of National-Socialist Germany]. Austrians were better “Germans” than the National Socialists.
Hitler was alarmed by Schuschnigg’s proposed plebiscite. Hitler had hoped for an evolutionary strategy in Austria that would gradually merge Austria into the Reich. However, Hitler felt humiliated and betrayed by Schuschnigg, and he could not let the phony plebiscite proceed. After receiving word on March 11, 1938 that Mussolini accepted the Anschluss, Hitler decided to march into Austria with his troops on March 12, 1938. Hitler was greeted with a joyously enthusiastic reception from the masses of the Austrian people. Not a shot was fired by Hitler’s army.
Hitler was aware of the bad publicity abroad such an apparent act of force would generate. He had hoped to assimilate Austria in an obviously legal manner. However, Schuschnigg and his entire cabinet had resigned from office after Britain, France and Italy all denounced the phony plebiscite. Hitler feared that Austrian Marxists might take advantage of Austria’s momentary political vacuum and stage an uprising. Göring also warned of the possibility that Austria’s neighbors might exploit its temporary weakness by occupying Austrian territory. Hitler decided to militarily occupy Austria to prevent either of these possibilities from occurring.
On April 10, 1938, joint plebiscites were held in Germany and Austria to approve the Anschluss. All Germans and Austrians over the age of 20 were eligible to vote, with the exception of Jews and criminals. The result of the plebiscites was 99.08% of the people in Germany were in favor of the Anschluss, while 99.73% of Austrians were for the Anschluss. The plebiscites might have been manipulated to some extent as shown by the near-unanimous assent from the Dachau Prison Camp. Also, the ballot was not anonymous since the voter’s name and address were printed on the back of each ballot. However, there is no question that the vast majority of people in Germany and Austria approved the Anschluss. Hitler’s aims had struck a chord with national German aspirations, and the plebiscite reflected Hitler’s popularity with the German people.
The invasion of Austria had hurt Germany’s public image. British historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote:
Hitler had won. He had achieved the first object of his ambition. Yet not in the way that he had intended. He had planned to absorb Austria imperceptibly, so that no one could tell when it had ceased to be independent; he would use democratic methods to destroy Austrian independence as he had done to destroy German democracy. Instead he had been driven to call in the German army. For the first time, he lost the asset of aggrieved morality and appeared as a conqueror, relying on force. The belief soon became established that Hitler’s seizure of Austria was a deliberate plot, devised long in advance, and the first step towards the domination of Europe. This belief was a myth. The crisis of March 1938 was provoked by Schuschnigg, not by Hitler. There had been no German preparations, military or diplomatic. Everything was improvised in a couple of days – policy, promises, armed force…But the effects could not be undone…The uneasy balance tilted, though only slightly, away from peace and towards war. Hitler’s aims might still appear justifiable; his methods were condemned. By the Anschluss – or rather by the way in which it was accomplished – Hitler took the first step in the policy which was to brand him as the greatest of war criminals. Yet he took this step unintentionally. Indeed, he did not know that he had taken it.
Winston Churchill made the following statement in the House of Commons shortly after the Anschluss:
The public mind has been concentrated upon the moral and sentimental aspects of the Nazi conquest of Austria – a small country brutally struck down, its Government scattered to the winds, the oppression of the Nazi party doctrine imposed upon a Catholic population and upon the working-classes of Austria and Vienna, the hard ill-usage of persecution which indeed will ensue – which is probably in progress at the moment – of those who, this time last week, were exercising their undoubted political rights, discharging their duties to their own country.…
Churchill’s statement is a lie. The overwhelming majority of Austrians had desired a union with Germany. The Anschluss was hugely popular in Austria. Churchill in his speech had begun the warmongering that led to World War II.
The Czechoslovakia Crisis
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, 3.25 million German inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia were transferred to the new Czechoslovakia in a flagrant disregard of Woodrow Wilson’s ideal of self-determination. The new Czechoslovakia was a multiethnic, multilingual, Catholic-Protestant conglomerate that had never existed before as a sovereign nation. From 1920 to 1938, repeated petitions had been sent to the League of Nations by the repressed minorities of Czechoslovakia. By 1938, the Sudeten Germans were eager to be rid of Czech rule and become part of Germany. In a fair plebiscite, a minimum of 80% of Sudeten Germans would have voted for the territories they lived in to become part of the new Reich.
It was clear to Czech leaders that the excitement among the Sudeten Germans after the Anschluss would soon force the resolution of the Sudeten question. The Czech cabinet and military leaders decided on May 20, 1938 to order a partial mobilization of the Czech armed forces. This partial mobilization was based on the false accusation that German troops were concentrating on the Czech frontiers. Czech leaders hoped that the resulting confusion would commit the British and French to support the Czech position before a policy favoring concessions to the Sudeten Germans could be implemented. Although the plot failed, Czech leaders granted interviews in which they claimed that Czechoslovakia had scored a great victory over Germany. An international press campaign representing that Czechoslovakia had forced Hitler to back down from his planned aggression reverberated around the world.
British Ambassador to Germany Nevile Henderson believed that the Czech mobilization of its army, and the ridicule heaped upon Hitler by the world press, led directly to the Munich Agreement:
The defiant gesture of the Czechs in mobilizing some 170,000 troops and then proclaiming to the world that it was their action which had turned Hitler away from his purpose was… regrettable. But what Hitler could not stomach was the exultation of the press…Every newspaper in America and Europe joined in the chorus. “No” had been said and Hitler had been forced to yield. The democratic powers had brought the totalitarian states to heel, etc.
It was, above all, this jubilation which gave Hitler the excuse for his…worst brain storm of the year, and pushed him definitely over the border line from peaceful negotiation to the use of force. From May 23rd to May 28th his fit of sulks and fury lasted, and on the later date he gave orders for a gradual mobilization of the Army, which should be prepared for all eventualities in the autumn.
By the 1930s, the majority of the British people believed that Germany had been wronged at Versailles. The British people now broadly supported the appeasement of Germany in regaining her lost territories. If appeasement meant granting self-determination to the Sudetenland Germans, the British people approved.
Lord Halifax informed French leaders on July 20, 1938 that a special fact-finding mission under Lord Runciman would be sent to Czechoslovakia. President Beneš of Czechoslovakia was disturbed by this news. It was a definite indication that the British might adopt a compromising policy toward Germany in the crisis. The British mission completed its study in September 1938, and it reported that the main difficulty in the Sudeten area had been the disinclination of the Czechs to grant reforms. This British report was accompanied by the final rupture of negotiations between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech leaders. The Czech crisis was coming to a climax.
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew to Hitler’s mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden to discuss the Czech problem directly with Hitler. At their meeting Hitler consented to refrain from military action while Chamberlain would discuss with his cabinet the means of applying the principle of self-determination to the Sudeten Germans. The result was a decision to transfer to Germany areas in which the Sudeten Germans constituted more than 50% of the population. President Beneš of Czechoslovakia reluctantly accepted this proposal.
A problem developed in the negotiations when Chamberlain met with Hitler a second time. Hitler insisted on an immediate German military occupation of regions where the Sudeten Germans were more than half of the population. Hitler also insisted that the claims of the Polish and Hungarian minorities be satisfied before participating in the proposed international guarantee of the new Czechoslovakian frontier. Several days of extreme tension followed. Chamberlain announced on September 28, 1938 to the House of Commons that Hitler had invited him, together with Daladier and Mussolini, to a conference in Munich the following afternoon. The House erupted in an outburst of tremendous enthusiasm.
The parties signed the Munich Agreement in the early hours of September 30, 1938. Hitler got substantially everything he wanted. The territories populated by the Sudeten Germans had become a part of Germany. Chamberlain and Hitler signed a joint declaration that the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-German naval accord symbolized “the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with each other again.” Chamberlain told the cheering crowd in London that welcomed him home, “I believe it is peace in our time.” War had been averted in Europe. The chains of Versailles had been completely broken.
The British war enthusiasts lost no time in launching their effort to spoil the celebration of the Munich Agreement. On October 1, 1938, First Lord of the Admiralty Alfred Duff Cooper announced that he was resigning from the British cabinet. In a speech delivered on October 3, 1938, Duff Cooper criticized the British government for not assuming a definite commitment during the Czech crisis. He asserted that Great Britain would not have been fighting for the Czechs, but rather for the balance of power, which was precious to many British hearts. Duff Cooper believed that it was his mission and that of his country to prevent Germany from achieving a dominant position on the continent.
Clement Attlee, the new Labor Party leader, spoke of the Munich Agreement as a huge victory for Hitler and an “annihilating defeat for democracy.” Attlee in his speech included the Soviet Union as a democracy. Anthony Eden gave a speech in which he criticized Chamberlain on detailed points, and expressed doubt that Britain would fulfill her promised guarantee to the Czech state. Eden advised the House to regard the current situation as a mere pause before the next crisis. He claimed that the British armament campaign was proceeding too slowly.
In his speech on October 5, 1938, Winston Churchill stated that Hitler had extracted British concessions at pistol point, and he loved to use the image of Hitler as a gangster. Churchill used flowery rhetoric and elegant phrases to describe the allegedly mournful Czechs slipping away into darkness. Churchill wanted to convince his countrymen that National-Socialist Germany was seized of an insatiable desire for world conquest. The simple and stark purpose of Churchill’s speech was to convince the British people to eventually accept a war of annihilation against Germany. Churchill was a useful instrument in building up British prejudice against Germany.
The debate on the Munich Agreement surpassed all other parliamentary debates on British foreign policy since World War I. Other Conservatives who refused to accept the Munich Agreement included Harold Macmillan, Duncan Sandys, Leopold Amery, Harold Nicolson, Roger Keyes, Sidney Herbert, and Gen. Edward Spears. These men were joined by a score of lesser figures in the House of Commons, and they were supported by such prominent people as Lord Cranborne and Lord Wolmer in the House of Lords. Chamberlain won the vote of confidence, but he did not possess the confidence of the British Conservative Party.
The warmongering that led to World War II was increasing in Great Britain. Hitler was dismayed at the steady stream of hate propaganda directed at Germany. In a speech given in Saarbrücken on October 9, 1938, Hitler said: “…All it would take would be for Mr. Duff Cooper or Mr. Eden or Mr. Churchill to come to power in England instead of Chamberlain, and we know very well that it would be the goal of these men to immediately start a new world war. They do not even try to disguise their intents; they state them openly.”
 Degrelle, Leon, Hitler: Born at Versailles, Torrance, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1992, Author’s Preface, p. x.
 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 13-15, 20-22.
 Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 86-87.
 Franz-Willing, Georg, “The Origins of the Second World War,” The Journal of Historical Review, Torrance, Cal.: Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1986, p. 103.
 Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 81, 84.
 Franz-Willing, Georg, “The Origins of the Second World War,” The Journal of Historical Review, Torrance, Cal.: Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1986, p. 103.
 Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, New York: E. P. Dutton, 1980, pp. 215-216.
 Luckau, Alma, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. 98-100.
 Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, translated by James Murphy, London: Hurst and Blackett Ltd., 1942, p. 260.
 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 45.
 Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 118.
 Bochaca, Joaquin, “Reversing Versailles,” The Barnes Review, Nov. /Dec. 2012, Vol. XVIII, No. 6, p. 61.
 Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, p. 86.
 Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 119.
 Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 145-147.
 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 46.
 Rowland, Peter, David Lloyd George: A Biography, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, p. 728.
 Ibid., p. 733.
 Churchill, Winston, Great Contemporaries, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1937, p. 228.
 Ibid., p. 232.
 Kershaw, Ian, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis, New York: W. W. Norton, 2000, p. 91.
 Neilson, Francis, The Makers of War, New Orleans, La.: Flanders Hall Publishers, 1950, p. 171.
 Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 183-184.
 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 76.
 Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 183-187.
 Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, pp. 137-138.
 Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 188-189.
 Tedor, Richard, Hitler’s Revolution, Chicago: 2013, p. 98.
 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 91.
 Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 141.
 Quigley, Carroll, Tragedy and Hope, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966, p. 624.
 Tedor, Richard, Hitler’s Revolution, Chicago: 2013, p. 102.
 MacDonogh, Giles, Hitler’s Gamble, New York: Basic Books, 2009, p. 35.
 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 93.
 Tedor, Richard, Hitler’s Revolution, Chicago: 2013, p. 104.
 Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, 1939 – The War That Had Many Fathers, 6th edition, Munich, Germany: Olzog Verlag GmbH, 2011, p. 150.
 MacDonogh, Giles, Hitler’s Gamble, New York: Basic Books, 2009, pp. 104-106.
 Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, pp. 149-150.
 Neilson, Francis, The Makers of War, New Orleans, La.: Flanders Hall Publishers, 1950, pp. 176-177.
 Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 213-215.
 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, pp. 106-107.
 Henderson, Sir Nevile, Failure of a Mission, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940, pp. 142-143.
 Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, pp. 213-227.
 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 108.
 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 53-54.
 Ibid., p. 54.
 Ibid., p. 55.
 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, pp. 180-181.
 Ibid., p. 188.
 Ibid., p. 190.
 Ibid., p. 191.
 Bradberry, Benton L., The Myth of German Villainy, Bloomington, Ind.: Author House, 2012, p. 324.